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substitute for proof of acquiescence. (3) The degree of participation required is less when only injunctive relief is requested. 69

Absent proof of affirmative involvement of supervisory personnel, federal injunctive relief was denied in Lewis v. Hyland, 554 F.2d 93 (3d Cir. 1977). There, travelers on New Jersey's roads sought injunctive relief against the New Jersey state police for alleged Fourth Amendment violations. The court of appeals noted that the district court's extensive fact finding revealed callous indifference by the New Jersey state police for the rights of citizens using the roads and commented that prior to Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 S.Ct. 598, 46 L. Ed. 2d 561 (1976), they would have reversed the district court's denial of injunctive relief. However, the court stated:

The Supreme Court, however, has recently given expression to the doctrine of federal equitable abstention as it relates to federal court intervention in local police operations. In light of Rizzo v. Goode, supra, in which the Supreme Court reversed this Court's approval of an injunction against widespread police abuses in Philadelphia, we conclude that the record of law enforcement abuses as it appears in this case -- dismaying as it is -- will not support federal injunctive relief.

554 F.2d at 95.

5. Fourth Circuit

Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926 (4th Cir. 1977) approved the dismissal of the complaint alleging denial of medical care as to defendant Gibbs, Superintendent of Jails for the State of Virginia. By statute the sheriff, and not Gibbs, was responsible for prisoners' medical needs:

68. Holland v. Connors, 491 F.2d 539, 541 (5th Cir. 1974).

69. Downs, supra note 55.

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550 F.2d at 928. The court noted that the plaintiff failed to allege facts indicating Gibbs' personal involvement in the denial of medical care70 and stated:

Id.

Although § 1983 must be "read

against the background of tort
liability that makes a man responsi-
ble for the natural consequences of
his actions," Monroe v. Pape,
"[1]iability will only lie where it
is affirmatively shown that the
official charged acted personally
in the deprivation of the plain-
tiff's rights. The doctrine of
respondeat superior has no applica-
tion under this section.

Having failed to allege any
personal connection between Gibbs
and any denial of Vinnedge's consti-
tutional rights, the action against
him must fail.

6. Fifth Circuit

Holland v. Connors, 491 F.2d 539 (5th Cir. 1974) vacated the district court's dismissal of a complaint

70. See also Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147 (4th Cir. 1978) (no claim stated against warden where personal involvement was not alleged).

without a response or a hearing. The plaintiff alleged that prison authorities coerced a false confession, placed an unwarranted statement pertaining to a homosexual offense in plaintiff's file, and improperly imposed confinement in administrative segregation. Plaintiff alleged that although the defendant prison superintendent was not present during the illegal questioning, he was legally responsible since the practices were so widespread and had been standard procedure so long he must have been aware of them. The court found that reversal was required since it could not say with assurance that the allegations of the pro se complaint proved no set of facts which would entitle him to relief. "Moreover, fundamental tenets of tort law, negligence and vicarious liability, cardinal doctrines upon which this and other circuits have invoked prophylactic application of the Civil Rights Act, are sufficiently broad to support such relief against Superintendent Connors on the basis of the bare allegations made." 491 F.2d at 541.

Money damages for medical mistreatment and neglect while incarcerated were sought in Taylor v. Gibson, 529 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1976). The court of appeals reversed the district court's dismissal of the action and, regarding the liability of the sheriff stated:

Taylor's assertions of Sheriff Gibson's liability appear to have been dismissed below because they were predicated upon a theory of respondeat superior, and thus could not support a Section 1983 claim. This determination will not withstand examination. Study of the complaint shows that Sheriff Gibson is charged both with derivative liability from the actions of his deputies, and with numerous direct actions involving deprivations of plaintiff's constitutional rights. Moreover assertions of insulation from liability because Section 1983 does not permit derivative, respondeat superior, liability are questionable, and, at best, overbroad. It is true that some cases hold that absent overt acts, Section 1983 does not authorize recovery of monetary damages through respondeat superior, but this

Circuit has carved out some exceptions
to this rule. A sheriff may be held
liable for the actions of his appointed
deputies, over whom he has control, in
certain circumstances
Even

more to the point this Court has
established in several fairly recent
cases that "prison administrators
may under certain circumstances be
held vicariously liable for the acts
of their subordinates.
At this

stage it is simply impossible to
determine whether or not Taylor's
broad allegations will support deriva-
tive liability under a respondeat
superior theory.

529 F.2d at 716.

Where plaintiff had been improperly held in custody under a warrant based on an indictment which had been dismissed, the court held that the jailor could be liable if he negligently established a record keeping system in which such errors could occur. Bryan v. Jones, 530 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 865, 97 S.Ct. 174, 50 L.Ed.2d 145 (1976).

Harris v. Chanclor, 537 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1976) affirmed a $12,000 jury verdict against a police officer who had beaten plaintiff up and the jailor who was present and did not attempt to object, intervene or obtain medical assistance for plaintiff. On appeal, the jailor argued that he was entitled to an instruction that "he would only be liable if he had 'willfully or culpably denied the plaintiff [medical attention] under such circumstances that it would shock the conscience of ordinarily reasonable people' and that 'a good faith error in judgment' amounting to 'mere negligence' would not support a verdict." 537 F.2d at 205. The court found it unnecessary to determine whether the jailor was entitled to such an instruction since a warden's deliberate indifference to an inmate's severe and obvious injuries is tantamount to an intentional infliction of cruel and unusual punishment. Further, the court recognized cases holding a supervisory officer liable under section 1983 for refusing to intervene in the beating of an inmate by his subordinates in his presence. Consequently, any error in the instructions on the issue of the jailor's intent was harmless.

The dismissal of a claim of unlawful arrest and physical abuse was reversed as to supervisory defendants including the mayor of Atlanta, the chief of police, and members of the police committee in Sims v. Adams, 537 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1976). The complaint alleged that defendants subjected Atlanta citizens to a systematic pattern of racial violence by police, that defendants knew or should have known of one officer's prior violent misconduct against blacks, and that they failed to discipline him or prevent further violence. The district court had dismissed, finding that no personal participation was alleged. However, the court of appeals found that the district court had misunderstood the nature of personal participation required to establish a section 1983 claim:

The language of § 1983 requires

a degree of causation as an element of
individual liability, but it does not
specifically require "personal partici-
pation." The proper question is
therefore whether the complaint
adequately alleges the requisite causal
connection between the supervisory
defendants' actions and a deprivation
of plaintiff's constitutional rights.
"Personal participation" is only one
of several theories which can be used
to establish causation.

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Another theory which includes the requisite causation is that a supervisory defendant is subject to § 1983 liability when he breaches a duty imposed by state or local law, and this breach causes plaintiff's constitutional injury We have previously sustained a judgment against a Georgia police chief on the theory that his improper performance of training and supervisory duties made him liable for a physical beating administered by a subordinate policeman. Beverly v. Morris, 470 F.2d 1356 (5th Cir. 1972). We have also indicated, admittedly without reference to Georgia law, that a complaint alleging that a police supervisor has notice of past

culpable conduct of his subordinates

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