BOOK II.

forms of

actual or

ideal.

OUR purpose is to consider what form of political II. 1. community is best of all for those who are most able Reasons for examining to realise their ideal of life. We must therefore examine model not only this but other constitutions, both such as government actually exist in well-governed states, and any theoretical forms which are held in esteem; that what is good and useful may be brought to light. And let no one suppose that in seeking for something beyond them we at all want to philosophise at the expense of truth; we only undertake this enquiry because all the constitutions with which we are acquainted are faulty.

2 We will begin with the natural beginning of the subject. What Three alternatives are conceivable: The members of a common in

should be

state must either have (1) all things or (2) nothing in
(2) nothing in a state?

The logical common, or (3) some things in common and some not, alternatives. That they should have nothing in common is clearly impossible, for the state is a community, and must at 1261 a. any rate have a common place—one city will be in one place, and the citizens are those who share in that one

munism of

3 city. But should a well-ordered state have all things, The comas far as may be, in common, or some only and not Plato. others? For the citizens might conceivably have wives and children and property in common, as Socrates proposes in the Republic of Plato. Which is better, our present condition, or the proposed new order of society?

munity of

There are many difficulties in the community of 2. women. And the principle on which Socrates rests the The comnecessity of such an institution does not appear to be women. established by his arguments. The end which he ascribes

• Or, as Bernays, taking πάντως with σοφίζεσθαι βουλομένων, ' we are anxious to make a sophistical display at any cost.'

Rep. v. 457 C.

II. 2. to the state, taken literally, is impossible, and how we (1) Plato is are to interpret it is nowhere precisely stated. I am 2 wrong in making the speaking of the premiss from which the argument of

greatest unity the end of the state.

Socrates proceeds, 'that the greater the unity of the state the better.' Is it not obvious that a state may at length attain such a degree of unity as to be no longer a state?—since the nature of a state is to be a plurality, and in tending to greater unity, from being a state, it becomes a family, and from being a family, an individual; for the family may be said to be more one than the state, and the individual than the family. So that we ought not to attain this greatest unity even if we could, for it would be The state is the destruction of the state. Again, a state is not made 3 difference. up only of so many men, but of different kinds of men ; for similars do not constitute a state. It is not like a military alliance, of which the usefulness depends upon its quantity even where there is no difference in quality. For in that mutual protection is the end aimed at; and the question is the same as about the scales of a balance: which is the heavier ?

a unity in

A state, unlike a nation, is composed of different

and freedom is preserved by the

In like manner, a state differs from a nation; for in a nation the people are not distributed into villages, but live scattered about, like the Arcadians; whereas in a elements; state the elements out of which the unity is to be formed differ in kind. Wherefore the principle of compensation, 4 as I have already remarked in the Ethics, is the salvation of states. And among freemen and equals this is a principle which must be maintained, for they cannot all rule together, but must change at the end of a year or some other period of time or in some order of succession. The result is that upon this plan they all 5 govern; [but the manner of government is] just as if shoemakers and carpenters were to exchange their occupations, and the same persons did not always continue shoemakers and carpenters. And it is clearly better 6

interchange

of them.

• Or, 'dispersed in villages, but are in the condition of the Arcadians.' c N. Eth. v. 8. § 6.

b Or, 'reciprocal proportion.'

FALSE CONCEPTION OF UNITY.

29

that, as in business, so also in politics there should be II. 2. continuance of the same persons where this is possible. 1261 b. But where this is not possible by reason of the natural equality of the citizens, and it would be unjust that any one should be excluded from the government (whether to govern be a good thing or a bada), then it is better, instead of all holding power, to adopt a principle of rotation, equals giving place to equals, as the original rulers 7 gave place to them. Thus the one party rule and the others are ruled in turn, as if they were no longer the same persons. In like manner there is a variety in the offices held by them. Hence it is evident that a city Excessive is not by nature one in that sense which some persons ruin the affirm; and that what is said to be the greatest good state. of cities is in reality their destruction; but surely the good of things must be that which preserves theme. 8 Again, in another point of view, this extreme unification of the state is clearly not good; for a family is more self-sufficing than an individual, and a city than a family, and a city only comes into being when the community is large enough to be self-sufficing. If then self-sufficiency is to be desired, the lesser degree of unity is more desirable than the greater.

