Page images
PDF
EPUB

psychiatric treatment if a physician or other health care provider made certain findings, one of which was that the potential for harm to the plaintiff by reason of delay or denial of care would be substantial. The court stated:

This limited right to treatment stems from the Eighth Amendment, whose language must be interpreted in light of 'the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." It is also premised upon notions of rehabilitation and the desire to render inmates useful and productive citizens upon their release.

551 F.2d at 48. The court commented that it would not attempt to second-guess the propriety or adequacy of a particular course of treatment which remained a question of sound professional judgment and the courts would not intervene upon allegations of mere negligence, mistake or difference of opinion.

The plaintiff in Jackson v. McLemore, 523 F.2d 838 (8th Cir. 1975), had been disciplined for his refusal to comply with an instruction to spell certain words. The court held that a prisoner could be required to participate in a rehabilitation program and could be punished for refusing to participate. court stated:

It would defeat the purpose of
rehabilitation if access to such
programs could be at the option
of the prisoner. Federal courts
will not audit such programs,
which are well within the adminis-
trative prerogatives of the state
institution, absent a clear showing
that such programs are being
purposefully used to infringe upon
protected constitutional rights.
No such showing has been made in
this case. While a prisoner may
not be punished simply because he
failed to learn, either through
inability or lack of motivation,
he may be required to participate
in the program, and this necessarily
includes participation in classroom

The

exercises when called upon by the instructor. Refusal to participate is clearly distinguishable from a stated inability to perform, and such refusal in a penal institution may properly result in disciplinary action.

523 F.2d at 838-39.

Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977) stated: "Failure of prison authorities to provide a rehabilitation program, by itself, does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment." 559 F.2d at 291. The court further stated:

If the State furnishes its
prisoners with reasonably

adequate food, clothing, shelter,
sanitation, medical care, and
personal safety, so as to avoid
the imposition of cruel and
unusual punishment, that ends its
obligations under Amendment Eight.
The Constitution does not require
that prisoners, as individuals or
as a group, be provided with any
and every amenity which some
person may think is needed to
avoid mental, physical, and emotional
deterioration.

We

Even so, on the facts of this case, we affirm the actions of the District Court designed to provide Alabama prison inmates with reasonable recreational facilities. do this simply because such facilities may play an important role in extirpating the effects of the conditions which undisputably prevailed in these prisons at the time the District Court entered its order.

559 F.2d at 291. The court later stated:

We interpret those portions

of the order dealing with opportunities to obtain a basic education,

to attend vocational school, and to
attend a transitional program prior
to release as meaning that if the
prison authorities operate such
programs each prisoner shall have
impartially equal access on an
objective standard of basic utility
to the individual. We would find
it difficult to hold, and we do not
now hold, that if the state has no
such programs it amounts to cruel
and unusual punishment within the
prohibitions of the Eighth Amendment.
As a matter of fact, in the operation
of a good prison system, we under-
stand that such programs are fairly
standard practices, instituted and
operated on the initiative of state
authorities.

559 F.2d at 292.

12. Relevancy of State Codes

Although constitutional issues do not arise merely because a state prisoner has been treated at variance with state law, state codes reveal to the district judge the minimum standards by which the state itself proposes to govern itself concerning habitability. Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1977). "Such a standard is a valuable reference for what is minimal for human habitation in the public view, thus serving as an indicator of 'evolving notions of

decency."" 547 F.2d at 1214. The court in Williams

approved the use of state sanitation and fire codes.

13. Prison Work

Although compelling prison inmates to work does 166 1 not violate the Thirteenth Amendment, "[t]here are circumstances in which prison work requirements can constitute cruel and unusual punishment." Ray v. Mabry, 556 F.2d 881, 882 (8th Cir. 1977). The court quoted from Talley v. Stephens, 247 F.Supp. 683 (E.D. Ark. 1965):

166. See Section VIII,J infra.

[F]or prison officials knowingly
to compel convicts to perform
physical labor which is beyond
their strength, or which con-
stitutes a danger to their lives
or health, or which is unduly
painful constitutes an infliction
of cruel and unusual punishment
prohibited by the Eighth Amendment
to the United States as included
in the 14th Amendment.

247 F.Supp. at 687. In Ray the court commented that the plaintiff's religious claim was too conclusory to state a claim for relief. He did not allege he was a follower of a religion which prohibited working on Sunday or that his work deprived him of an opportunity to spend some part of Sunday in worship. However, since the case was being remanded the court commented that the district court could review plaintiff's religious claim at that time.

Newman v. State of Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977) stated:

The District Court directed

that each prisoner shall be assigned
to a meaningful job on the basis of
his or her abilities and interests
and according to institutional needs.
While there is no federal constitu-
tional, mandate for this proviso, as
phrased it should not impose any real
burden on the penitentiary authori-
ties, so, in the context of this
case we allow it to stand, not,
however, to enjoy any precedential
status in future cases if they should
arise.

559 F.2d at 292.

Bryan v. Werner, 526 F.2d 233 (3d Cir. 1975) stated: "We do not believe that an inmate's expectation of keeping a particular prison job amounts either to a 'property' or 'liberty' interest entitled to protection under the due process clause." 526 F.2d at 240. However, Navarette v. Enomoto, 536 F.2d 277 (9th Cir. 1976) found that allegations that the plaintiff was removed as prison librarian solely to punish

or hamper his legal activities stated a cause of action based on interference with plaintiff's right of access to the courts.

Altizer v. Paderick, 569 F.2d 812 (4th Cir. 1978) held that the plaintiff's complaint that he had been removed as an inmate counselor by the prison officials without a fact finding hearing failed to state a claim. The court stated:

[T]he classification and work.
assignments of prisoners in such
institutions are matters of prison
administration, within the discretion
of the prison administrators, and do
not require fact finding hearings as
a prerequisite for the exercise of
such discretion.

[merged small][merged small][merged small][ocr errors][merged small][merged small]

Forced labor by prisoners does not violate the Thirteenth Amendment. Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971); Ray v. Mabry, 556 F.2d 881 (8th Cir. 1977). James v. Wallace, 406 F.Supp. 318, 335 (N.D. Ala. 1976) required the officials to assign each inmate a meaningful job on the basis of his abilities and interests and according to institutional needs.

Davis v. Fisher, 546 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1977) held that plaintiff's allegation that "he worked for the defendant sheriff 'painting houses . and doing other labor and that he was told he would be paid but was not paid" raised a constitutional claim. However, the court stated: "Breach of an agreement to pay wages to a validly incarcerated prisoner would not of itself necessarily constitute peonage or involuntary servitude. "168 546 F.2d at 66 n. 1.

167. See Section VIII,I,13 supra.

168. See Tentative Draft of Standards Relating to the Status of Prisoners, Prisoner Employment, 14 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 458-65

(1977).

« PreviousContinue »