KINGS IN THE HEROIC AGES. 97 in one of his irregular songs, They chose Pittacus III. 14. tyrant,' and he reproaches his fellow-citizens for 'having made the low-born Pittacus tyrant of the spiritless and 1285 b. ill-fated city, with one voice shouting his praises.' 11 These forms of government have always had the character of despotism, because they possess tyrannical power; but inasmuch as they are elective and acquiesced in by their subjects, they are kingly. hereditary subjects. (4) There is a fourth species of kingly rule-that of (4) The the heroic times-which was hereditary and legal, and ruler over 12 was exercised over willing subjects. For the first chiefs willing were benefactors of the people in arts or arms; they either gathered them into a community, or procured land for them; and thus they became kings of voluntary subjects, and their power was inherited by their descendants. They took the command in war and presided over the sacrifices, except those which required a priest. They also decided causes either with or without an oath; and when they swore, the form of the oath was 13 the stretching out of their sceptre. In ancient times The king's their power extended to all things whatsoever, in city gradually and country, as well as in foreign parts; but at a later declined, date they relinquished several of these privileges, others the people took from them, until in some states alone remaining nothing was left to them but the sacrifices; and where to him. they retained more of the reality they had only the right of leadership in war beyond the border. 14 power the office and of priest or general ation of the To the These, then, are the four kinds of royalty. First the Re-enumer monarchy of the heroic ages; this was exercised over kinds of voluntary subjects, but limited to certain functions; the royalty. king was a general and a judge, and had the control of four abovereligion. The second is that of the barbarians, which is mentioned an hereditary despotic government in accordance with law. A third is the power of the so-called Aesymnete or Dictator; this is an elective tyranny. The fourth is the Lacedaemonian, which is in fact a generalship, Cp. v. c. 10. § 3. a Or, 'banquet-odes,' σkóλia. VOL. I. H III. 14. hereditary and perpetual. These four forms differ from 15 one another in the manner which I have described. is added 15. Only the two extreme forms need be considered. There is a fifth form of kingly rule in which one has the disposal of all, just as each tribe or each state has the disposal of the public property; this form corresponds to the control of a household. For as household management is the kingly rule of a house, so kingly rule is the household management of a city, or of a nation, or of many nations. Of these forms we need only consider two, the Lacedaemonian and the absolute royalty; for most of the others lie in a region between them, having less power than the last, and more than the first. Thus the en- 2 quiry is reduced to two points: first, is it advantageous to the state that there should be a perpetual general, and if so, should the office be confined to one family, or open to the citizens in turn? Secondly, is it well that a 1286 a. single man should have the supreme power in all things? The first question falls under the head of laws rather than of constitutions; for perpetual generalship might equally exist under any form of government, so that 3 this matter may be dismissed for the present. The royalty other kind of royalty is a sort of constitution; this we questions. have now to consider, and briefly to run over the difficulties involved in it. We will begin by enquiring whether laws or the it is more advantageous to be ruled by the best man or by the best laws. The Lace daemonian royalty is an office, not a con stitution; the absolute raises many Should the best best man rule? Laws are general, The advocates of royalty maintain that the laws 4 speak only in general terms, and cannot provide for circumstances; and that for any science to abide by written rules is absurd. Even in Egypt the physician is allowed to alter his treatment after the fourth day, but if sooner, he takes the risk. Hence it is argued that a government acting according to written laws is plainly not the best. Yet surely the ruler cannot dispense with the 5 have gene- general principle which exists in law; and he is a better ciples. but they are passionless, and the rules too must ral prin * Cp. Plato Polit. pp. 293–295. 6 IS NOT THe rule oF MANY BETTER? 99 ruler who is free from passion than he who is passionate. III. 15. the heart of man. about par which can- by law? There mu be a legisla whether you call him kin one best many de Yes, some one will answer, but then on the other But how hand an individual will be better able to advise in par- ticular cases ticular cases. [To whom we in turn make reply:] A king-must-legislate, and laws must be passed, but these termined laws will have no authority when they miss the mark, though in all other cases retaining their authority. [Yet a further question remains behind:] When the law can- Should the not determine point at all, or not well, should the one 7 best man or should all decide? According to our present me them? practice assemblies meet, sit in judgment, deliberate and decide, and their judgments all relate to individual cases. Now any member of the assembly, taken separately, is certainly inferior to the wise man. But the state is made up of many individuals. And as a feast to which The all the guests contribute is better than a banquet fur- collectively nished by a single mana, so a multitude is a better judge of many things than any individual. 