.

unity would

3.

unity (2) Com

munism will

means by

tained.

But, even supposing that it were best for the community to have the greatest degree of unity, this is by no means proved to follow from the fact of all not be the men saying "mine" and "not mine" at the same instant which unity of time,' which, according to Socrates, is the sign of is to be at2 perfect unity in a state. For the word 'all' is ambiguous. If the meaning be that every individual says 'mine' and 'not mine' at the same time, then perhaps the result at which Socrates aims may be in some degree accomplished; each man will call the same person his own son and his own wife, and so of his property and of all that belongs to him. This, however, is not the way in which people would speak who had their wives and children in

■ Cp. Pl. Rep. i. 345–6.

Cp. PL Rep. i. 352.

b Cp. i. 12. § 2 ; iii. 17. § 4.
a Pl. Rep. v. 462 C.

II. 3. common; they would say 'all' but not 'each.'

the word

'all.'

What is

common least

cared for.

In like 3 manner their property would be described as belonging Fallacy in to them, not severally but collectively. There is an obvious fallacy in the term 'all': like some other words, 'both,' 'odd,' 'even,' it is ambiguous, and in argument becomes a source of logical puzzles. That all persons call the same thing mine in the sense in which each does so may be a fine thing, but it is impracticable; or if the words are taken in the other sense [i.e. the sense which distinguishes 'all' from 'each'], such an unity in no way conduces to harmony. And there is another objection 4 to the proposal. For that which is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it. Every one thinks chiefly of his own, hardly at all of the common interest; and only when he is himself concerned as an individual. For besides other considerations, everybody is more inclined to neglect the duty which he expects another to fulfil; as in families many attendants are often less useful than a few. Each citizen will have a thousand 5 sons who will not be his sons individually, but anybody will be equally the son of anybody, and will therefore be 1262a. neglected by all alike. Further, upon this principle, every one will call another' mine' or 'not mine' according as he is prosperous or the reverse; however small a fraction he may be of the whole number, he will say of every individual of the thousand, or whatever be the number of the city, 'such an one is mine,'' such an one his'; and even about this he will not be positive; for it is impossible to know who chanced to have a child, or whether, if one came into existence, it has survived. But 6 which is better-to be able to say 'mine' about every one of the two thousand or the ten thousand citizens, or to use the word 'mine' in the ordinary and more restricted sense? For usually the same person is called by 7 one man his son whom another calls his brother or cousin or kinsman or blood-relation or connexion by marriage either of himself or of some relation of his, and these relationships he distinguishes from the tie which binds

Present

arrangements

better.

9

COMMUNITY OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN. 31

him to his tribe or ward; and how much better is it to be II. 3. the real cousin of somebody than to be a son after Plato's

covered.

8 fashion! Nor is there any way of preventing brothers The real relationship and children and fathers and mothers from sometimes will often recognizing one another; for children are born like their be disparents, and they will necessarily be finding indications of their relationship to one another. Geographers declare such to be the fact; they say that in Upper Libya, where the women are common, nevertheless the children who are born are assigned to their respective fathers on the ground of their likeness. And some women, like the females of other animals-for example mares and cows -have a strong tendency to produce offspring resembling their parents, as was the case with the Pharsalian mare called Dicaea (the Just).

conceal

Other evils, against which it is not easy for the authors 4. of such a community to guard, will be assaults and Evils of homicides, voluntary as well as involuntary, quarrels and ment. slanders, all which are most unholy acts when committed against fathers and mothers and near relations, but not equally unholy when there is no relationship. Moreover, they are much more likely to occur if the relationship is unknown, and, when they have occurred, the customary 2 expiations of them cannot be made. Again, how strange it is that Socrates, after having made the children common, should hinder lovers from carnal intercourse only, but should permit familiarities between father and son or between brother and brother, than which nothing can be more unseemly, since even without them, love 3 of this sort is improper. How strange, too, to forbid intercourse for no other reason than the violence of the pleasure, as though the relationship of father and son or of brothers with one another made no difference.

4

ism a source

This community of wives and children seems better Communsuited to the husbandmen than to the guardians, for if of weak1262 b.they have wives and children in common, they will be ness. bound to one another by weaker ties, as a subject class • Cp. Herod. iv. 180. b Cp. Hist. Anim. vii. 6, p. 586 a. 13.