SECTION XVII: RELIEF Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1977) stated: A § 1983 plaintiff's burden constitutional rights. But, no 566 F.2d at 831. Actions seeking money damages were distinguished from actions for injunctive relief in Collins v. Schoonfield, 363 F.Supp. 1152, 1155 (D. Md. 1973). In an action seeking injunctive relief the court is concerned with the constitutionality of long term practices and procedures in the institution. However, when the plaintiff is seeking money damages the court is called upon to rule upon specific acts of allegedly unconstitutional conduct committed by the individual defendants. Judge Harvey observed that federal courts have been taking an increasingly enlightened and progressive approach in considering constitutional attacks on the conditions of confinement in state and local penal institutions. Standards formerly accepted are now rejected. However, when the plaintiff is seeking compensatory and punitive damages against an individual defendant, the defendant's liability is personal in nature, intended to be satisfied out of the individual defendant's pocket. The court stated: "It has therefore been recognized that it would contravene basic notions of fundamental fairness if prison officials were held to be liable monetarily for acts which they could not reasonably have known were unlawful." 363 F.Supp. at 1156. In Wycoff v. Brewer, 572 F.2d 1260 (8th Cir. 1978), the court stated: However, it is one thing to grant to prison inmates, including violent or recalcitrant ones, prospective declaratory or injunctive relief designed to protect them in the future from unconstitutional practices or conditions. It is quite another thing to expose prison personnel, including personnel in the higher echelons of prison administration and policy formulation, to personal pecuniary liability in suits brought by largely irresponsible inmates under § 1983. In Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L. Ed. 2d 252 (1978), the Court held that where the plaintiff shows a deprivation of due process but fails to show actual injury resulting from the deprivation, he is entitled to nominal damages of one dollar. In that case the plaintiffs had been suspended from school without due process of law. The district court declined to award damages because the plaintiffs had offered no evidence of the extent of their injuries. In response to plaintiffs' argument that they should be awarded substantial damages for the deprivation of a constitutional right, whether or not any injury was caused by the deprivation, the Court stated: "To the extent that Congress intended that awards under § 1983 should deter the deprivation of constitutional rights, there is no evidence that it meant to establish a deterrent more formidable than that inherent in the award of compensatory damages." 435 U.S. at 256, 98 S. Ct. at 1048, 55 L. Ed. 2d at 260. The Court recognized that it was difficult to determine damage awards under section 1983, but determined that the starting point should be the rules developed over the years through the common law of torts. 435 U.S. at 257, 98 S.Ct. at 1049, 55 L. Ed. 2d at 261. The Court stated: In order to further the purpose 435 U.S. at 258, 98 S.Ct. at 1050, 55 L.Ed.2d at 262. Discussing the facts of plaintiffs' case the Court recognized that the purpose of the procedural due process rules is not protection from the actual deprivation but protection from mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or property. The Court agreed with the defendants that injury could not be presumed from a denial of due process. Plaintiffs were required to prove injury in order to recover compensatory damages. If plaintiffs' deprivations, i.e., their suspensions, were justified, they could not recover damages for their suspensions although they could recover damages for any mental and emotional distress which was actually caused by the denial of due process. The Court concluded: In sum, then, although mental and 435 U.S. at 264, 98 S.Ct. at 1052, 55 L.Ed.2d at 265. Further, the Court stated: "More importantly, the elements and prerequisites for recovery of damages appropriate to compensate injuries caused by the deprivation of one constitutional right are not necessarily appropriate to compensate injuries caused by the deprivation of another. 435 U.S. at 264, 98 S.Ct. at 1053, 55 L. Ed. 2d at 265. The Court concluded: Because the right to procedural due process is "absolute" in the sense that it does not depend upon the merits of a claimant's substantive assertions, and because of the importance to organized society that procedural due process be observed, we believe that the denial of procedural due process should be actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury. We therefore hold that if, upon remand, the District Court determines that respondents' suspensions were justified, respondents nevertheless will be entitled to recover nominal damages not to exceed one dollar from petitioners. 435 U.S. at 266, 98 S.Ct. at 1054, 55 L.Ed.2d at 266. In The opinion in Perez v. Rodriguez Bou, 575 F.2d 21 (1st Cir. 1978), was written before Carey but was not released until after Carey had been decided. footnote 2, 575 F.2d at 25, the court commented that it was consistent with Carey. In that case the court approved the district court's award of $1,000 as damages for each plaintiff. The plaintiffs had been suspended from the university because of their allegedly disruptive activity during a march to the office of the chancellor. None of the students had received any form of hearing prior to their suspension and a subsequent hearing revealed that the suspensions were unwarranted and they were revoked. In explaining its award the district court stated: This valuation is not an "evaluation" 575 F.2d at 25. The court noted that although it had suggested that a plaintiff who proved only an intangible loss of civil rights or purely mental suffering could be awarded substantial compensatory damages, it had never indicated that such damages were required to be awarded for either intangible loss or mental distress. Plaintiffs' only evidence of actual injury were their own statements that they experienced some psychological discomfort as a result of their suspensions. The court noted that courts are not inclined to award compensatory damages for general mental distress or unexplained negative effects of violations of constitutional rights. Therefore, the court deferred to the judgment of the district court as to the appropriate damages. The court noted that the defendants had not acted out of malicious bad faith and the case did not involve repeated deprivations or harassment. Rather, it involved an isolated error in the administration of university discipline. 575 F.2d at 25. In United States ex rel. Tyrrell v. Speaker, 535 F.2d 823, 829 (3d Cir. 1976), the district court had found that plaintiff was entitled to nominal damages only because the conditions in administrative segregation, in which he was improperly placed, were less restrictive than the conditions in the county prison from which he had been transferred. The court of appeals reduced the nominal damages from $500 to $1.00.305 The court commented that federal courts could look to state law to determine the amount of nominal damages to be awarded. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 494, 93 S. Ct. 1827, 1838, 36 L.Ed.2d 439, 453 (1973) recognized in dictum that money damages are available to prisoners in actions under section 1983. Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1971) held that federal law enforcement officers could be held liable to plaintiff for money damages for violating 305. Accord, Magnett v. Pelletier, 488 F.2d 33 (1st Cir. 1973). See also Thompson v. Burke, 556 F.2d 231, 240 (3d Cir. 1977), where the court stated: "[w]here nominal damages are to be awarded, the amount should be $1.00." |