shall be made before a responsive pleading is served or, if there is none, before the introduction of evidence at the trial or hearing. (d) COSTS OF PREVIOUSLY-DISMISSED ACTION. If a plaintiff who has once dismissed an action in any court commences an action based upon or including the same claim against the same defendant, the court may make such order for the payment of costs of the action previously dismissed as it may deem proper and may stay the proceedings in the action until the plaintiff has complied with the order. (As amended Dec. 27, 1946, eff. Mar. 19, 1948; Jan. 21, 1963, eff. July 1, 1963; Feb. 28, 1966, eff. July 1, 1966; Dec. 4, 1967, eff. July 1, 1968.) NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES Note to Subdivision (a). Compare Ill.Rev.Stat. (1937) ch. 110, § 176, and English Rules Under the Judicature Act (The Annual Practice, 1937) O. 26. Provisions regarding dismissal in such statutes as U.S.C., Title 8, § 164 (Jurisdiction of district courts in immigration cases) and U.S.C., Title 31, § 232 (Liability of persons making false claims against United States; suits) are preserved by paragraph (1). Note to Subdivision (b). This provides for the equivalent of a nonsuit on motion by the defendant after the completion of the presentation of evidence by the plaintiff. Also, for actions tried without a jury, it provides the equivalent of the directed verdict practice for jury actions which is regulated by Rule 50. NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES-1946 Note. Subdivision (a). The insertion of the reference to Rule 66 correlates Rule 41(a)(1) with the express provisions concerning dismissal set forth in amended Rule 66 on receivers. The change in Rule 41(a)(1)(1) gives the service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party the same effect in preventing unlimited dismissal as was originally given only to the service of an answer. The omission of reference to a motion for summary judgment in the original rule was subject to criticism. 3 Moore's Federal Practice, 1938, 3037-3038, n. 12. A motion for summary judgment may be forthcoming prior to answer, and if well taken will eliminate the necessity for an answer. Since such a motion may require even more research and preparation than the answer itself, there is good reason why the service of the motion, like that of the answer, should prevent a voluntary dismissal by the adversary without court approval. The word "generally" has been stricken from Rule 41(a)(1)(ii) in order to avoid confusion and to conform with the elimination of the necessity for special appearance by original Rule 12(b). Subdivision (b). In some cases tried without a jury, where at the close of plaintiff's evidence the defendant moves for dismissal under Rule 41(b) on the ground that plaintiff's evidence is insufficient for recovery, the plaintiff's own evidence may be conflicting or present questions of credibility. In ruling on the defendant's motion, questions arise as to the function of the judge in evaluating the testimony and whether findings should be made if the motion is sustained. Three circuits hold that as the judge is the trier of the facts in such a situation his function is not the same as on a motion to direct a verdict, where the jury is the trier of the facts, and that the judge in deciding such a motion in a non-jury case may pass on conflicts of evidence and credibility, and if he performs that function of evaluating the testimony and grants the motion on the merits, findings are required. Young v. United States, C.C.A.9th, 1940, 111 F.2d 823; Gary Theatre Co. v. Columbia Pictures Corporation, C.C.A.7th, 1941, 120 F.2d 891; Bach v. Friden Calculating Ma chine Co., Inc., C.C.A.6th, 1945, 148 F.2d 407. Cf. Mateas v. Fred Harvey, a Corporation, C.C.A.9th, 1945, 146 F.2d 989. The Third Circuit has held that on such a motion the function of the court is the same as on a motion to direct in a jury case, and that the court should only decide whether there is evidence which would support a judgment for the plaintiff, and, therefore, findings are not required by Rule 52. