deprived of due process through the infliction of summary punishment. Plaintiffs had been arrested while engaged in a civil rights march without a parade permit. There was insufficient space in the jail to accommodate the arrestees who did not make bond and they were taken by bus to the state penitentiary without any prior appearance before a magistrate to have bond set. The district court should have directed a verdict against the chief of police who had decided, contrary to the requirements of a state statute, that no one would be taken before a magistrate who had not posted bond. At the state prison the plaintiffs were placed in a section of the prison reserved for felons who were required to be in maximum security. (The felons had been removed to another section of the prison.) Each person was compelled to take a laxative and many of them were stripped of their clothing. Four to eight persons were placed in cells designed to accommodate two persons with two bunk beds, one lavatory, and one commode in each cell. They were given no mattresses, pillows, or covers. They slept on the bare steel beds or on the floor. The temperature ranged from sixty to seventy degrees and they huddled together for warmth. Toilet paper was in short supply. The court concluded that these facts made out a case of summary punishment without any semblance of due process. 456 F.2d at 841.

The Seventh Circuit in Duran v. Elrod, 542 F.2d 998 (7th Cir. 1976) stated:

they are convicted of no crime for
which they may presently be punished,
the state must justify any conditions
of their confinement solely on the
basis of ensuring their presence at
trial. Any restriction or condition
that is not reasonably related to
this sole stated purpose of confine-
ment would deprive a detainee of
liberty or property without due

process, in contravention of the

Fourteenth Amendment.

542 F.2d at 999-1000. The court directed that, upon remand, the plaintiffs should be permitted to introduce evidence that they were denied the opportunity to work inside the institution on jobs or projects not necessarily provided by the state.

Dillard v. Pitchess, 399 F.Supp. 1225 (C.D. Cal. 1975) applied the balancing test as follows:

Any deprivation of liberty is,

of course, very substantial punishment.
But the punishment imposed upon a man
by confining him in the Hall of
Justice jail in order to insure his
presence at trial is far more onerous
than the legitimate purpose of such
confinement can justify.

[I]f public safety and the effective
enforcement of the criminal laws are
deemed to require the pretrial incar-
ceration of selected defendants, the
public must be prepared to pay the
cost of keeping them under the
reasonably humane conditions that
their constitutional rights demand.
"Humane considerations and
constitutional requirements are not,
in this day, to be measured or
limited by dollar considerations

399 F.Supp. at 1234-35.

11. Failure to Comply with State Law.

Failure to comply with state procedural law does not, without more, give rise to a claim under section 1983. Martin v. Blackburn, 581 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1978).

deny

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides "[N] or shall any state

to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

State statutes which require segregation of the races in prisons and jails violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 88 S.Ct. 994, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1212 (1968). In a concurring opinion, Justice Black, joined by Justices Harlan and Stewart, stated:

[P]rison authorities have the right,
acting in good faith and in partic-
ularized circumstances, to take into
account racial tensions in maintaining
security, discipline, and good order
in prisons and jails. We are unwill-
ing to assume that state or local
prison authorities might mistakenly
regard such an explicit pronouncement
as evincing any dilution of this
Court's firm commitment to the Four-
teenth Amendment's prohibition of
racial discrimination.

390 U.S. at 334, 88 S.Ct. at 994, 19 L. Ed. 2d at 1213.

Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881, 887 (N.D. Miss. 1972), aff'd, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974) found that the prison facilities were segregated by race and that black inmates were subjected to disparate and unequal treatment. The court ordered desegregation of inmate housing and termination of racially discriminatory practices and procedures.

McCray v. Sullivan, 559 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1977)

stated:

[P]laintiff's pleadings may reason-
ably be read as asserting, in addition
to those ascertained by the court
below, claims that black prisoners
are subjected to discriminatory
parole criteria as compared to whites,
that the parole board was intention-
ally constituted of racially prejudiced
persons, and that prisoners such as he

were administratively segregated for
racial reasons and for filing writs.
Such claims, however difficult they
may be for plaintiff to prove, are
ones upon which, if proved, relief
can be granted. They should not
have been dismissed on a barebones
basis.

559 F.2d at 293-94.

A complaint alleging that the plaintiff has been denied visitors because of his race states a claim. Thomas v. Brierley, 481 F.2d 660 (3d Cir. 1973). A complaint alleging that plaintiff was denied permission to purchase certain religious publications and was denied other privileges enjoyed by other prisoners, solely because of his religious beliefs also states a claim. Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546, 84 S.Ct. 1733, 12 L.Ed.2d 1030 (1964).

The district court in Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 97 S.Ct. 2532, 53 L. Ed. 2d 629 (1977) improperly struck down the prison officials' regulations prohibiting meetings of the prisoners' labor union and refusing to deliver packets of union publications that had been mailed in bulk to several inmates for redistribution among other prisoners. The district court had determined that members of the union were being denied equal protection because bulk mailing and meeting rights had been extended to other prisoner organizations, such as the Jaycees, Alcoholics Anonymous, and the Boy Scouts. The district court reasoned that:

[J]ust as outside the prison,

a "government may not pick and choose
depending upon its approval or dis-
approval of the message or purpose
of the group,

. . so too, [the prison officials] could not choose among groups without first demonstrating that the activity prescribed is "detrimental to proper penological objectives, subversive to good discipline, or otherwise harmful."

433 U.S. at 133, 97 S.Ct. at 2542, 53 L. Ed. 2d at 643. The Supreme Court noted that the district court had improperly treated the case as if the prison

environment were essentially a "public forum." Prison officials "need only demonstrate a rational basis for their distinction between organizational groups. U.S. at 134, 97 S.Ct. at 2543, 53 L.Ed.2d at 643. Court further stated:

The District Court's further
requirement of a demonstrable
showing that the Union was in

fact harmful is inconsistent with
the deference federal courts should
pay to the informed discretion of
prison officials. Procunier v.
Martinez, 416 U.S. at 405. It is
precisely in matters such as this,
the decision as to which of many
groups should be allowed to
operate within the prison walls,
where, confronted with claims
based on the Equal Protection
Clause, the courts should allow
the prison administrators the full
latitude of discretion, unless it
can be firmly stated that the two
groups are so similar that discretion
has been abused.

433 The

433 U.S. at 136, 97 S.Ct. at 2543, 53 L.Ed.2d at 644.

McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 93 S. Ct. 1055, 35 L.Ed.2d 282 (1973) held that a prisoner is not denied equal protection by being denied good time credit for the period he was incarcerated in a county jail before he was sentenced. The fact that jails do not have a significant rehabilitation program provided a rational basis for not giving prisoners good time credit for their pretrial jail detention period.

Plain

The district court in French v. Heyne, 547 F.2d 994 (7th Cir. 1976) improperly dismissed plaintiff's claims based upon denial of equal protection. tiffs alleged that the vocational training programs were offered only to inmates with short indeterminate sentences and were never provided to inmates with longer indeterminate and determinate sentences. Further, plaintiffs alleged that educational and vocational programs were provided only to inmates who did not possess a high school degree or a vocational trade. In finding that the complaint stated a claim, the court of appeals stated: