2 HIPPODAMUS-HIS CONSTITUTION AND LAWS. 47 aspiring to be an adept in the knowledge of nature, was II. 8. fold divi the land, laws. The city of Hippodamus was composed of 10,000 His threecitizens divided into three parts,—one of artisans, one of sion of the husbandmen, and a third of armed defenders of the citizens, of 3 state. He also divided the land into three parts, one sacred, one public, the third private:-the first was set apart to maintain the customary worship of the gods, the second was to support the warriors, the third was the 4 property of the husbandmen. He also divided his laws and of the into three classes, and no more, for he maintained that there are three subjects of lawsuits,-insult, injury, and homicide. He likewise instituted a single final court of Court of appeal. appeal, to which all causes seeming to have been improperly decided might be referred; this court he formed of elders chosen for the purpose. He was further of Verdicts opinion that the decisions of the courts ought not to be limited to a given by the use of a voting pebble, but that every one simple should have a tablet on which he might not only write a 'not guilty.' simple condemnation, or leave the tablet blank for a simple acquittal; but, if he partly acquitted and partly condemned, he was to distinguish accordingly. To the existing law he objected that it obliged the judges to be 1268 a. 5 not to be 'guilty' or inventions. tenance of citizens slain in 6 guilty of perjury, whichever way they voted. He also Rewards for enacted that those who discovered anything for the good of the state should be rewarded; and he provided that Mainthe children of citizens who died in battle should be children of maintained at the public expense, as if such an enactment had never been heard of before, yet it actually exists battle. 7 at Athens and in other places. As to the magistrates, Magishe would have them all elected by the people, that is, to be by the three classes already mentioned, and those who elected : were elected were to watch over the interests of the public, of strangers, and of orphans. These are the most striking points in the constitution of Hippodamus. There is not much else. * Cp. Thục. ii. c. 46. trates, how II. 8. fold division of the citizens The first of these proposals to which objection may (1) Three be taken, is the threefold division of the citizens. The 8 artisans, and the husbandmen, and the warriors, all criticised. have a share in the government. But the husbandmen have no arms, and the artisans neither arms nor land, and therefore they become all but slaves of the warrior class. That they should share in all the offices is an im- 9 possibility; for generals and guardians of the citizens, and nearly all the principal magistrates, must be taken from the class of those who carry arms. Yet, if the two other classes have no share in the government, how can they be loyal citizens? It may be said that those who have arms must necessarily be masters of both the other classes, but this is not so easily accomplished unless they are numerous; and if they are, why should the 10 other classes share in the government at all, or have power to appoint magistrates? Artisans there must be, for these are wanted in every city, and they can live by their craft, as elsewhere; and the husbandmen, too, if they really provided the warriors with food, might fairly have a share in the government. But in the republic of Hippodamus they are supposed to have land of their own, which they cultivate for their private benefit. Again, as 11 to this common land out of which the soldiers are maintained, if they are themselves to be the cultivators of it, the warrior class will be identical with the husbandmen, although the legislator intended to make a distinction between them. If, again, there are to be other cultivators distinct both from the husbandmen, who have land of their own, and from the warriors, they will make a fourth class, which has no place in the state and no share in anything. Or, if the same persons are to cul- 12 tivate their own lands and those of the public as well, they will have a difficulty in supplying the quantity of produce which will maintain two households: and why, 1268 b. in this case, should there be any division, for they might find food themselves and give to the warriors from the same lots? There is surely a great confusion in all this. 13. COURTS OF LAW: INVENTIONS. 49 demned. Neither is the law to be commended which says that II. 8. the judges, when a simple issue is laid before them, (2) Proposed should distinguish in their judgment; for the judge is verdict in thus converted into an arbitrator. Now, in an arbitra- detail contion, although the arbitrators are many, they confer with one another about the decision, and therefore they can distinguish; but in courts of law this is impossible, and, indeed, most legislators take pains to prevent the judges from holding any communication with one another. 