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Mason, C.C.A.3d, 1940, 115 F.2d 548; Schad v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., C.C.A.3d, 1943, 136 F.2d 991. The added sentence in Rule 41(b) incorporates the view of the Sixth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits. See also 3 Moore's Federal Practice, 1938, Cum. Supplement § 41.03, under "Page 3045"; Commentary, The Motion to Dismiss in NonJury Cases, 1946, 9 Fed.Rules Serv., Comm.Pg. 41b.14. NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES-1963 Under the present text of the second sentence of this subdivision, the motion for dismissal at the close of the plaintiff's evidence may be made in a case tried to a jury as well as in a case tried without a jury. But, when made in a jury-tried case, this motion overlaps the motion for a directed verdict under Rule 50(a), which is also available in the same situation. It has been held that the standard to be applied in deciding the Rule 41(b) motion at the close of the plaintiff's evidence in a jury-tried case is the same as that used upon a motion for a directed verdict made at the same stage; and, just as the court need not make findings pursuant to Rule 52(a) when it directs a verdict, so in a jury-tried case it may omit these findings in granting the Rule 41(b) motion. See generally O'Brien v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 293 F.2d 1, 5-10 (3d Cir. 1961). As indicated by the discussion in the O'Brien case, the overlap has caused confusion. Accordingly, the second and third sentences of Rule 41(b) are amended to provide that the motion for dismissal at the close of the plaintiff's evidence shall apply only to nonjury cases (including cases tried with an advisory jury). Hereafter the correct motion in jury-tried cases will be the motion for a directed verdict. This involves no change of substance. It should be noted that the court upon a motion for a directed verdict may in appropriate circumstances deny that motion and grant instead a new trial, or a voluntary dismissal without prejudice under Rule 41(a)(2). See 6 Moore's Federal Practice § 59.08[5] (2d ed. 1954); cf. Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212, 217, 67 S.Ct. 752, 91 L.Ed. 849 (1947). The first sentence of Rule 41(b), providing for dismissal for failure to prosecute or to comply with the Rules or any order of court, and the general provisions of the last sentence remain applicable in jury as well as nonjury cases. The amendment of the last sentence of Rule 41(b) indicates that a dismissal for lack of an indispensable party does not operate as an adjudication on the merits. Such a dismissal does not bar a new action, for it is based merely "on a plaintiff's failure to comply with a precondition requisite to the Court's going forward to determine the merits of his substantive claim." See Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 284-288, 81 S.Ct. 534, 5 L.Ed.2d 551 & n. 5 (1961); Mallow v. Hinde, 12 Wheat. (25 U.S.) 193, 6 L.Ed. 599 (1827); Clark, Code Pleading 602 (2d ed. 1947); Restatement of Judgments § 49, comm. a, b (1942). This amendment corrects an omission from the rule and is consistent with an earlier amendment, effective in 1948, adding "the defense of failure to join an indispensable party" to clause (1) of Rule 12(h). NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES-1966 AMENDMENT The terminology is changed to accord with the amendment of Rule 19. See that amended rule and the Advisory Committee's Note thereto. NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES-1968 AMENDMENT The amendment corrects an inadvertent error in the reference to amended Rule 23. CROSS REFERENCES Approval of court for dismissal of class action, see rule 23. Costs, see rule 54. Counterclaim, cross-claim or third party claim, see rules 13 and 14. Discontinuance of civil actions arising under immigration laws, see section 1329 of Title 8, Aliens and Nationality. Findings of fact in non-jury action, see rule 52. Motion for directed verdict at close of evidence offered by an opponent, see rule 50. Motion to dismiss For failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, see rule 12. For lack of jurisdiction or improper venue, see rule 12. Order of court for dismissal of action wherein receiver has been appointed, see rule 66. Taxation of costs, see section 1920 of this title. Withdrawal or discontinuance of false claim actions against United States, see section 3730 of Title 31, Money and Finance. Rule 42. Consolidation; Separate Trials (a) CONSOLIDATION. When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay. (b) SEPARATE TRIALS. The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues, always preserving inviolate the right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or as given by a statute of the United States. (As amended Feb. 28, 1966, eff. July 1, 1966.) NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES Subdivision (a) is based upon U.S.C., Title 28, former § 734 (Orders to save costs; consolidation of causes of like nature) but insofar as the statute differs from this rule, it is modified. For comparable statutes dealing with consolidation see Ark.Dig.Stat. (Crawford & Moses, 1921) § 1081; Calif.Code Civ.Proc. (Deering, 1937) § 1048; N.M.Stat. Ann. (Courtright, 