GOODS OF FORTUNE, AND GOODS OF THE SOUL. 207 not ac preserved external virtue. 6 reputation, and the like. To whom we reply by an appeal VII. 1. to facts, which easily prove that mankind do not acquire Virtue is or preserve virtue by the help of external goods, but ex- quired or 1323 b.ternal goods by the help of virtue, and that happiness, by external whether consisting in pleasure or virtue, or both, is more goods, but often found with those who are most highly cultivated goods by in their mind and in their character, and have only a moderate share of external goods, than among those who possess external goods to a useless extent but are deficient in higher qualities; and this is not only matter of experience, but, if reflected upon, will easily appear to 7 be in accordance with reason. For, whereas external goods have a limit, like any other instrument*, and all things useful are of such a nature that where there is too much of them they must either do harm, or at any rate be of no use, to their possessors, every good of the soul, The goods the greater it is, is also of greater use, if the epithet useful 8 as well as noble is appropriate to such subjects. No excess; proof is required to show that the best state of one thing primary, in relation to another is proportioned to the degree of of seconexcellence by which the natures corresponding to those importance. states are separated from each other: so that, if the soul is more noble than our possessions or our bodies, both absolutely and in relation to us, it must be admitted that the best state of either has a similar ratio to the other. 9 Again, it is for the sake of the soul that goods external and goods of the body are eligible at all, and all wise men ought to choose them for the sake of the soul, and not the soul for the sake of them. of the soul never in they are of other goods dary, nature 10 Let us acknowledge then that each one has just so much of happiness as he has of virtue and wisdom, and of virtuous and wise action. God is a witness to us of The divine this truth, for he is happy and blessed, not by reason of witnesses to any external good, but in himself and by reason of his own nature. And herein of necessity lies the difference between good fortune and happiness; for external goods of external ■ Cp. i. 8. § 15. b Cp. c. 3. § 10; N. Eth. x. 8. §7; Met. xii. 7. the truth that happi ness is in dependent goods. VII. 1. come of themselves, and chance is the author of them, but no one is just or temperate by or through chancea. In like manner, and by a similar train of argument, the 11 happy state may be shown to be that which is [morally] best and which acts rightly; and rightly it cannot act without doing right actions, and neither individual nor state can do right actions without virtue and wisdom. Thus the courage, justice, and wisdom of a state have 12 the same form and nature as the qualities which give the individual who possesses them the name of just, wise, or temperate. The best life; 2. the same for indi state. Thus much may suffice by way of preface: for I 13 could not avoid touching upon these questions, neither could I go through all the arguments affecting them; these must be reserved for another discussion. 14 Let us assume then that the best life, both for individuals and states, is the life of virtue, having external goods enough for the performance of good actions. If 1324a. there are any who controvert our assertion, we will in this treatise pass them over, and consider their objections hereafter. There remains to be discussed the question, Whether the happiness of the individual is the same as that of the viduals and state, or different? Here again there can be no doubtno one denies that they are the same. For those who 2 hold that the well-being of the individual consists in his wealth, also think that riches make the happiness of the whole state, and those who value most highly the life of a tyrant deem that city the happiest which rules over the greatest number; while they who approve an individual for his virtue say that the more virtuous a city is, the happier it is. Two points here present themselves for con- 3 sideration: first (1), which is the more eligible life, that of a citizen who is a member of a state, or that of an alien who has no political ties; and again (2), which is the best form of constitution or the best condition of a Ethics i. 9. § 6. 1 IS CONTEMPLATION BEST, OR ACTION? 209 state, either on the supposition that political privileges VII. 2. are given to all, or that they are given to a majority only? 4 Since the good of the state and not of the individual is the proper subject of political thought and speculation, and we are engaged in a political discussion, while the first of these two points has a secondary interest for us, the latter will be the main subject of our enquiry. 