monitoring suspected drug trafficking. The Commander in Chief (CINC), NORAD conducts this mission in coordination with other supported and supporting CINCS (including the JTFs) and agencies as part of their normal peacetime air sovereignty mission. 46 DPS FBT By sesorandum dated Pabruary 4, 1994, Charles R. Thomson, REASON 1: REASON 2: REASON 3: REASON : Committing a Gross Error in Judgment in Making Palse Statements in the Course of a Making Inconsistent and Kisleading Use of Poor Judgment in Making Alterations This is the final decision on that proposed action. In Charles D. Sarabyn Assistant Special Agent in Charge also known as David Koresh, dated September 1993, as well as certain documentation assembled by the Treasury Waco Review Tean and relied on by them in preparing their report;' the notice of proposed removal; your written reply dated March 22, 1994; your oral reply, which you presented to se on March 24, 1994; and your written comments on the official Summary of your oral reply, dated April 14, 1994. Based on all of this information, I find the following: Reason i is sustained, Reason 2 is sustained, Reason 3 is sustained, and Reason 4 is sustained. My decision is discussed specifically below. I will not restate all of the specific details of your actions which led Mr. Thomson to propose that you be removed, as those details are fully presented in the proposal notice. REASON 1: Committing a Gross Error in Judgment in Information that the Raid had been Compromised— I have fully considered the evidence relied upon by the proposing official and your oral and written replies. I find that the facts and reasoning outlined in the notice of proposed removal are fully supported by the evidence. Your arguments and supplemental documentation submitted in response to the proposal fail to dissuade me that your recommendation to the incident commander that the raid proceed represents a gross error in judgment, given the information you had before you at the time, and given the instructions you had from Headquarters. As ASAC of the Houston Field Division, you participated in the final development of the tactical plan for the raid on the Branch Davidian Compound and in the presentation of that plan to Headquarters. You and SAC Chojnacki vere the two individuals with ultimate responsibility for coordinating 1 You have raised several general objections to the body of evidence relied upon. I have considered your arguments and I do not find anything improper in the process by which these charges have been proposed and considered and I do not find that you have been in any way disadvantaged in your ability to respond to the charges. Charles D. Sarabyn Assistant Special Agent in Charge In I the preparation for and execution of the planned operation. I find disingenuous your assertions in reply to your proposed removal that surprise and the sen vorking outside in the pit were not, in fact, key elements of the plan. as astounded by your suggestion that surprise is not an essential factor in executing a raid of this nature. support of this premise you assert that the raid was going to be a "dynamic entry, not a dynamic/surprise_entry. you then proceed to define "dynamic entry" as "a sudden, vigorous and maxnacted entry.' Reply at-1 (emphasis added). Yet Your efforts at obfuscation also fail with respect to the importance of the sen vorking in the pit. In your explanation of the plan to Beadquarters, you emphasized the importance of the san vorking in the pit as a significant factor, in particular in response to questions concerning hov ATT could safely execute the raid at 10 a.a. You admit in your reply that to serve the varrants safely, the guns had to be separated from the Branch Davidians vào vere capable of using them against the agents. You admit that surprise as to timing of the raid and activity in the pit vere means of ensuring that the guns vere kept separate. You imply that there were other means, but you suggest none. Indeed, no other means vere part of the plan or appear to have been reasonably contemplated. In light of this, if, you assert, by the time of the raid, you and others involved in the raid knew that in all likelihood the sen vould not vorking in the pit, I am only further convinced of your gross inability to make the types of judgments critical to the position of a special agent and to the role you were assigned with respect to this operation. I am convinced, that at the time you recommended proceeding with the raid, you know that Koresh knew that ATP and the National Guard vere coming. Your statements at the staging area confira as much. Despite your suggestions that surprise vas not a key element to the plan, you seek in your reply to persuade me that you did not know at the time that surprise vas in fact lost because you did not know that Koresh knew the raid vas imminent. Your assertions in reply are but additional variations of the several inconsistent statements you have made in the past about what you knew at the time. Nevertheless, in your written reply you admit that you understood Koresh's statement to be different than his usual statements about AT? because of his reference to the National Guard. You further acknowledge that Rodrigues told you that Koresh vas nervous and agitated. You also |