8 many are wiser, ruptible, Again, the many are more incorruptible than the few; less corthey are like the greater quantity of water which is less easily corrupted than a little. The individual is liable to be overcome by anger or by some other passion, and then his judgment is necessarily perverted; but it is hardly freer from passion, to be supposed that a great number of persons would all get into a passion and go wrong at the same moment. 9 Let us assume that they are freemen, never acting in violation of the law, but filling up the gaps which the law is obliged to leave. Or, if such virtue is scarcely attainable by the multitude, we need only suppose that the majority are good men and good citizens, and ask which will be the more incorruptible, the one good ruler, 1286b. or the many who are all good? Will not the many? But, you will say, there may be parties among them, more sub10 whereas the one man is not divided against himself. To faction. and not ject to Cp. supra, c. II. § 2. III. 15. which we may answer that their character is as good as his. If we call the rule of many men, who are all of them good, aristocracy, and the rule of one man royalty, then aristocracy will be better for states than royalty, whether the government is supported by force or not, provided only that a number of men equal in virtue can be found. Ancient monarchies The first governments were kingships, probably for 11 this reason, because of old, when cities were small, men of eminent virtue were few. They were made kings because they were benefactors, and benefits can only be bestowed by good men. But when many persons tocracies, equal in merit arose, no longer enduring the pre-emithese into nence of one, they desired to have a commonwealth, and 12 oligarchies ; set up a constitution. The ruling class soon deteriorated passed into aris tyrannies, and enriched themselves out of the public treasury; riches became the path to honour, and so oligarchies then came naturally grew up. These passed into tyrannies and tyrannies into democracies; for love of gain in the ruling classes was always tending to diminish their number, and so to strengthen the masses, who in the end set lastly, de- upon their masters and established democracies. Since cities have increased in size, no other form of govern- 13 ment appears to be any longer possible. mocracies. Should monarchy be hereditary? Even supposing the principle to be maintained that kingly power is the best thing for states, how about the family of the king? Are his children to succeed him? If they are no better than anybody else, that will be mischievous. But [says the lover of royalty] the king, 14 though he might, will not hand on his power to his children. That, however, is hardly to be expected, and is Should the too much to ask of human nature. There is also a difficulty about the force which he is to employ; should a king have guards about him by whose aid he may be able to coerce the refractory? but if not, how will he 15 administer his kingdom? Even if he be the lawful monarch have a military force? • Cp. infra, § 15. b Cp. c. 14. § 12. * Cp. iv. 6. § 5 ; 13. ( 10. THE RULE OF ONE IS THOUGHT UNNATURAL. 101 he must sovereign who does nothing arbitrarily or contrary to III. 15. law, still he must have some force wherewith to main16 tain the law. In the case of a limited monarchy there Yes; but is not much difficulty in answering this question; the not be too king must have such force as will be more than a match powerful. for one or more individuals, but not so great as that of the people. The ancients observed this principle when they gave the guards to any one whom they appointed dictator or tyrant. Thus, when Dionysius asked the Syracusans to allow him guards, somebody advised that they should give him only a certain number. 1287 a. 16. life general found in of state. lute monar At this place in the discussion naturally follows the enquiry respecting the king who acts solely according to his own will; he has now to be considered. The so-called The royalty of Sparta limited monarchy, or kingship according to law, as I have is only already remarked, is not a distinct form of govern- ship, which ment, for under all governments, as, for example, in a may be democracy or aristocracy, there may be a general hold- any kind ing office for life, and one person is often made supreme over the administration of a state. A magistracy of this kind exists at Epidamnus, and also at Opus, but in the 2 latter city has a more limited power. Now, absolute But absomonarchy, or the arbitrary rule of a sovereign over all chy is often the citizens, in a city which consists of equals, is thought thought to be contrary by some to be quite contrary to nature; it is argued that to nature. those who are by nature equals must have the same natural right and worth, and that for unequals to have an equal share, or for cquals to have an unequal share, in the offices of state, is as bad as for different bodily constitutions to have the same food and clothing or the 3 same different. Wherefore it is thought to be just that Equals among equals every one be ruled as well as rule, and that all should have their turn. We thus arrive at law; for impersonal an order of succession implics law. And the rule of the law is preferable to that of any individual. On the same principle, even if it be better for certain individuals to govern, they should be made only guardians and ministers * Cp. c. 15. § 2. b Cp. v. 1. §§ 10, 11 ; 4. § 7. 4 should be under the rule of law. |