5 ent lives of Now it is evident that the form of government is best The differin which every man, whoever he is, can act for the best men: some and live happily. But even those who agree in thinking say that the life of virtue is the most eligible raise a question, whether the life of business and politics is or is not more eligible than one which is wholly independent of external goods, I mean than a contemplative life, which by some is maintained to be the only one worthy of a 6 philosopher. For these two lives-the life of the philosopher and the life of the statesman-appear to have been preferred by those who have been most keen in the pursuit of virtue, both in our own and in other ages. Which is the better is a question of no small moment; for the wise man, like the wise state, will necessarily 7 regulate his life according to the best end. There are (1) that even a political some who think that while a despotic rule over others is or constituthe greatest injustice, to exercise a constitutional rule tional rule is over them, even though not unjust, is a great impedi- to the ment to a man's individual well-being. Others take an (2) that the opposite view; they maintain that the true life of man political is the practical and political, and that every virtue admits true life; 1324 b.of being practised, quite as much by statesmen and rulers 8 as by private individuals. Others, again, are of opinion (3) that happiness is that arbitrary and tyrannical rule alone consists with despotic happiness; indeed, in some states the entire aim of the power. laws is to give men despotic power over their neigh9 bours. And, therefore, although in most cities the laws may be said generally to be in a chaotic state, still, if • Or, inserting kai before vóμwv (apparently the reading of the old translator), 'in some cases the entire aim both of the constitution and the laws.' detrimental character; is the The laws of most nations, however confused, and con aim. Illustrations. VII. 2. they aim at anything, they aim at the maintenance of power: thus in Lacedaemon and Crete the system of education and the greater part of the laws are framed with a view to war. And in all nations which are able 10 make power to gratify their ambition military power is held in esteem, quest their for example among the Scythians and Persians and Thracians and Celts. In some nations there are even laws tending to stimulate the warlike virtues, as at Carthage, where we are told that men obtain the honour of wearing as many rings as they have served campaigns. There 11 was once a law in Macedonia that he who had not killed an enemy should wear a halter, and among the Scythians no one who had not slain his man was allowed to drink out of the cup which was handed round at a certain feast. Among the Iberians, a warlike nation, the number of enemies whom a man has slain is indicated by the number of obelisks which are fixed in the earth round his tomb; and there are numerous practices among other 12 nations of a like kind, some of them established by law and others by custom. Yet to a reflecting mind it must appear very strange that the statesman should be always considering how he can dominate and tyrannize over others, whether they will or not. How can that which 13 is not even lawful be the business of the statesman or the legislator? Unlawful it certainly is to rule without regard to justice, for there may be might where there is no right. The other arts and sciences offer no parallel; a physician is not expected to persuade or coerce his patients, nor a pilot the passengers in his ship. Yet 14 many appear to think that a despotic government is a true political form, and what men affirm to be unjust and inexpedient in their own case they are not ashamed of practising towards others; they demand justice for themselves, but where other men are concerned they care nothing about it. Such behaviour is irrational; 15 unless the one party is born to command, and the other born to serve, in which case men have a right to But is domination the true object of statesman ship? Nay, it is unjust. Cp. Plato Laws i. 633 ff. WAR NOT THE SUPreme end. 211 command, not indeed all their fellows, but only those who VII. 2. stances. 16 to say, such wild animals as are eatable. And surely A city placed 1325 a. there may be a city happy in isolation, which we will where war assume to be well-governed (for it is quite possible that is an im possibility a city thus isolated might be well-administered and have may still be happy. good laws); but such a city would not be constituted with any view to war or the conquest of enemies,—all that sort 17 of thing must be excluded. Hence we see very plainly that warlike pursuits, although generally to be deemed honourable, are not the supreme end of all things, but only means. And the good lawgiver should enquire The ideal of how states and races of men and communities may par- relative to the lawgiver ticipate in a good life, and in the happiness which is circum18 attainable by them. His enactments will not be always the same; and where there are neighbours he will have to deal with them according to their characters, and to see what duties are to be performed towards each. The end at which the best form of government should aim may be properly made a matter of future consideration". Let us now address those who, while they agree that the 3. life of virtue is the most eligible, differ about the manner Is the life of practising it. For some renounce political power, and man better think that the life of the freeman is different from the the ruler? life of the statesman and the best of all; but others think the life of the statesman best. The argument of the latter is that he who does nothing cannot do well, and that virtuous activity is identical with happiness. To both we say: 'you are partly right and partly wrong.' The Better than first class are right in affirming that the life of the freeman the despot 2 is better than the life of the despot; for there is nothing certainly. grand or noble in having the use of a slave, in so far as he is a slave; or in issuing commands about necessary things. But it is an error to suppose that every sort of * Cp. ii. 6. § 7 ; 7. § 14. b Cp. c. 14. of the free than that of the life of |