1929) § 105-828; N.Y.C.P.A. (1937) §§ 96, 96a, and 97; American Judicature Society, Bulletin XIV (1919) Art.26. For severance or separate trials see Calif.Code Civ.Proc. (Deering, 1937) § 1048; N.Y.C.P.A. (1937) § 96; American Judicature Society, Bulletin XIV (1919) Art. 3, § 2 and Art. 10, § 10. See also the third sentence of Equity Rule 29 (Defenses-How Presented) providing for discretionary separate hearing and disposition before trial of pleas in bar or abatement, and see also Rule 12(d) of these rules for preliminary hearings of defenses and objections. For the entry of separate judgments, see Rule 54(b) (Judgment at Various Stages). NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES-1966 AMENDMENT In certain suits in admiralty separation for trial of the issues of liability and damages (or of the extent of liability other than damages, such as salvage and general average) has been conducive to expedition and economy, especially because of the statutory right to interlocutory appeal in admiralty cases (which is of course preserved by these Rules). While separation of issues for trial is not to be routinely ordered, it is important that it be encouraged where experience has demonstrated its worth. Cf. Weinstein, Routine Bifurcation of Negligence Trials, 14 Vand.L.Rev. 831 (1961). In cases (including some cases within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction) in which the parties have a constitutional or statutory right of trial by jury, separation of issues may give rise to problems. See e.g., United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 286 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1961). Accordingly, the proposed change in Rule 42 reiterates the mandate of Rule 38 respecting preservation of the right to jury trial. CROSS REFERENCES Preliminary hearings of defenses and objections, see rule 12. Separate Judgments, see rule 54. Trial for parties, see rule 20. Trials of counterclaims or cross-claims, see rule 13. Third party claims, see rule 14. Rule 43. Taking of Testimony (a) FORM. In all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open court, unless otherwise provided by an Act of Congress or by these rules, the Federal Rules of Evidence, or other rules adopted by the Supreme Court. [(b) SCOPE OF EXAMINATION AND CROSS-EXAMINATION.] (Abrogated Nov. 20, 1972, and Dec. 18, 1972, eff. July 1, 1975) [(c) RECORD OF EXCLUDED EVIDENCE.] (Abrogated Nov. 20, 1972, and Dec. 18, 1972, eff. July 1, 1975) (d) AFFIRMATION IN LIEU OF OATH. Whenever under these rules an oath is required to be taken, a solemn affirmation may be accepted in lieu thereof. (e) EVIDENCE on Motions. When a motion is based on facts not appearing of record the court may hear the matter on affidavits presented by the respective parties, but the court may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions. (f) INTERPRETERS. The court may appoint an interpreter of its own selection and may fix his reasonable compensation. The compensation shall be paid out of funds provided by law or by one or more of the parties as the court may direct, and may be taxed ultimately as costs, in the discretion of the court. (As amended Feb. 28, 1966, eff. July 1, 1966; Nov. 20, 1972, and Dec. 18, 1972, eff. July 1, 1975.) NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES Note to Subdivision (a). The first sentence is a restatement of the substance of U.S.C., Title 28, former § 635 (Proof in common-law actions), formerly § 637 (now §§ 2072, 2073) (Proof in equity and admiralty), and former Equity Rule 46 (Trial-Testimony Usually Taken in Open Court-Rulings on Objections to Evidence). This rule abolishes in patent and trade-mark actions, the practice under former Equity Rule 48 of setting forth in affidavits the testimony in chief of expert witnesses whose testimony is directed to matters of opinion. The second and third sentences on admissibility of evidence and Subdivision (b) on contradiction and cross-examination modify U.S.C., Title 28, formerly § 725 (now § 1652) (Laws of states as rules of decision) insofar as that statute has been construed to prescribe conformity to state rules of evidence. Compare Callihan and Ferguson, Evidence and the New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 45 Yale L.J. 622 (1936), and Same: 2, 47 Yale L.J. 195 (1937). The last sentence modifies to the extent indicated U.S.C., Title 28, § 631 (Competency of witnesses governed by State laws). Note to Subdivision (b). See 4 Wigmore on Evidence (2d ed., 1923) § 1885 et seq. Note to Subdivision (c). See former Equity Rule 46 (Trial-Testimony Usually Taken in Open Court-Rulings on Objections to Evidence). With the last sentence compare Dowagiac v. Lochren, 143 Fed. 211 (C.C.A.8th, 1906). See also Blease v. Garlington, 92 U.S. 1, 23 L.Ed. 521 (1876); Nelson v. United States, 201 U.S. 92. 