purpose. unequal treatment bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state The requirements of the equal protection clause apply to administrative as well as legislative classifications. Defendants' contention that equal protection is violated only when a classification deprives a group of rights otherwise secured by the Constitution is erroneous. An examination of equal protection cases reveals that although the involvement of certain fundamental rights invokes the more stringent "compelling interest" test it is by no means essential that the benefits deprived or burdens bestowed by the different treatment be otherwise guaranteed by the Constitution. 547 F.2d at 997. The court found that since a rational basis for the classification was not apparent on the face of the classification itself, the district court had erred in dismissing the claim. Plaintiffs in LaBatt v. Twomey, 513 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1975) alleged they were denied equal protection in that they were retained in a restricted status institutional dead-lock which had been imposed on the entire prison after an altercation, after other prisoners were released. Defendant's affidavit submitted with their motion for summary judgment stated that some prisoners were released early for the purpose of maintaining critical services and functions of the institution. Granting defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiff who merely purported to identify certain inmates who were released and whose job assignments and duties were alleged to be nonvital and of a similar nature to those of plain tiffs was proper The court stated: "The equal protection clause does not take from the state the power to make classifications for a reasonable purpose which do not create invidious discrimination or invade some fundamental interest." 513 F.2d at 649. However, dismissal was improper as to the plaintiff who alleged that he and others were not chosen for release because they had exercised their First Amendment right to criticize the warden and his prison administration. The court stated: "[I]t is clear that the affidavits before the district court raise the issue of whether prisoners similarly situated to plaintiffs, except for First Amendment related activity, have been treated more favorably in the granting of early release from deadlock. 513 F.2d at 649. In Hodges v. Klein, 562 F.2d 277 (3d Cir. 1977), the plaintiffs who were assigned to the management control unit of the Trenton state prison claimed they were being denied equal protection in that they were denied freedoms and privileges enjoyed by the general inmate population. The court stated: If the challenged classification factual findings regarding the 552 F.2d at 278. The district court in Durso v. Rowe, 579 F.2d 1365 (7th Cir. 1978) erred in dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim. The plaintiff alleged that his work-release status was revoked without the same kind of hearing given to other participants in the program. The court stated: A state prisoner need not allege A complaint alleging that plaintiff, a black male, was photographed in accordance with a directive from state officials to banks and other financial institutions to photograph suspicious black males or females coming on the premises stated a claim which had been improperly dismissed by the district court in Hall v. Pennsylvania State Police, 570 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1978). The court stated: Butler v. Cooper, stated: The fourteenth amendment equal protection clause embraces a right to be free from racially discriminatory enforcement of a state's criminal laws. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 S.Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976) The plaintiff correctly stated that in alleging discrimination, one must do more than allege and prove that others have violated the law and are not being prosecuted Before a claim of unlawful discrimination in the enforcement of criminal laws can be established, the plaintiff must allege and prove a deliberate selective process of enforcement based upon race (or other arbitrary classification). 544 F.2d at 646. SECTION IX: REQUIREMENTS FOR A CAUSE OF ACTION Unlike actions brought under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, section 1985 and 1986 actions do not require state involvement. Section 1986 provides: Every person who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs conspired to be done, and mentioned in section 1985 of this title, are about to be committed, and having power to prevent or aid in preventing the commission of the same, neglects or refuses so to do, if such wrongful act be committed, shall be liable to the party injured, or his legal representatives, for all damages caused by such wrongful act, which such person by reasonable diligence could have prevented; and such damages may be recovered in an action on the case; and any number of persons guilty of such wrongful neglect or refusal may be joined as defendants in the action; and if the death of any party be caused by any such wrongful act and neglect, the legal representatives of the deceased shall have such action therefor, and may recover not exceeding $5,000 damages therein, for the benefit of the widow of the deceased, if there be one, and if there be no widow, then for the benefit of the next of kin of the deceased. But no action under the provisions of this section shall be sustained which is not commenced within one year after the cause of action has accrued. (Emphasis added) The subdivision of section 1985 which is most frequently cited in prisoner civil rights actions is clause (3) which provides in relevant part: If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire |