Id.

wrongful.

Emotional involvement in a lawsuit is not enough to meet the case or controversy requirement; were the rule otherwise, few cases could ever become moot.

Since

Slavin v. Curry, 574 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), was an action against a state court judge and other officials for conspiring to bring criminal charges against plaintiff. Plaintiff alleged that the judge cancelled plaintiff's original bond and directed the court reporters to alter the trial transcript. the judge would be immune from damages, plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that his actions were unconstitutional and a violation of section 1983. court of appeals found that the district judge had erred in dismissing the action upon his finding that there was no longer an active controversy between the parties. Although the state appellate court had vacated the conviction and directed a retrial, the record did not reveal the outcome of any subsequent state proceedings against plaintiff. The court

stated:

It is true that courts will grant
declaratory relief only if there
is "a substantial controversy of
sufficient immediacy and reality
between parties having adverse
legal interests. . . In this

case, whether there is such a
substantial controversy will
depend upon Slavin's current
condition. If he has not been
retried on the same charges,
these defendants may continue
to infringe his constitutionally
guaranteed rights. If that possi-
bility were proved, the district
court is not foreclosed from
enjoining the judge and others
from continuing their conduct.
It may be, however, that Slavin

has been retried and found innocent.
If that be true, the district court

The

will probably conclude that equitable relief would be inappropriate. If Slavin is

presently in prison after

having been convicted, whatever
controversy may exist would be
between Slavin and the state
official responsible for continu-
ing his imprisonment. Under
those circumstances, there would
be no controversy between the
judge and Slavin. Because we do
not know which of those conditions
is true, we remand the claim
against Judge Lindsey to the
district court for further
proceedings.

574 F.2d at 1264.

The district court in Main Road v. Aytch, 565 F.2d 54 (3d Cir. 1977), should have entered a declaratory judgment for the plaintiffs rather than dismissing their complaint. After a remand from the court of appeals the superintendent of Philadelphia prisons had adopted new regulations relating to press conferences. The new regulations eliminated consideration of content a basis for denial of a press interview and instituted an administrative review program. The district court approved the new regulations and dismissed the complaint. The court of appeals determined that the district court should have entered a declaratory judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The court stated:

As a result of the litiga

tion, defendant has been required
to eliminate consideration of
content as a basis for denial of
a press interview, to promulgate
regulations and to institute an
administrative review procedure.
These steps have been taken, not
merely as a settlement, but in
response to directions of this
court and with the approval of
the district court. Plaintiffs,
therefore, are entitled to entry
of a judgment with the benefits of
res judicata or collateral estoppel.

In the absence of definitive

court action, the plaintiffs
would produce nothing binding upon
the defendant and his successors.
There has been no agreement between
the parties and therefore a consent
decree would not be appropriate.
However, a declaratory judgment in
favor of the plaintiffs is in order.
It should indicate that the plain-
tiffs are entitled to prevail to the
extent provided in our earlier
opinion and on this appeal. More-
over, the judgment should declare
that the regulations as submitted
and amended by the defendant are
acceptable compliance with
directions of the court.

565 F.2d at 59.

Where the plaintiffs are not proceeding as a class, a declaratory judgment in their favor may not be applied to other prisoners. McKinnon v. Patterson, 568 F.2d 930, 940 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,

U.S.

98 S.Ct. 1282, 55 L.Ed.2d 792 (1978) In McKinnon the district court found the three plaintiffs were not given adequate disciplinary hearings and ordered:

"[I]n future adjustment committee
proceedings involving keeplock,
1) formal written notification of
the charges must be given to the
inmate at least 24 hours before
the hearing and 2) no one with
direct, personal involvement in
the incident upon which the
complaint against the inmate is
based may sit on that case."

568 F.2d at 933. The parties raised questions as to whether the order was injunctive in character rather than merely declaratory. The court of appeals construed it as declaratory only.

While the declaratory judgment applies only to the plaintiffs, it may have stare decisis effect as to other prisoners. Young Women's Christian Ass'n. of Princeton, N.J. v. Kugler, 463 F.2d 203 (3d Cir. 1972).

D. Immunities

The courts have developed two very different types of immunities for officials absolute immunity and qualified good faith immunity. The absolute immunity is a complete defense to all actions taken by the official within the scope of his jurisdiction. The qualified good faith immunity more closely resembles a good faith defense than a true immunity and shields an official from claims for money damages if he has followed the applicable law and acted in good faith.

The immunities usually apply only to claims for damages and do not bar claims for injunctive relief. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 314 n. 6, 95 S.Ct. 992, 997 n. 6, 43 L.Ed.2d 214, 221 n. 6 (1975); Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 10, 15 n. 4 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (federal prosecutor); Timmerman v. Brown, 528 F.2d 811, 812 (4th Cir. 1975) (magistrate and prosecutor); Slavin v. Curry, 574 F.2d 1256, 1264 (5th Cir. 1978) (judge and prosecutor); Shipp v. Todd, 568 F.2d 133, 134 (9th Cir. 1978) (clerk of court).

Rud v. Dahl, 578 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1978) noted that judges are not immune when the plaintiff is seeking declaratory and injunctive relief without money damages.

The Third Circuit holds that prosecutors are immune from claims for equitable relief. Helstoski v. Goldstein, 552 F.2d 564, 566 n. 9 (3d Cir. 1977); Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830, 834 (3d Cir. 1976). However, it has declined to decide whether state court judges are immune from actions for injunctive relief. Conover v. Montemuro, 477 F.2d 1073, 1093-94 (3d Cir. 1973).

Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967) held that the common law immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts committed

267. See Comment, Immunity of Federal and State Judges from Civil Suit--Time for a Qualified Immunity?, 27 Case Western Res. L. Rev. 727 (1977).