114, 26 S.Ct. 358, 50 L.Ed. 673 (1906); Unkle v. Wills, 281 Fed. 29 (C.C.A.8th 1922). See Rule 61 for harmless error in either the admission or exclusion of evidence. Note to Subdivision (d). See former Equity Rule 78 (Affirmation in Lieu of Oath) and U.S.C., Title 1, § 1 (Words importing singular number, masculine gender, etc.; extended application), providing for affirmation in lieu of oath. NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULESSUPPLEMENTARY NOTE REGARDING RULES 43 and 44 Note. These rules have been criticized and suggested improvements offered by commentators. 1 Wigmore on Evidence, 3d ed. 1940, 200-204; Green, The Admissibility of Evidence Under the Federal Rules, 1941, 55 Harv.L.Rev. 197. Cases indicate, however, that the rule is working better than these commentators had expected. Boerner v. United States, C.C.A.2d, 1941, 117 F.2d 387, cert. den., 1941, 313 U.S. 587, 61 S.Ct. 1120; Mosson v. Liberty Fast Freight Co., C.C.A.2d, 1942, 124 F.2d 448; Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Olivier, C.C.A.5th, 1941, 123 F.2d 709; Anzano v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. of New York, C.C.A.3d, 1941, 118 F.2d 430; Franzen v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., C.C.A.3d, 1944, 146 F.2d 837; Fakouri v. Cadais, C.C.A.5th, 1945, 147 F.2d 667; In re C. & P. Co., S.D.Cal. 1945, 63 F.Supp. 400, 408. But cf. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, S.D.N.Y. 1938, 1 Fed.Rules Serv. 438.3, Case 1; Note, 1946, 46 Col.L.Rev. 267. While consideration of a comprehensive and detailed set of rules of evidence seems very desirable, it has not been feasible for the Committee so far to undertake this important task. Such consideration should include the adaptability to federal practice of all or parts of the proposed Code of Evidence of the American Law Institute. See Armstrong, Proposed Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 4 F.R.D. 124, 137-138. NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES-1966 This new subdivision authorizes the court to appoint interpreters (including interpreters for the deaf), to provide for their compensation, and to tax the compensation as costs. Compare proposed subdivision (b) of Rule 28 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. NOTES OF Advisory Committee on RULES-1972 Rule 43, entitled Evidence, has heretofore served as the basic rule of evidence for civil cases in federal courts. Its very general provisions are superseded by the detailed provisions of the new Rules of Evidence. The original title and many of the provisions of the rule are, therefore, no longer appropriate. Subdivision (a). The provision for taking testimony in open court is not duplicated in the Rules of Evidence and is retained. Those dealing with admissibility of evidence and competency of witnesses, however, are no longer needed or appropriate since those topics are covered at large in the Rules of Evidence. They are accordingly deleted. The language is broadened, however, to take account of acts of Congress dealing with the taking of testimony, as well as of the Rules of Evidence and any other rules adopted by the Supreme Court. Subdivision (b). The subdivision is no longer needed or appropriate since the matters with which it deals are treated in the Rules of Evidence. The use of leading questions, both generally and in the interrogation of an adverse party or witness identified with him, is the subject of Evidence Rule 611(c). Who may impeach is treated in Evidence Rule 601 and scope of cross-examination is covered in Evidence Rule 611(b). The subdivision is accordingly deleted. Subdivision (c). Offers of proof and making a record of excluded evidence are treated in Evidence Rule 103. The subdivision is no longer needed or appropriate and is deleted. REFERENCES IN TEXT The Federal Rules of Evidence, referred to in subsec. (a), are set out in this Appendix. EFFECTIVE Date of AmendmENTS PROPOSED NOVEMBER 20, 1972, AND DECEMBER 18, 1972 Amendments of this rule embraced by orders entered by the Supreme Court of the United States on November 20, 1972, and December 18, 1972, effective on the 180th day beginning after January 2, 1975, see section 3 of Pub. L. 93-595, Jan. 2, 1975, 88 Stat. 1959, set out as a note under section 2071 of this title. CROSS REFERENCES Amendment of pleading to conform to evidence, see rule 15. Certified public accountant as witness before master, statement of accounts as evidence, see rule 53. Compelling giving of testimony, application of rules, see rule 81. Depositions