reasonable juror could have 579 F.2d at 741. Punitive damages in the amount of $25,000 against the deputy sheriff and $10,000 against the police officer who allegedly beat plaintiff after arresting him without a warrant and without probable cause were affirmed in Vetters v. Berry, 575 F.2d 90 (6th Cir. 1978). Jury awards of punitive damages in the amount of $60,000 against a judge and $1,000 against a deputy sheriff were affirmed in Zarcone v. Perry, 572 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1978).308 The judge had directed the deputy sheriff to bring the plaintiff, a coffee vendor, before him in handcuffs because the coffee tasted "putrid." With the plaintiff standing before him in handcuffs the judge conducted an inquisition, screaming at him, threatening him and his livelihood, and scaring him. The incident led to the judge's removal from the bench. The court found that under the circumstances it could not say that the jury had acted out of "passion and prejudice" or that the verdict shocked the court's conscience. The court stated: "Given Perry's position, his relationship of power and authority to plaintiff, who was a simple coffee vendor, the handcuffing, threats and intimidation inflicted upon plaintiff, and Perry's outrageous conduct, we are not compelled to conclude that the jury acted out of 'passion and prejudice. '" 572 F.2d at 57. Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 120 (2d Cir. 1978) urged caution in the exercise of the court's equitable powers in conditions of confinement cases, and stated: [A]lthough district courts are empowered with broad discretion to frame equitable remedies so long as the relief granted is commensurate with the scope of the 308. The jury also awarded the plaintiff compensatory damages in the amount of $80,000 against both defendants. 309. The principles of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971) limiting the power of federal courts to enjoin state criminal proceedings and the application of those principles to some civil proceedings are not treated in this volume. But see Aldisert, On Being Civil to Younger, 11 Conn. L. Rev. 181 (1979). constitutional infraction, a trial judge must tread carefully in less substantial matters best left to the expertise of prison officials." 573 F.2d at 120. The court of appeals noted that the district court had intervened broadly into almost every facet of the institution and stated: In most instances, the able district 573 F.2d at 121. Ahrens v. Thomas, 570 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1978) held that the district court had improperly prescribed specific standards for future construction of a new county jail. The court stated that "in prescribing specific standards for future construction and operation and in retaining jurisdiction for the purpose of insuring conformance therewith, it is our opinion that the district court has impermissibly intruded into the affairs of state prison administration." 570 F.2d at 289. Detainees of Brooklyn House of Detention for Men v. Malcolm, 520 F.2d 392, 399 (2d Cir. 1975), dealt with the problems faced by district courts when defendants claim inadequate finances to provide constitutionally adequate prison facilities. In that case the court stated: Inadequate resources of finances can never be an excuse for depriving detainees of their constitutional rights. . . . On the other hand, as the above authorities indicate, this Court is hardly in the position to order the City to raise the necessary funds to build additional facilities. We can, however, order the release of persons held under conditions which deprive them of rights guaranteed by the Constitution unless the conditions are corrected within a reasonable time. 520 F.2d at 399. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's order prohibiting incarceration of pretrial detainees at the Charles Street Jail in Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, 573 F.2d 98 (1st Cit. 1978). However, the court of appeals modified the district court's order to allow the prison officials a period of six months in which to make interim arrangements prior to closing the jail to pretrial detainees. court stated: Plaintiffs are entitled to be incarcerated under constitutional conditions of confinement. We are prepared, because of practical exigencies, to allow the plaintiff class to be incarcerated under lower standards for a fixed interim period while an appropriate facility is being readied. However, However, there is no legal basis for our permitting unconstitutional conditions to continue interminably. 573 F.2d at 101. The The district court in Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974), had found that the conditions at the Manhattan House of Dentention for Men, which housed pretrial detainees, were unconstitutional and ordered the city to submit within thirty days a comprehensive and detailed plan for the elimination of all conditions and practices declared to be in violation of the Constitution of the United States by the court's earlier opinion. The city refused to submit the required plan. Thereupon, the district judge enjoined the city from further confining anyone in the Tombs after a certain date. The judge did make it clear that he would reconsider his order if the city submitted a plan. The court of appeals found that the conditions did violate the Constitution as found by the district judge and in response to the defendants' complaint that they were given only thirty days to comply with the order, the court of appeals noted that the order was actually entered two months after the judge had filed a thorough opinion finding the conditions of confinement to be unconstitutional. The court of appeals noted that the case was unusual in that substantial physical changes in a jail located in the heart of a large metropolitan area were required. The court stated; [W]e believe that the order should functions by a fixed date, unless 507 F.2d at 340. The court noted that this procedure The district court in Welsch v. Likins, 550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977) had found that unconstitutional practices and conditions existed at a state hospital for mentally retarded persons and had entered an order requiring improvements in the physical plant, the addition of staff members, and other changes. The defendants were directed to seek necessary funding through regular administrative and legislative channels. They did so but the legislature failed to respond and the defendants were not able to comply fully with the requirements of the court. Plaintiffs then filed a supplemental complaint seeking to enjoin state officials from enforcing the provisions of the state Constitution which prohibited expenditures of public funds except upon legal appropriations. 550 F.2d at 1127. The district court, finding it had authority, entered the injunction. On appeal the defendants argued that the order violated the Eleventh Amendment. However, the court of appeals determined that if the state chose to operate hospitals for the mentally retarded, it was required to meet minimal constitutional standards. That obligation could not yield to financial considerations. The court stated: Alternatives to the operation of the existing state hospital system, including Cambridge, may appear undesirable, but alternatives do exist. Primarily, it is the function of the state to determine whether it is going to operate a system of hospitals which comply with constitutional standards, and, if so, what kind of a hospital system it is going to operate. And it is the function |