controversy be $10,000 in value jurisdiction . We think resolution of that issue here must await the plaintiffs' decision whether or not to amend their complaint properly to allege § 1331 jurisdictional facts. 528 F.2d at 1201 n. 10. Spock v. David, 469 F.2d 1047 (3d Cir. 1972) stated: Section 1331 refers both to sum and to value. In cases in which 238 469 F.2d at 1052. However, Amen v. City of Dearborn, 532 F.2d 554 (6th Cir. 1976) held: "Plaintiff's claim 1 of a 'right' to continue to live in their 'unique, Arab Moslem majority, neighborhood, even if a common and undivided interest, cannot aid them in meeting the jurisdictional amount required. Such right, clearly 'incapable of monetary valuation' cannot support section 1331 jurisdiction.' 532 F.2d at 559. 238. See same case at 502 F.2d 953 (3d Cir. 1974), rev'd on merits, Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 96 S.Ct. 1211, 47 L.Ed.2d 505 (1976). Grant v. Hogan, 505 F.2d 1220 (3d Cir. 1974) was an action by a federal prisoner seeking relief from a detainer lodged against him by the state. The court held that he was required to exhaust state remedies before proceeding through federal habeas corpus. was no jurisdiction under section 1983 since the defendant warden was a federal official. The court stated: While he might be able to sue under 505 F.2d at 1225. There Briggs v. Godwin, 569 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1977) held that under 28 U.S.C. section 1391 (e), the United States District Court for the District of Columbia had proper venue of a civil rights action for money damages against an attorney for the Department of Justice who resided in the District of Columbia and two other prosecutors and an FBI agent who resided in Florida. Plaintiff's claim for money damages against the federal officials did not deprive the court of venue. SECTION XI: DEFENSES A. Statute of Limitations Since there is no federal statute of limitations for civil rights actions under section 1983, the statę. 239 statute of limitations for analogous actions applies. Walden III, Inc. v. State of Rhode Island, 576 F.2d 945 (1st Cir. 1978); Slavin v. Curry, 574 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978); Ammlung v. City of Chester, 494 F.2d 811, 815 (3d Cir. 1974). However, the time of accrual of the cause of action is determined by federal law. Although the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, it can be the basis for dismissal under Rule 12(b) (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when the bar of the statute clearly appears on the face of the complaint. White v. Padgett, 475 F.2d 79, 82 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 861, 94 S.Ct. 78, 38 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1973); Burkhardt v. Liberty, 394 F.Supp. 1296, 1298 (W.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd 530 F.2d 693 (3d Cir. 1976). Vinson v. Richmond Police Dept., 567 F.2d 263 (4th Cir. 1977) stated: [W]hen new parties-defendant are added by amendment, the commencement of the action as against such defendants, for purposes of assessing the bar of the statute of limitations, does not relate back to the initial filing of the action but is governed by the date of the amendment itself. 567 F.2d at 265. 239. The same applies to Bivens actions. 563 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1977). Beard v. Robinson, 240. Cox v. Stanton, 529 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1975). 241. See also Bethel v. Jedoco Construction Corp., 570 F.2d 1168, 1174 (3d Cir. 1978). In some instances a court must segregate the plaintiff's various civil rights claims and apply a separate statute of limitations to each. Chambers v. Omaha Public School District, 536 F.2d 222, 227 (8th Cir. 1976); Polite v. Diehl, 507 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1974). 2421 Where the plaintiff alleges a conspiracy to violate his civil rights he must allege and prove that each defendant to be charged committed an action constituting a civil rights violation in furtherance of the conspiracy within the limitation period. Gual Morales v. Hernandez Vega, 579 F.2d 667, 681 (1st Cir. 1978). B. Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel 243 When the plaintiff is challenging matters which may have been determined against him in the course of his criminal prosecution, has action may be barred by collateral estoppel or res judicata. Under the doctrine of res judicata a final, valid judgment on the merits precludes further litigation of the same cause of action between the same parties or those in privity with them. Where the cause of action is different but some of the issues are the same, the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars reconsideration of those matters which were actually determined in the earlier case. An important distinction between the application of the two doctrines is that res judicata bars reconsideration of both matters which were actually determined in the prior case and those which could or should have been litigated. Collateral estoppel, on the other hand, bars only issues which 242. See also Williams v. Walsh, 558 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1977); Jennings v. Shuman, 567 F.2d 1213 (3d Cir. 1977). 243. See Currie, Res Judicata: The Neglected Defense, 45 Univ. of Chi. L. Rev. 317 (1978). See also Theis, Res Judicata in Civil Rights Act Cases: An Introduction to the Problem, 70 N.W. L. Rev. 859 (1976); Comment, The Collateral Estoppel Effect of State Criminal Convictions in Section 1983 Actions, 1975 U. Ill. L.F. 95 (1975). were actually finally determined. Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, L.Ed.2d (1979) (47 U.S.L.W. 4079, Jan. 9, 1979). The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are applicable to section 1983 actions. 245 Since civil and criminal proceedings, even when based upon the same facts, do not involve the same cause of action, the applicable doctrine in prisoner civil rights actions challenging state court criminal 246 proceedings is usually collateral estoppel. However, res judicata may apply when the plaintiff is challenging the constitutionality of the law he was convicted of violating. The primary inquiry in the determination of whether collateral estoppel is applicable is whether the issue was actually determined in the prior case. In most cases this requires a ręyjew of the record of the state court proceedings. 248 The party 244. See also Newman v. Board of Education of City School District of New York, 508 F.2d 277 (2d Cir. 1975); Mastracchio v. Ricci, 498 F.2d 1257 (1st Cir. 1974); see Brault v. Town of Milton, 527 F.2d 730 n. 5 (2d Cir. 1975); see generally 1B Moore's Federal Practice, 0.401, at 12, 0.405[1], at 622, [3], at 631, 0.441[1], at 3772 (2d ed. 1974). 245. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 606 n. 18, 95 S.Ct. 1200, 1209 n. 18, 43 L.Ed.2d 482, 493 n. 18 (1975); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 497, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 1840, 36 L.Ed.2d 439, 454 (1973). 246. Mastracchio, note 244 supra; see 1B Moore's Federal Practice, 0.418[1], at 2701 (2d ed. 1974). The holding in Mastracchio that res judicata is applicable to section 1983 actions was adopted by the Fourth Circuit in Rimmer v. Fayetteville Police Dept., 567 F.2d 273, 276 (4th Cir. 1977). Rimmer was cited with approval in Wiggins v. Murphy, 576 F.2d 572 (4th Cir. 1978) (per curiam). 247. Thistlethwaite v. City of New York, 497 F.2d 339 (20 Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1093, 95 S.Ct. 686, 42 L.Ed.2d 686. 248. Cardillo v. Zyla, 486 F.2d 473 (1st Cir. 1973); Kauffman v. Moss, 420 F.2d 1270, 1274 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 846, 91 S.Ct. 93, 27 L.Ed.2d 84. (While |