thirty-three dollars in cash together with some personal pictures and papers was seized by the defendant correctional officer. The cash had been The cash had been placed in his prison trust fund account but the billford and its remaining contents had not been returned to him. The defendant filed an affidavit in which he admitted he had taken plaintiff into custody and had taken possession of his wallet. The cash was deposited in the prison trust fund account and the wallet and personal papers were later placed on the transfer bus to be sent to Central Prison in Raleigh where the plaintiff was incarcerated. The plaintiff filed a responsive affidavit in which he admitted the money had been credited to his account but stated he had not received the wallet. The court stated: We agree with the district court that the seizure of the plaintiff's wallet by the defendant was neither unreasonable nor arbitrary, and since the statement in the defendant's affidavit relative to placing the wallet on the prison bus was uncontroverted there was no triable factual issue and summary disposition of the case was appropriate. 527 F.2d at 977. An action was brought against the Director of the Texas Department of Corrections in Carter v. Estelle, 519 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1975). Plaintiff sought compensatory damages in the amount of $427.75 for lost articles and $1,000 in punitive damages. He alleged that prison guards had confiscated his radio and had negligently left his watches, wedding ring, electric fan, and other articles in a place exposed to thieves. The articles were subsequently stolen. The opinion reveals that plaintiff's demand for punitive damages was supported by allegations of malice and criminal intent, apparently on the part of the guards who were not named as defendants. The court held that the district court had acted improvidently in dismissing the complaint without hearing and without requiring a responsive pleading and stated: It is established law that prison administrators may under certain circumstances be held vicariously liable for the acts of their subordinates. It is also now clear that a civil rights action lies for wrongful confiscation or loss by prison officials of an inmate's property. 519 F.2d at 1136. Carter would appear to conflict with Bonner v. Coughlin, 545 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1976), discussed infra, in which the court required more than negligence to impose liability upon a defendant, and Milton v. Nelson, 527 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1976), in which the court noted that respondeat superior was not applicable to impose liability upon supervisory personnel for confiscation of a prisoner's property by others. The allegation of malice and criminal intent, apparently on the part of the guards who were not defendants in Carter, which is absent in Milton, would not appear to be a relevant distinction between the cases, although under Bonner v. Coughlin, 545 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1976), and Kimbrough v. O'Neil, 545 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1976), malice or lack of malice on the part of the defendant is relevant. In Fox v. Sullivan, 539 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1976), the plaintiff alleged that while he was in the prison hospital one of the defendants, a prison official, had taken possession of his money and personal effects and had not returned them. The district judge conducted an evidentiary hearing and then granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, stating: "The claim of the appellant that a prison official should have but did not return his money and other personal property to him also asserts a protected right which may be determined under Section 1983." 539 F.2d at 1066. An allegation by a prisoner in Bonner v. Coughlin, 545 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1976), that he lost a copy of his trial transcript because guards negligently left his cell door open after a security search, did not allege a deprivation of property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court found that the plaintiff alleged no more than negligent conduct on the part of the guards and decided that negligence constituted neither a state deprivation of property without due process of law nor action under color of state law: Here there was no state action Similarly, the taking of the tran- encouraged nor condoned by state 545 F.2d at 567. The court affirmed the summary judg- avoids any constitutional violation. 517 F.2d at 1319-20. As to the first claim--that the transcript was taken by one of the guards during the conduct of the search which violated the Fourth Amendment--the panel found that a prisoner enjoys the protection of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches to some minimal extent which is less than that possessed by the unincarcerated members of society. If plaintiff can prove the taking of his property by one of the guards, the defendants would have the burden of establishing the "reasonableness" of the seizure. 517 F.2d at 1317. Therefore, the summary judgment as to this claim was vacated and the case was remanded. The panel further held that plaintiff's complaint stated a cause of action in alleging that in taking his transcript the defendants had interfered with his access to the courts protected by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. The court noted that the defendants may have owed the plaintiff a higher degree of care to avoid the loss of his trial transcript than the duty they owed to him with respect to other items of personal property. Kimbrough v. O'Neil, 545 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1976), which was decided the day following the en banc opinion of Bonner, supra, held that plaintiff's allegations that a deputy sheriff intentionally took his diamond ring and failed to return it on demand stated a claim for violation of the due process clause. The court stated: "Because defendant Johnson assertedly acted within the sphere of his official responsibility with the malicious intention of causing a deprivation of Kimbrough's constitutional rights, plaintiff had adequately stated a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As in Monroe and Bonner, it is immaterial that Kimbrough might have an adequate remedy in the Illinois courts." 545 F.2d at 1061. The court noted that "reckless disregard" is sufficient to maintain a section 1983 action. Id. F.2d Secret v. Brierton, No. 77-1653 (7th Cir. October 13, 1978) required that a prisoner exhaust adequate administrative remedies when he alleges the deprivation without due process of intangible items of personal property of no great monetary value. The court stated: [B]ecause the plaintiff has the those procedures, a strict due procedures. Although we have F.2d at Sell v. Parratt, 548 F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 873, 98 S.Ct. 220, 54 L.Ed.2d 152 affirmed the district court, which had granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. The two inmate plaintiffs had been found to be in possession of currency, possession of which was prohibited by the regulations. The money was immediately seized and confiscated by prison officials. While the regulations prohibited inmates from possessing currency, they did not authorize the forfeiture of currency illegally possessed. The district court ordered that the money be returned to the plaintiff who was no longer incarcerated and be credited to the account of the plaintiff who was incarcerated. The court of appeals recognized that there was no question that the state could forbid its convicts to have money in their possession while undergoing confinement and could take away from them money found in their possession. The court commented that the district court could have decided the case without reaching the constitutional question since the department of correctional services was not authorized by statute to confiscate currency of prisoners. The court stated: |