INTRODUCTION, BOOK VIII. 7. cxliii motion; and of the latter some have a more vulgar, others a nobler, movement. Seeing the great power of music, we cannot afford to neglect the use of it in education. It is suited to the time of youth; we have in us an affinity to harmonies and rhythms which makes some philosophers say that the soul is, or contains, harmony. But the question has not yet been determined 1) whether youth c. 6. should be taught to sing and play themselves or not? Clearly their characters will be more influenced if they can play themselves; they will be better judges of music, and while they are growing up, music will be to them what the rattle is to very young children, and will keep them out of mischief. But they must not continue the study too far into life. A gentleman should not aim at acquiring the marvellous execution of the professor of music. But he should know enough to feel delight in simple and noble rhythms. Musical instruments should be simple and adapted to a simple style of music. The flute and the harp must be rejected. The flute requires too much skill, and has not a good moral effect; it is too exciting; it also prevents the use of the voice, and is therefore an impediment to education. The ancients were right in forbidding it, although about the time of the Persian War, when a great educational movement arose in Hellas, the flute came into fashion. But soon a reaction took place, and the flute, together with various oddly-shaped, old-fashioned instruments, was again banished. There is truth in the old myth which tells how Athene, after inventing the flute, threw it away, not approving of an instrument which distorted the features. That was a pleasing fancy of ancient mythology. But with still more reason may the wise goddess be supposed to have rejected it because it contributed nothing to the mind. Professional music, then,—that is to say, the music which is performed in contests and is adapted to the taste of the audience, who are vulgar themselves and vulgarize the performers,—is unsuited to education, and should therefore be prohibited by us. Lastly, we have to consider what melodies and rhythms shall be c. 7. employed in education. Melodies have been divided into ethical melodies, melodies of action, and inspiring melodies. Accepting these divisions, we further maintain that music should be studied with three objects,—1) education, 2) purification (of which we will explain the meaning when we treat of poetry), 3) intellectual enjoyment. And in education ethical melodies are to be preferred, but we may listen to the others. For men are variously affected by pity, fear, enthusiasm, and the various melodies corresponding to these feelings lighten and deliver the soul. The freeman will desire to hear the nobler sort of melodies at the theatre, but for the amusement of artisans and slaves the lower kinds may be also admitted. Plato in the Republic wishes to retain only the Dorian and Phrygian modes, although he rejects the flute, which is to other musical instruments what the Phrygian is to other modes. He is wrong in retaining the Phrygian, which is exciting and emotional; he is equally wrong in excluding the Lydian, which is better adapted to old men and to children of tender years than the severer melodies; and he is inconsistent with himself in keeping the Phrygian mode when he rejects the flute. The Dorian is grave and manly, and therefore especially suited to education. Two principles should be always kept in view, What is possible and What is becoming; yet even these are relative to age, the relaxed song of the old will naturally differ from the severer strain of youth. These two principles, to which may be added a third, viz. the mean, lie at the foundation of education. One of the Aristotelian ideas which we have a difficulty in translating into English words and modes of thought is σχολή or ἡ ἐν σχολῇ διαγωγή. Το us leisure means hardly more than the absence of occupation, the necessary alternation of play with work. By the Greek, axon was regarded as the condition of a gentleman. In Aristotle the notion is still further idealized, for he seems to regard it as an internal state in which the intellect, free from the cares of practical life, energizes or reposes in the consciousness of truth. To such an elevation of the soul, music, in which the mind through the ear receives the mathematical proportions of harmony and rhythm, lends the greatest aid. Some old Pythagorean feeling, exaggerated by fancy and tradition, enters into all this; but we also INTRODUCTION, BOOK VIII. cxlv know by experience how, when listening to the tones of the organ, strange but undefined thoughts arise in our minds,-we feel better than ourselves, and are caught up into a sort of heaven,—and we know also that those who have learnt in their youth to play on an instrument are much better able to realize the power of music than the uninstructed listener, who nevertheless, like the Lacedaemonians, may not be a bad judge of the style of music. We agree with Aristotle that marvels of execution may very well be dispensed with, if simple and noble rhythms are retained. The ancient Greek music was devoid of harmony in the modern sense, but the beauty of music, as of poetry, lies not only in subtle adjustments of notes or words, but much more in simplicity, in purity, in sweetness. There was a nearer connexion between poetry and music than among ourselves; for the metre of the words coincided with the time of the music. The instrument was secondary, not primary; the human voice was the dominant or prevailing tone in the performance. The choric lays of Eschylus or Sophocles were heard above the Dorian and Phrygian modes which kept measure with them. There was some combination of mind and sense, some sweet influence falling melodiously on the ear, and 'finding a way to the inner place of the soul' (Plato), which we fail to conceive. And since Greek music can no longer be performed, 'married to immortal verse,' with its accompaniments of dance and song, and the modes of it are unfamiliar to us and not ennobled by national and religious associations, we shall always continue to think that the language of the Greeks about music is exaggerated and unreal. THE POLITICS. Ed. Bekker, BOOK I. community EVERY state is a community of some kind, and every I. I. 1252 a. community is established with a view to some good; for The state being the mankind always act in order to obtain that which they highest think good. But, if all communities aim at some good, aims at the the state or political community, which is the highest of highest good. all, and which embraces all the rest, aims, and in a greater degree than any other, at the highest good. 2 treated the household, difference Now there is an erroneous opinion that a statesman, Plato king, householder, and master are the same, and that difference they differ, not in kind, but only in the number of their between subjects. For example, the ruler over a few is called royal, and political a master; over more, the manager of a household; over rule as a a still larger number, a statesman or king, as if there were only of no difference between a great household and a small degree. state. The distinction which is made between the king and the statesman is as follows: When the government is personal, the ruler is a king; when, according to the principles of the political science, the citizens rule and are ruled in turn, then he is called a statesman. 3 But all this is a mistake; for governments differ in But it is kind, as will be evident to any one who considers the ference in matter according to the method which has hitherto kind, as guided us. As in other departments of science, so in if we resolve politics, the compound should always be resolved into the into its simple elements or least parts of the whole. We must Cp. Plato Politicus, 258 E foll. B b Cp. c. 8. § 1. really a dif will be clear the state elements. 2-1 |