help although he requested it at his arrest. The court of appeals affirmed the district court dismissal as to the superintendent of jails, since the doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable in section 1983 cases. However, the court reversed and remanded the dismissal as to the detectives who arrested plaintiff for a determination of whether he had been in their custody long enough to establish a duty to obtain medical treatment. Prison inmates were held to be entitled to psychological and psychiatric treatment in Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44 (4th Cir. 1977). Plaintiff, who was denied parole on the basis that psychological tests showed he would be an unsuccessful candidate, sought psychiatric treatment to make him eligible for parole. The court stated that plaintiff was entitled to treatment if: [A] physician or other health care 551 F.2d at 47-48. The court was careful to emphasize the role of professional judgment in these decisions: "For a constitutional tort to arise and for a cause of action to be stated under § 1983, the complaint must allege deliberate indifference to his continued health and well-being. 551 F.2d at 48. These tests were followed in Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F.Supp. 269 (D. N.H. 1977), where the court noted: "[P]rison inmates are entitled to . . . psychiatric . treatment when medically necessary, and that defendants are under an affirmative duty to provide such care to inmates diagnosed as needing it ir. conformity with the Bowring test. 437 F.Supp. at 313. Hutto v. Finney, U.S. 98 S.Ct. 2565, (1978) affirmed the district court's order forbidding the department of corrections to sentence an inmate to more than thirty days in punitive isolation and awarding attorney fees to be paid from the department's budget. The district court had conducted multiple hearings on the conditions of confinement in the Arkansas prisons between 1969 and 1976 and had ordered the department of corrections to fashion its own remedies. Among the evils to be corrected were the "grue" diet, the crowding of prisoners into windowless cells with no furniture other than a U.S. water and a toilet, the use of armed "trusties" prisoners as guards who were authorized to kill escaping prisoners, the maintenance of large open sleeping areas where homosexual rape and murder were committed, the beating with leather straps and the use of electrical devices to shock prisoners, and the indeterminate length of confinement in isolation. n.n. 3-7, 98 S.Ct. 2656 at 256970 n.n. 3-7, L.Ed.2d at n.n. 3-7. The Court found that where the district court had given the department of corrections ample opportunity to correct the conditions, but the department had failed to take adequate corrective measures, and considering the conditions as a whole, the district court correctly limited the duration of punitive isolation: at The question before the trial court was whether past constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments. In fashioning a remedy, the District Court had ample authority to go beyond earlier orders and to address each element contributing to the violation. The District Court had given the Department repeated opportunities to remedy the cruel and unusual conditions in the isolation cells. If petitioners had fully complied with the court's earlier orders, the present time limit might well have been unnecessary. But taking the long and unhappy history of the litigation into account, the Court was justified in entering a comprehensive order to insure against the risk of inadequate compliance. U.S. at 98 S.Ct. at 2572, L. Ed. 2d at Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 126 (2d Cir. 1978) affirmed the district court's order insofar as it banned the double-celling of pretrial detainees, but remanded for reconsideration of the prohibition on double-celling sentenced inmates. The district court had found that the average room afforded two inmates virtually no space for minimal privacy in which to avoid the other's presence. The court stated: But we find the lack of privacy 573 F.2d at 127. The court recognized that the standards for sentenced prisoners are lower than those for pretrial detainees and commented that on remand the court might find that double-celling in a seventy-five foot room violated the Eighth Amendment even for sentenced inmates. However, the honor unit contained rooms ranging in size from 100 to 150 square feet and the court could not say on the record that placing two sentenced inmates in rooms so spacious constituted a per se violation on the Eighth Amendment. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's order prohibiting the practice of requiring newly arrived inmates to sleep in common areas where the balcony lights burned all night. The dormitory unit, which had originally been designed to hold ten inmates in each of its six rooms, was housing 120 sentenced inmates at the time of the hearing before the district court which ordered that a maximum of sixty inmates be housed in the dormitory unit. The court of appeals found that the district judge should have considered whether a number of inmates in excess of the rated capacity could be suitably quartered within the dormitories. The court stated: "There is no constitutional magic to the term 'rated capacity.' Indeed, '[t]hose who design prisons are not vested with either the duty or the power to prescribe constitutional standards as to prison space. 573 F.2d at 128. The court approved the approach of Judge Lasker in Ambrose v. Malcolm, 414 F. Supp. 485 (S.D. N.Y. 1976), in using the American Correctional Association's standard which provides that each inmate should be allowed a total of seventy-five square feet of living space. The court noted157 that the American Correctional Association's Commission on Accreditation for Corrections had recommended that a minimum of sixty square feet be accorded each inmate housed in a dormitory unit. The court commented that the Fifth Circuit, in Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206, 1215 (5th Cir. 1977), had found fifty square feet of sleeping space adequate. Because of the design of the center, which used a series of self-contained "modular units, inmates were permitted to leave their units only to go to the roof recreation area, sick call, or to court. This lack of movement severely limited their opportunities to attend religious services and educational and recreational programs which are normally given in only a few of the units. While pretrial detainees were separated from sentenced prisoners, the institution had attempted no further classification. The court of appeals affirmed the district judge's order requiring the prison officials to create additional classification guidelines to permit greater movement within the institution. 157. 573 F.2d at 128 n. 22. The district court's order that each pretrial detainee be accorded at least forty-eight square feet of space was affirmed in Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1978). James v. Wallace, 406 F.Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976) found the state institutions to be horrendously crowded and enjoined institution officials from accepting any new prisoners, except escapees and parole violators, until the population in each prison was reduced to design capacity. Similar relief was ordered by the district judge in Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1977). On appeal, defendants complained that the district judge's computation of overcrowding was based on an unrealistic figure of eighty square feet per inmate. The court of appeals affirmed the district judge's order forbidding additions to the inmate population. However, it stated: The We do, however, remand this issue 547 F.2d at 1215. Crowe v. Leeke, 540 F.2d 740 (4th Cir. 1976) held that plaintiff's allegation that he had been placed with two other inmates in a cell so small that one inmate had to sleep on the floor did not reach. constitutional proportions. The court noted that plaintiff had been approved for transfer to a new institution upon completion of its construction. The court found that the cramped conditions in the cell had not resulted from prison rules which could be characterized as "vindictive, cruel or inhuman" or from an arbitrary or capricious exercise of judgment by prison officials. The court concluded: "Standing alone, Crowe's claim that, until transferred to a new facility now under construction, he is forced to sleep in an overcrowded cell is not a condition of |