BOOK IV.

nastic art

IN all arts and sciences which embrace the whole of IV. 1. any subject, and are not restricted to a part only, it is The problems the province of a single art or science to consider all that of the gymappertains to a single subject. For example, the art of gymnastic considers not only the suitableness of different modes of training to different bodies (2), but what sort is absolutely the best (1); (for the absolutely best must suit that which is by nature best and best furnished with the means of life), and also what common form of training is 2 adapted to the great majority of men (4). And if a man does not desire the best habit of body or the greatest skill in gymnastics, which might be attained by him, still the trainer or the teacher of gymnastic should be able to impart any lower degree of either (3). The same principle equally holds in medicine and ship-building, and the making of clothes, and in the arts generally a.

3

lems of

for the

Hence it is obvious that government too is the sub-illustrate ject of a single science, which has to consider what kind the prob of government would be best and most in accordance politics with our aspirations, if there were no external impedi- statesman. ment, and also what kind of government is adapted to particular states. For the best is often unattainable, and therefore the true legislator and statesman ought to be acquainted, not only with (1) that which is best in the abstract, but also with (2) that which is best relatively to 4 circumstances. We should be able further to say how a state may be constituted under any given conditions (3); both how it is originally formed and, when formed, howit may be longest preserved; the supposed state being so far from the very best that it is unprovided even with the conditions necessary for the very best; neither is it the best under the circumstances, but of an inferior type.

The numbers in this paragraph are made to correspond with the numbers in the next.

IV. 1.

The best

state for the majority.

mation of

the old as

creation of

the new.

The 'pathology' of states.

He ought, moreover, to know (4) the form of govern- 5 ment which is best suited to states in general; for political writers, although they have excellent ideas, are often unpractical. We should consider, not only what form 6 of government is best, but also what is possible and what is easily attainable by all. There are some who would have none but the most perfect; for this many natural advantages are required. Others, again, speak 1289 a. of a more attainable form, and, although they reject the constitution under which they are living, they extol some one in particular, for example the Lacedaemoniana. The refor- Any change of government which has to be introduced 7 should be one which men will be both willing and able hard as the to adopt, since there is quite as much trouble in the reformation of an old constitution as in the establishment of a new one, just as to unlearn is as hard as to learn. And therefore, in addition to the qualifications of the statesman already mentioned, he should be able to find remedies for the defects of existing constitutions". This he cannot do unless he knows how many forms of s a government there are. It is often supposed that there is only one kind of democracy and one of oligarchy. But this is a mistake; and, in order to avoid such mistakes, we must ascertain what differences there are in the constitutions of states, and in how many ways they are combined. The same political insight will enable a man 9 to know which laws are the best, and which are suited to different constitutions; for the laws are, and ought to be, relative to the constitution, and not the constitution to the laws. A constitution is the organization of offices 10 in a state, and determines what is to be the governing body, and what is the end of each community. But claws are not to be confounded with the principles of the constitution: they are the rules according to which the magistrates should administer the state, and proceed * Cp. ii. 6. § 16. * Cp. $ 4.

• Or: 'laws, though in themselves distinct, show the character of the constitution.'

GOVERNMENTS TRUE ANd perverteD. 109

11 against offenders. So that we must know the number IV. 1. and varieties of the several forms of government, if only with a view to making laws. For the same laws cannot be equally suited to all oligarchies and to all democracies, and there is certainly more than one form both of democracy and of oligarchy.

and aris

have been

discussed.

oligarchy,

remain.

In our original discussion about governments we 2. divided them into three true forms: kingly rule, aris- Royalty tocracy, and constitutional government, and three corre- tocracy sponding perversions-tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy. already Of kingly rule and of aristocracy we have already spoken, for the enquiry into the perfect state is the same thing democracy, with the discussion of the two forms thus named, since tyranny, both imply a principle of virtue provided with external means. We have already determined in what aristocracy and kingly rule differ from one another, and when the latter should be established". In what follows we have to describe the so-called constitutional government, which bears the common name of all constitutions, and the other forms, tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy.

optimi

It is obvious which of the three perversions is the 'Corruptio worst, and which is the next in badness. That which is pessima.' the perversion of the first and most divine is necessarily 1289 b. the worst. And just as a royal rule, if not a mere name, must exist by virtue of some great personal superiority in the king, so tyranny, which is the worst of governments, is necessarily the farthest removed from a wellconstituted form; oligarchy is a little better, but a long

way from aristocracy, and democracy is the most toler- ||

able of the three.

с

on Plato.

3 A writer who preceded me has already made these A criticism distinctions, but his point of view is not the same as mine. For he lays down the principle that of all good constitutions (under which he would include a virtuous oligarchy and the like) democracy is the worst, but the best of bad ones. Whereas we maintain that they are b Cp. iii. 17. § 8.

■ Book iii. 7; N. Eth. viii. 10.

c Plato Polit. 303 A.

IV. 2. all defective, and that one oligarchy is not to be accounted better than another, but only less bad.

A new beginning:

to be discussed.

Not to pursue this question further at present, let us 4 Questions begin by determining (1) how many varieties of states there are (since of democracy and oligarchy there are several); (2) what constitution is the most generally acceptable, and what is eligible in the next degree after the perfect or any other aristocratical and well-constituted form of government-if any other there be-which is at the same time adapted to states in general; (3)d of the other forms of government to whom is each suited. For democracy may meet the needs of some better than 5 oligarchy, and conversely. In the next place (4) we have to consider in what manner a man ought to proceed who desires to establish some one among these various forms, whether of democracy or of oligarchy; and lastly, 6 (5) having briefly discussed these subjects to the best of our power, we will endeavour to ascertain whence arise the ruin and preservation of states, both generally and in individual cases, and to what causes they are to be attributed. The reason why there are many forms of government is that every state contains many elements. In the first ment differ place we see that all states are made up of families, and in the multitude of citizens there must be some rich and some poor, and some in a middle condition; the rich are heavy-armed, and the poor not. Of the 2 common people, some are husbandmen, and some traders, and some artisans. There are also among the notables differences of wealth and property-for example, in the number of horses which they keep, for they cannot afford to keep them unless they are rich. And therefore 3 in old times the cities whose strength lay in their cavalry b C. 7-9 and 11.

3.

Forms

of govern

because

states are made up of various

There are differences

of occupa

tion, wealth,

C. 4-6.

© Or: 'after the perfect state; and besides this what other there is which is aristocratical and well constituted, and at the same time adapted to states in general.'

d C. 12.

• Book vi.

f Book v.

8 Or: 'and again both of rich and poor some are armed and some are unarmed.'

why forms of governmENT DIFFER. 111

were oligarchies, and they used cavalry in wars against IV. 3. their neighbours; as was the practice of the Eretrians and Chalcidians, and also of the Magnesians on the river 4 Mæander, and of other peoples in Asia. Besides differences of wealth there are differences of rank and rank, 1290 a. merit, and there are some other elements which were merit. mentioned by us when in treating of aristocracy we enumerated the essentials of a state. Of these elements, sometimes all, sometimes the lesser and sometimes the 5 greater number, have a share in the government. It is evident then that there must be many forms of government, differing in kind, since the parts of which they are composed differ from each other in kind. For a constitution is an organization of offices which all the citizens distribute among themselves, according to the power which different classes possess, for example the rich or the poor, or according to some principle of compensation 6 which includes both. There must therefore be as many forms of government as there are modes of arranging the offices, according to the superiorities and other inequalities of the different parts of the state.

rally re

There are generally thought to be two principal forms: Two geneas men say of the winds that there are but two-north puted and south, and that the rest of them are only variations types, oligarchy and of these, so of governments there are said to be only two democracy. 7 forms-democracy and oligarchy. For aristocracy is con

sidered to be a kind of oligarchy, as being the rule of a few, and the so-called constitutional government to be really a democracy, just as among the winds we make the west a variation of the north, and the east of the south wind. Similarly of harmonies there are said to be two kinds, the Dorian and the Phrygian; the other arrangements of the scale are comprehended under one 8 of these two. About forms of government this is a very favourite notion. But in either case the better and more

Reading either noλéμovs with v. tr. (Moerbek) and Bekk. 2nd edit., or rodeμious with the Greek MSS; cp. c. 13. § 10; vi. c. 7. § 1. b Not in what has preceded, but cp. vii. 8.