and has failed to prevent a recur- 537 F.2d at 831. The court commented that Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 S.Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976), did not cast any doubt on the instant case since its holding that the complaint stated a claim was not based on generalized constitutional duties to prevent future police misconduct or to act in the face of a statistical pattern of misconduct. Since the case did not involve any assertion of vicarious liability, and plaintiff did not seek equitable relief which would implicate principles of comity and federalism, the case would not interject the federal court into the supervision of a police department. The plaintiff in Kellerman v. Askew, 541 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1976), brought an action for money damages and injunctive relief against the governor and other state officials of the state of Florida and corrections division personnel for failure to furnish necessary medical treatment. The district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants based upon plaintiff's failure to show they had personal knowledge was reversed by the court of appeals which stated: While it is undisputed that none of Indeed, this Court has held that inaction on the part of governmental agencies can result in constitutional deprivations Thus, Kellerman's suit is founded on [B]efore they can be exonerated from 541 F.2d at 1091. The plaintiff in McCollan v. Tate, 575 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1978), was arrested as a result of his brother's having used his name. He was kept in custody for a period of one week until the error was noticed and he was released. The district court's directed verdict for the sheriff in plaintiff's subsequent civil rights action was reversed by the court of appeals. The sheriff's office had failed to furnish the mugshots and fingerprints of plaintiff's brother for comparison with plaintiff. Referring to Bryan v. Jones, supra, the court stated: Bryan made clear that in a section 1983 false imprisonment action the reasonable good faith of the sheriff comes into play only as a defense. To make out a prima facie case, a plaintiff need show only: (1) intent to confine; (2) acts resulting in confinement; and (3) consciousness of the victim of confinement or resulting harm Since the deputies' actions were authorized by Sheriff Baker and the same actions were in keeping with the policies of the Potter County Sheriff's Department at that time, plaintiff established his prima facie case against Sheriff Baker. incur liability under section 1983 a state official need not directly subject a person to a deprivation of his constitutional rights To [H]e can be held liable if he causes the plaintiff to be subjected to a deprivation of his constitutional rights 575 F.2d at 512. The court found that the sheriff's failures to require his deputies to transmit the mugshots and fingerprints "caused" plaintiff's detention. Therefore, plaintiff had made out a prima facie case. Reimer v. Short, 578 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1978) held that the district court had properly dismissed plaintiff's claim against the police chief since there was no evidence that he had participated in, had knowledge of, or was negligent with regard to the actions of the defendant police officers. 7. Sixth Circuit The Sixth Circuit generally follows the other circuits in holding that the doctrine of respondeat superior is inapplicable in section 1983 actions. "Therefore, absent an allegation that a named-defendant has personally subjected the plaintiff to a deprivation of his constitutional rights or has caused the conduct complained of or participated in some manner in the allegedly unlawful actions [it is] insufficient to state a claim against such defendant under § 1983. Knipp v. Weikle, 405 F.Supp. 782, 783 (N.D. Ohio 1975). The court further decided that the existence of a state statute which specifically allowed for vicarious liability recovery against a state officer could not be extended to create a federal cause of action and impose vicarious liability upon that person in a section 1983 action. 8. Seventh Circuit The Seventh Circuit noted in Adams v. Pate, 445 F.2d 105, 107 n. 2 (7th Cir. 1971), that although respondeat superior did not apply in actions for money damages, it might apply in actions seeking equitable relief. Little v. Walker, 552 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1977) reversed the district court's dismissal of an amended complaint alleging acts of physical violence, sexual assault, and other crimes by inmates. Plaintiffs sought to hold the director and former director of the department of corrections, the governor of the state, and other supervisory officials liable for failing to protect plaintiff-inmates from other inmates. The district court's dismissal was based on a finding that defendants did not fail to apply the law as it existed at the time and were not motivated by actual malice. To this the court of appeals replied: Thus while an official "has, of course, no duty to anticipate unforeseeable constitutional developments" he cannot hide behind a claim that the Violent attacks and sexual assaults by inmates upon the plaintiff while in protective segregation are mainfestly "'inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency. ་་ "Deliberate indifference" to these happenings ་་ More it was held that under the Eighth Amendment prisoners are entitled to protection from the assaults of other prisoners. 552 F.2d at 197 Supervisory officials are not liable under respondeat superior. A complaint must allege personal involvement which is satisfied by an allegation that the constitutional deprivation took place at the direction of the supervisor or with his knowledge and consent. 71 Perry v. Elrod, 436 F.Supp. 229 (N.D. Ill. 71. See also Cochran v. Rowe, 438 F.Supp. 566 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (respondeat superior inapplicable, personal involvement is required). 1977). McDonald v. Illinois, 557 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1977) noted: We are not aware of any decision which holds a local government entity liable in money damages for the constitutional deprivations committed by its agents, independently of any official policy. The principle of respondeat superior has not been applied under § 1983, although it must be noted that the opportunity to apply it to municipal bodies was foreclosed by the statutory interpretation that such bodies were not subject to § 1983 liability.72 557 F.2d at 604. 9. Eighth Circuit Jennings v. Davis, 476 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1973) affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claim alleging she had received physical and emotional injuries when she was subjected to an assault and battery by a civilian police clerk after her arrest for a speeding violation. The suit as to the civilian clerk, who had been discharged by the defendant members of the board of police commissioners, was dismissed, and the chief of police and commissioners also sought dismissal, averring that each had no personal knowledge of the incident, was not present at the time, and did not direct or order the arrest or subsequent action relating to plaintiff. The patrolman stated that although he was present at the time of the incident, he had not been involved in any act directed toward plaintiff and had no supervisory authority. The desk sergeant admitted that he had been present but averred that he had not become involved in the incident and had been unable to intervene. The arresting officer admitted that he had given plaintiff a speeding summons but he had not been present during the incident of which 72. The opportunity does now exist in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Monell, supra, that municipalities are "persons" under section 1983. However, Monell commented that municipalities will not be liable under respondeat superior in 1983 actions. |