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that courts must give "appropriate deference to the
decisions of prison administrators and appropriate
recognition to the peculiar and restrictive circum-
stances of penal confinement." 433 U.S. at 125, 97
S. Ct. at 2538, 53 L. Ed. 2d at 638. The Court examined
the regulations to determine whether they were
reasonable, whether they were consistent with the
inmates' status as prisoners, and whether they were
consistent with the legitimate considerations of the
institution. 433 U.S. at 130, 97 S.Ct. at 2540, 53
L. Ed. 2d at 641.

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The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment assures inmates a right of access to the courts. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L. Ed. 2d 72 (1977); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 40 L. Ed. 2d 224 (1974); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1974). Basically the reported cases have discussed the validity of regulations restricting access to the court, punishment of prisoners for exercising their right of access to the court, and the state's duty to furnish prisoners with affirmative assistance, including law libraries, counsel, or other alternatives. While the courts have not required the states to provide any particular type of assistance, the question in each case is whether the prisoners do have adequate access to the court.

Wolff v. Mc Donnell, supra, held that prisoners are entitled to the same right to legal assistance in civil rights actions as was assured to them in habeas corpus cases in Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 89 S.Ct. 747, 21 L. Ed. 2d 718 (1969). Johnson stated: "But unless and until the state provides some alternative to assist inmates in the preparation of petitions for post conviction relief, it may not validly enforce a regulation such as that here in issue, barring inmates from furnishing such assistance to other prisoners." 393 U.S. at 490, 89 S. Ct. at 751, 21 L. Ed. 2d at 718. Wolff, supra, noted: "The right of access to the courts, upon which Avery was premised, is found in the Due Process Clause and assures that no person will be denied the opportunity to present to the judiciary allegations concerning violations of fundamental constitutional rights. 418 U.S. at 579, 94 S. Ct. at 2986, 41 L. Ed. 2d at 964.

Plaintiff's allegation that prison officials took retaliatory action against him for preparing legal material for another inmate was held not to state a cause of action in Ervin v. Ciccone, 557 F.2d 1260 (8th Cir. 1977). The court stated:

Ervin does not allege, however,
that the prison officials failed
to make available to the other
inmates adequate assistance from
persons trained in the law. It
is no constitutional violation
to prohibit Ervin from assisting
other inmates so long as prison
officials make available to those
other inmates assistance from
persons trained in the law.
Citing Bounds, supra.]

557 F.2d at 1262.

In Procunier v. Martinez, supra, the Court affirmed the district court's grant of an injunction against enforcement of a rule which restricted prisoners' access to members of the bar and licensed private investigators. The regulation banned the use by attorneys of law students and legal para-professionals to interview inmate clients. The Court stated:

The constitutional guarantee of due process of law has as a corollary the requirement that prisoners be afforded access to the courts in order to challenge unlawful convictions and to seek redress for violations of their constitutional rights. This means that inmates must have a reasonable opportunity to seek and receive the assistance of attorneys. Regulations and practices that unjustifiably obstruct the availability of professional representation or other aspects of the right of access to the courts are invalid.

416 U.S. at 419, 94 S. Ct. at 1814, 40 L. Ed. 2d at 243.

McDonald v. State of Illinois, 557 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966, 98 S. Ct. 508, 54 L. Ed. 2d 453 (1978) held that the complaint stated a cause of action against the former superintendent of the department of corrections who allegedly refused to allow plaintiff's counsel to photograph him shortly after his arrest in order to obtain evidence to corroborate his testimony that he had been beaten by unknown assailants. The court stated:

A defendant's right to prepare the
best defense he can and to bring to
the court's attention any evidence
helpful to this case is constitu-
tionally protected. The Supreme
Court in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215
(1963) recognized the right of a
defendant to have access to excul-
patory evidence in the hands of the
prosecutor. We believe a defendant
also has the right to preserve
possibly exculpatory evidence and
that, to the extent the government
or its agents frustrate such pres-
ervation, the defendant has a
constitutional claim.