of witnesses in foreign country, see section 1781 of this title. Documentary evidence, see section 1731 et seq. of this title. Evidence Generally, see section 1731 et seq. of this title. Exceptions to rulings unnecessary, see rule 46. Harmless error in admitting or excluding evidence, see rule 61. Interested persons, competency, see section 1822 of this title. Notary public and other persons authorized to administer oaths required by laws of the United States, see section 2903 of Title 5, Government Organization and Employees. Offer of judgment, see rule 68. Perpetuation of testimony by action, see rule 27. Proof of official record, see rule 44. Record made in regular course of business, see section 1732 of this title. Record on appeal, form of testimony included in, see Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, rule 10. Subpoena for attendance of witnesses and obtaining evidence, see rule 45. Transcript of evidence, filing by master with report, see rule 53. United States, evidence to establish claim on default, see rule 55. Witnesses generally, see section 1821 et seq. of this title. Rule 44. Proof of Official Record (a) AUTHENTICATION. (1) Domestic. An official record kept within the United States, or any state, district, commonwealth, territory, or insular possession thereof, or within the Panama Canal Zone, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, or the Ryukyu Islands, or an entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied by a certificate that such officer has the custody. The certificate may be made by a judge of a court of record of the district or political subdivision in which the record is kept, authenticated by the seal of the court, or may be made by any public officer having a seal of office and having official duties in the district or political subdivision in which the record is kept, authenticated by the seal of his office. (2) Foreign. A foreign official record, or an entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof; or a copy thereof, attested by a person authorized to make the attestation, and accompanied by a final certification as to the genuineness of the signature and official position (i) of the attesting person, or (ii) of any foreign official whose certificate of genuineness of signature and official position relates to the attestation or is in a chain of certificates of genuineness of signature and official position relating to the attestation. A final certification may be made by a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent of the United States, or a diplomatic or consular official of the foreign country assigned or accredited to the United States. If reasonable opportunity has been given to all parties to investigate the authenticity and accuracy of the documents, the court may, for good cause shown, (i) admit an attested copy without final certification or (ii) permit the foreign official record to be evidenced by an attested summary with or without a final certification. (b) LACK OF RECORD. A written statement that after diligent search no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records designated by the statement, authenticated as provided in subdivision (a)(1) of this rule in the case of a domestic record, or complying with the requirements of subdivision (a)(2) of this rule for a summary in the case of a foreign record, is admissible as evidence that the records contain no such record or entry. (c) OTHER PROOF. This rule does not prevent the proof of official records or of entry or lack of entry therein by any other method authorized by law. (As amended Feb. 28, 1966, eff. July 1, 1966.) NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES This rule provides a simple and uniform method of proving public records, and entry or lack of entry therein, in all cases including those specifically provided for by statutes of the United States. Such stat utes are not superseded, however, and proof may also be made according to their provisions whenever they differ from this rule. Some of those statutes are: U.S.C., Title 28, former: 8661 § 662 § 663 § 664 § 665 § 666 § 670 8 671 § 672 (Copies of department or corporation records and papers; admissibility; seal) (Same; in office of General Counsel of the Treasury) (Instruments and papers of Comptroller of Currency; admissibility) (Organization certificates of national banks; admissibility) (Transcripts from books of Treasury in suits against delinquents; admissibility) (Same; certificate by Secretary or Assistant Secretary) (Admissibility of copies of statements of demands by Post Office Department) (Admissibility of copies of post office records and statement of accounts) (Admissibility of copies of records in General Land Office) (Admissibility of copies of records, and so forth, of Patent Office) (Copies of foreign letters patent as prima facie evidence) (Copies of specifications and drawings of patents admissible) (Extracts from Journals of Congress admissible when injunction of secrecy removed) (Copies of records in offices of United States consuls admissible) (Books and papers in certain district courts) 8673 8 674 8 675 8 676 8 677 8 678 § 679 (Records in clerks' offices, western district of North Carolina) NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE on RULES-1966 Subdivision (a)(1). These provisions on proof of official records kept within the United States are similar in substance to those heretofore appearing in Rule 44. There is a more exact description of the geographical areas covered. An official record kept in one of the areas enumerated qualifies for proof under subdivision (a)(1) even though it is not a United States official record. For example, an official record kept in one of these areas by a government in exile falls within subdivision (a)(1). It also falls within subdivision (a)(2) which may be availed of alternatively. Cf. Banco de Espana v. Federal Reserve Bank, 114 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1940). Subdivision (a)(2). Foreign official records may be proved, as heretofore, by means of official publications thereof. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 1 F.R.D. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1939). Under this rule, a document that, on its face, appears to be an official publication, is admissible, unless a party opposing its admission into evidence shows that it lacks that character. The rest of subdivision (a)(2) aims to provide greater clarity, efficiency, and flexibility in the procedure for authenticating copies of foreign official records. The reference to attestation by "the officer having the legal custody of the record," hitherto appearing in Rule 44, has been found inappropriate for official records kept in foreign countries where the assumed relation between custody and the authority to attest does not obtain. See 2B Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice & Procedure § 992 (Wright ed. 1961). Accordingly it is provided that an attested copy may be obtained from any person authorized by the law of the foreign country to make the attestation without regard to whether he is charged with responsibility for maintaining the record or keeping it in his custody. Under Rule 44 a United States foreign service officer has been called on to certify to the authority of the foreign official attesting the copy as well as the genuineness of his signature and his official position. See Schlesinger, Comparative Law 57 (2d ed. 1959); Smit, International Aspects of Federal Civil Procedure, 61 Colum.L.Rev. 1031, 1063 (1961); 22 C.F.R. § 92.41(a), (e) (1958). This has created practical difficulties. For example, the question of the authority of the foreign officer might raise issues of foreign law which were beyond the knowledge of the United States officer. The difficulties are met under the amended rule by eliminating the element of the authority of the attesting foreign official from the scope of the certifying process, and by specifically permitting use of the chain-certificate method. Under this method, it is sufficient if the original attestation purports to have been issued by an authorized person and is accompanied by a certificate of another foreign official whose certificate may in turn be followed by that of a foreign official of higher rank. The process continues until a foreign official is reached as to whom the United States foreign service official (or a diplomatic or consular officer of the foreign country assigned or accredited to the United States) has adequate information upon which to base a "final certification." See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Aronson, 38 F.Supp. 687 (W.D. Pa. 1941); 22 C.F.R. § 92.37 (1958). The final certification (a term used in contradistinction to the certificates prepared by the foreign officials in a chain) relates to the incumbency and genuineness of signature of the foreign official who attested the copy of the record or, where the chain-certificate method is used, of a foreign official whose certificate appears in the chain, whether that certificate is the last in the chain or not. A final certification may be prepared on the basis of material on file in the consulate or any other satisfactory information. Although the amended rule will generally facilitate proof of foreign official records, it is recognized that in some situations it may be difficult or even impossi |