In Bell v. Wolff, 496 F.2d 1252 (8th Cir. 1974), the district court found that although plaintiff, a pretrial detainee, was subjected to involuntary servitude by being compelled to work, the defendant warden was not liable in damages because of his good faith belief that plaintiff wished to work rather than to remain idle. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. K. Fourteenth Amendment - Due Process Clause The Due Process Clause, Section 1, of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: [Nor] shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law Wolff v. Mc Donnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2974, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935, 951 (1974) held that prisoners are entitled to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the Court noted that the prisoner's right to due process may be subject to restrictions "imposed by the nature of the regime to which he has been lawfully committed." 418 U.S. at 556, 94 S. Ct. at 2975, 41 L.Ed.2d at 951. 1. Deprivation of Life, Liberty or Property In recent decades the federal courts have struggled to define, with precision, the meaning of "liberty" and "property" as set forth in the due process clause. However, in 1976 the Supreme Court started to define these terms more specifically. The procedural guarantees of the due process clause protect both interests guaranteed in the Bill of Rights and interests which attain constitutional status "by virtue of the fact that they have been initially recognized and protected by state law." Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710 n. 5 and text (1976). The Supreme Court stated, "[W]e have repeatedly ruled that the procedural guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment apply whenever the State seeks to remove or significantly alter that protected status. 424 U.S. at 71011. Thus the Supreme Court now appears willing to distinguish an interest which the state may protect against injury by virtue of tort law from an interest that the state has recognized as a liberty or property interest. Paul v.; Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1976) found that a personal or private interest in reputation was neither "liberty" nor "property" which was protected against state deprivation without due process of law. Where a prisoner alleges that he has been denied due process of law, one of the first considerations is whether he has alleged a deprivation of life, liberty, or property. This requires an inquiry into whether the Bill of Rights protects the interest in question or whether the state has elevated the interest to a protected status. Wolff, supra, involved a prisoner's loss of good time. The Court recognized that the federal Constitution does not guarantee good time credit for satisfactory behavior while in prison. But the state had created the right to good time by statute and had provided that it was to be forfeited only for serious misbehavior. Since the state had created the right and had authorized its deprivation as punishment for major misconduct, the prisoner's interest in good time constituted "liberty" and the due process clause required that the state-created right of "liberty" not be arbitrarily abrogated. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 47 L. Ed. 2d 810 (1976) indicated that the due process procedures required for the deprivation of good time are not required for the imposition of lesser penalties such as the loss of privileges. The Court stated: "[W]e are unable to consider the degree of 'liberty' at stake in loss of privileges and thus whether some sort of procedural safeguards are due when only such 'lesser penalties' are at stake." 425 U.S. at 323, 96 S.Ct. at 1560, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 824. In Paul v. Davis, supra, the plaintiff's photograph and name had appeared on a flyer distributed by the defendant chief of police to area merchants alerting them to possible shoplifters who might be operating during the Christmas season. More than a year prior to circulation of the flyer plaintiff had been arrested on a charge of shoplifting, arraigned, and had entered a plea of not guilty. Shortly after the flyer was circulated the charge was dismissed. Plaintiff's employer learned of the flyer, called plaintiff in to discuss the circumstances, and informed plaintiff that he would not be fired but that he "had best not find himself in a similar situation" in the future. The Supreme Court observed that the complaint appeared to state a classical claim for defamation actionable in the courts of virtually every state. 424 U.S. at 696, 96 S.Ct. at 1158, 47 L.Ed.2d at 411. The Court rejected plaintiff's argument that every legally cognizable injury which may have been inflicted by a state official acting under "color of law" established a violation of the Constitution, observing that a violation of local law does not necessarily mean federal rights have been invaded. Congress was not attempting to make all torts of state officials federal crimes when it enacted the criminal provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and the plaintiff had not pointed to any specific constitutional guarantee safeguarding the interests he asserted had been invaded. The Court rejected his claim that the due process clause extended to him a right to be free of injury wherever the state could be characterized as a tortfeasor. The Court concluded that the procedural guarantees of the due process clause do not create a body of general federal tort law. "[R]eputation alone, apart from some more tangible interests such as employment, is [not] either 'liberty' or 'property' by itself sufficient to invoke the procedural protection of the Due Process Clause."169 424 U.S. at 701, 96 S.Ct. at 1161, 47 L.Ed.2d at 414. The Court further stated: "[T]he weight of our decisions establishes no constitutional doctrine converting every defamation by a public official into a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment." 424 U.S. at 702, 96 S.Ct. at 1161, 47 L.Ed.2d at 414. Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 96 S.Ct. 2543, 49 L.Ed.2d 466 (1976) held that where state law does not condition the discretion of officials to transfer 169. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976), involved termination of the plaintiff's employment without a hearing. The Court found that neither property nor liberty rights were involved. The due process clause protects property interests created by state law but here the state had not created a property interest in continued employment. Plaintiff's attempt to show a liberty interest, based upon the likelihood that his good name, reputation, honor, or integrity would be impaired or that other employers would be less interested in hiring him failed because the asserted reasons for his discharge were not publically released until suit was instituted, and at that time it was in connection with the suit. inmates from one institution to another upon the occurrence of misconduct, the prisoner does not have a justifiable expectation that he will not be transferred unless found guilty of a misconduct. Therefore, the prisoner does not have a liberty interest which requires invocation of the protection of the due process clause prior to transfer. Similarly, in Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976), the Court found that where state law does not condition the authority to transfer a prisoner upon the occurrence of specific acts of misconduct or other events, a transfer to a less favorable prison does not implicate a liberty interest within the meaning of the due process clause. The Court rejected at the outset "the notion that any grievous loss visited upon a person by the State is sufficient to invoke, the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause."170 427 U.S. at 224, 96 S.Ct. at 2532, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 458. The Court later stated: "Similarly, we cannot agree that any change in the conditions of confinement having a substantial adverse impact on the prisoner involved is sufficient to invoke protections of the Due Process Clause." U.S. at 224, 96 S.Ct. at 2532, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 458. The Court distinguished Wolff, supra, in that Wolff was rooted in rights created by state law while in Meachum the state law did not confer the right sought by the plaintiff. The Court concluded: Holding that arrangements like this are within reach of the pro- The 427 170. See also Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 840, 97 S.Ct. 2094, 2108, 53 L.Ed.2d 14, 32 (1977). 427 U.S. at 228-29, 96 S.Ct. at 2540, 49 L.Ed.2d at 461. Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 97 S.Ct. 274, 50 L.Ed.2d 236 (1976) held that a federal parolee imprisoned for a crime committed while on parole is not entitled to a parole revocation hearing until the parole violator warrant is actually executed and he is taken into custody under it. The Court determined that the parole violator warrant did not have any present or inevitable effect upon plaintiff's liberty interests which would require a due process hearing. The Court stated: "[T]he loss of liberty as a parole violator does not occur until the parolee is taken into custody under the warrant. 429 U.S. at 87, 97 S.Ct. at 278, 50 L.Ed.2d at 244. The Court found that the other injuries petitioner claimed to suffer did not involve a loss of protected liberty or did not occur by reason of the warrant and detainer. The question of whether the effects of a parole violation detainer deprived plaintiff of a liberty interest was presented in Reddin v. Israel, 561 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1977). The authorities issuing the warrant upon which the detainer was based had refused to give plaintiff a parole revocation hearing. The district court had improperly granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment since the material facts were in dispute and the court of appeals remanded for determination of the effects of the detainer. Walker v. Hughes, 558 F.2d 1247 (6th Cir. 1977) reversed the district court, which had mandated changes in the disciplinary hearings for members of the plaintiff class who were incarcerated in a federal minimum security institution for young offenders. The court, after an extensive analysis of Supreme Court opinions, found the procedures required by the policy statements issued by the bureau of prisons were adequate. The court noted that "[t]he first question to be asked in a due process analysis is whether a life, liberty, or property interest within the meaning of the Due Process Clause is implicated." 558 F.2d at 1250. The second question for resolution is what process must be granted before the person can be deprived of the protected interest. On appeal it was found that the district court had improperly concentrated on plaintiff's grievous loss rather than their loss of a right to which they |