14 Again, will there not be confusion if the judge thinks that damages should be given, but not so much as the suitor demands? He asks, say, for twenty minae, and the judge allows him ten minae, or one judge more and another less; one five, another four minae. In this way they will go on apportioning the damages, and some will grant 15 the whole and others nothing: how is the final reckoning to be taken? Again, no one who votes for a simple acquittal or condemnation is compelled to perjure himself, if the indictment is quite simple and in right form; for the judge who acquits does not decide that the defendant owes nothing, but that he does not owe the twenty minae. He only is guilty of perjury who thinks that the defendant ought not to pay twenty minae, and yet condemns him. 17 reward informa 16 To reward those who discover anything which is useful (3) To to the state is a proposal which has a specious sound, political but cannot safely be enacted by law, for it may encourage tion informers, and perhaps even lead to political commotions. dangerous. This question involves another. It has been doubted whether it is or is not expedient to make any changes in the laws of a country, even if another law be better. Now, if all changes are inexpedient, we can hardly assent to the proposal of Hippodamus; for, under pretence of doing a public service, a man may introduce measures which are really destructive to the laws or to the constitution. But, since we have touched upon this subject, perhaps we should 18 had better go a little into detail, for, as I was saying, there changed at is a difference of opinion, and it may sometimes seem de- all? laws be II. 8. sirable to make changes. Such changes in the other arts Changes in and sciences have certainly been beneficial; medicine, for beneficial, example, and gymnastic, and every other art and science the arts have departed from traditional usage. And, if politics be an art, change must be necessary in this as in any other art. The need of improvement is shown by the fact 19 that old customs are exceedingly simple and barbarous. For the ancient Hellenes went about armed and bought their wives of each other. The remains of ancient laws 20 which have come down to us are quite absurd; for ex-1269 . ample, at Cumae there is a law about murder, to the effect that if the accuser produce a certain number of witnesses from among his own kinsmen, the accused shall be held guilty. Again, men in general desire the good, 21 and not merely what their fathers had. But the primeval inhabitants, whether they were born of the earth or were the survivors of some destruction, may be supposed to have been no better than ordinary foolish people among ourselves (such is certainly the tradition concerning the earth-born men); and it would be ridiculous to rest contented with their notions. Even when laws have been written down, they ought not always to remain unaltered. As in other sciences, so in politics, it is im- 22 possible that all things should be precisely set down in writing; for enactments must be universal, but actions are concerned with particulars. Hence we infer that sometimes and in certain cases laws may be changed; but when we look at the matter from another point of view, great caution would seem to be required. For 23 case of laws the habit of lightly changing the laws is an evil, and, is not quite analogous when the advantage is small, some errors both of lawgivers and rulers had better be left; the citizen will not but the to that of the arts. ■ Cp. Thucyd. i. c. 5 and 6. b Or, referring óμoíovs to yŋyeveis, 'whether they were born of the • Cp. Plato, Laws, iii. 677 A ; Polit. 271 A; Tim. 22 C. gain so much by the change as he will lose by the habit II. 8. 24 of disobedience. The analogy of the arts is false; a change in a law is a very different thing from a change in an art. For the law has no power to command obedience except that of habit, which can only be given by time, so that a readiness to change from old to new laws 25 enfeebles the power of the law. Even if we admit that the laws are to be changed, are they all to be changed, and in every state? And are they to be changed by anybody who likes, or only by certain persons? These are very important questions; and therefore we had better reserve the discussion of them to a more suitable occasion. tions to be In the governments of Lacedaemon and Crete, and 9. indeed in all governments, two points have to be con- Two quessidered; first, whether any particular law is good or bad, asked about when compared with the perfect state; secondly, whether governments: (1) it is or is not consistent with the idea and character Is the end which they 2 which the lawgiver has set before his citizens". That in propose a well-ordered state the citizens should have leisure and good? and (2) do they fulfil it? not have to provide for their daily wants is generally acknowledged, but there is a difficulty in seeing how this leisure is to be attained. [For, if you employ slaves, they are liable to rebel.] The Thessalian Penestae Defects of have often risen against their masters, and the Helots monian in like manner against the Lacedaemonians, for whose state. (1) The 3 misfortunes they are always lying in wait. Nothing, Helots however, of this kind has as yet happened to the Cretans; trouble. 1269 b. the reason probably is that the neighbouring cities, even when at war with one another, never form an alliance Lacedae a constant |