557 F.2d at 603.

The

Prison officials in Wycoff v. Brewer, 572 F.2d 1260, 1265 (8th Cir. 1978) had terminated a telephone call between plaintiff and an attorney after the conversation had continued for fifteen or twenty minutes. district court determined that the termination of the telephone conversation was reasonable, and the court of appeals agreed.

Ford v. Schmidt, 577 F.2d 408 (7th Cir. 1978) held that plaintiff was not denied access to the courts when prison personnel in the mail room refused to mail plaintiff's legal papers because he had used another inmate's stamp coupons on the envelope. Possession of another inmate's property was a violation of the prison rules. The other prisoner was a friend of plaintiff's and had agreed to place his stamp coupons on the envelope because plaintiff had not believed the two coupons he had could be used since they had previously been addressed to others. The court noted that the prison had a procedure whereby inmates who did not have stamp coupons or means to purchase

them could attach an inmate order form so that mail would still be sent. The court determined that requiring inmates who had the funds to purchase stamp coupons, to account for their failure to have planned ahead, or for the emergency which prompted their need for stamp s had a rational relationship to the prison's teaching responsibility and to orderly maintenance of the institution. Therefore, plaintiff had not been denied reasonable access to the courts.

Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F.Supp. 105, 111 (N.D. Cal. 1970) found that plaintiff prisoners' access to the courts was seriously infringed by the highly restrictive nature of the exclusive list of books available for prisoners, although it was supplemented to some extent by the state library. The court defined "access to the courts":

་་
"Access to the courts, then,

is a larger concept than that put
forward by the State. It encompasses
all the means a defendant or petitioner
might require to get a fair hearing
from the judiciary on all charges
brought against him or grievances
alleged by him. . Johnson v.

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Avery . . makes it clear that
some provision must be made to
ensure that prisoners have the
assistance necessary to file
petitions and complaints which will
in fact be fully considered by the
courts.

319 F.Supp. at 110.

Gilmore was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15, 92 S.Ct. 250, 30 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1971).

A resident law clinic had been established by the institution to assist inmates in the preparation of many of their legal claims in Bryan v. Werner, 516 F.2d 233 (3d Cir. 1975). The clinic maintained a law library staffed by inmates, but the clinic could not be used for "preparation of writs, damage suits, or civil suits against the institution or personnel of the institution.' Inmates were not required to use the clinic services in their legal matters. The court of appeals noted that it was unclear whether the clinic actually impeded access to the courts by prisoners. It observed that It observed that regulations prohibited the clinic from assisting inmates in suits

against the institution or prison officials. This regulation would be valid only if there were reasonable alternatives for obtaining assistance in such suits. Therefore, the court of appeals remanded for reconsideration by the district judge.

In Cruz v. Hauck, 515 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom. Andrade v. Hauck, 424 U.S. 917, 96 S.Ct. 1118, 47 L. Ed. 2d 322 (1976), a magistrate had conducted an evidentiary hearing and had determined that the inmates had adequate access to the courts because they were afforded the services of court-appointed counsel. The court of appeals remanded because the findings of fact did not state clearly whether attorneys aided the inmates in habeas corpus petitions and civil rights actions challenging jail conditions. The court noted that the authorities had the burden of proof of demonstrating the prisoners had adequate access to counsel in addition to their access to legal materials. The court stated: "If all inmates do not have such

the court should devise a plan ensuring adequate entry to the courts, either by reasonable access to attorneys, or by reasonable access to legal materials, or by any other reasonable means the district court may devise." 515 F.2d at 332. The court distinguished the need of prisoners who are incarcerated awaiting trial and those serving sentences from prisoners in shortterm holding facilities awaiting transfer to another institution:

Therefore, in determining

whether all inmates have adequate
access to the courts, the district
court need not consider those
inmates whose confinement is of a
very temporary nature or for purposes
of transfer to other institutions.
The district judge should have
little difficulty, realizing the
fundamental nature of the right of
access, in determining those cases
where the brevity of confinement
does not permit sufficient time for
prisoners to petition the courts.

515 F.2d at 333.

Kirby v. Blackledge, 530 F.2d 583, 587 (4th Cir. 1976) noted that prisoners in segregated detention may not be denied access to library facilities. However,

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