"A in a 'group therapy" program offered to inmates in segregation. During the non-jury trial there was expert tertimony that plaintiff's segregated environment was degrading, dehumanizing, conducive to mental derangement, and constituted a gross departure from enlightened and progressive contemporary standards for the proper treatment of prison inmates. psychiatrist testified that the isolation from human contact in punitive segregation might cause prisoners to hallucinate and to distort reality." 442 F.2d at 190. He felt that long term isolation might destroy a person's "mentality. The court admitted that plaintiff's expert testimony was fairly representative of the perspective of adherents to the "new penology" which was directed toward corrections rather than punishment. However, the court stated: "For a federal court, however, to place a punishment beyond the power of a state to impose on an inmate is a drastic interference with the state's free political and administrative processes. at 191. The court continued: Nor can we agree that Sostre's own It is undisputed on this appeal that segregated confinement does not itself violate the Constitution. "[W]illful refusal to obey an order or demonstrated defiance of personnel acting in line of duty may constitute sufficient basis for placing an inmate in segregation." 442 F.2d 442 F.2d at 192. The court noted in concluding that plaintiff's conditions of confinement did not violate the Eighth Amendment, it was taking into consideration his opportunity for participation in group therapy as well as diet, exercise and other factors. 442 F.2d at 193-94. Sweet v. South Carolina Dept. of Corrections, 529 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1975), stated: But specifically, "isolation from intellectual stimulation and 529 F.2d at 861. The court noted that in the federal prison system, segregated confinement is for an indefinite period. Wycoff v. Brewer, 572 F.2d 1260 (8th Cir. 1978) commented that confinement of a prison inmate in the nude, in a cell which could be darkened, with no bedding or cover, with only a sink and commode, and without toilet articles or toilet paper today would unquestionably be held unconstitutional.129 In that case the plaintiff, while confined in administrative segregation, had engaged in animal-like behavior, 128. Novak v. Beto, 453 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1971), rehearing denied, 456 F.2d 1303 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied sub nom. Sellers v. Beto, 409 U.S. 968, 93 S.Ct. 279, 34 L.Ed.2d 333 (1972) found that solitary confinement did not violate the Eighth Amendment. See also Ervin v. Ciccone, 557 F.2d 1260 (8th Cir. 1977); Gregory v. Wyse, 512 F.2d 378 (10th Cir. 1975); LeGrande v. Redman, 432 F.Supp. 1037 (D. Del. 1977). 129. 572 F.2d at 1263 n. 5. Owens-El v. Robinson, 442 F.Supp. 1368, 1384 (W.D. Pa. 1978) held it to be inhumane to strip an inmate and order confinement in a dark isolation cell with no furnishings. including threatening guards, screaming obscenities, destroying considerable property, and throwing urine and fecal matter on guards passing by his cell. Disciplinary hearings were conducted and plaintiff was sentenced to continued confinement in administrative segregation. However, he destroyed his entire cell and was moved to a strip cell in which he tore the plumbing fixtures from the walls. He was retained in that cell until prison personnel were able to build a special cell for his confinement, with the sink and toilet embedded in concrete. His bed consisted of a concrete slab covered with a foam rubber mattress. In view of plaintiff's conduct, the denial of an award of damages against the prison officials was not improper. The court recognized that prison administrators must deal in a constitutional manner with convicts who are violent and unruly and that the contributory fault of an inmate does not necessarily deprive him of his right to relief from deprivations of constitutional dimension. However, there was nothing in the case to indicate that the defendants acted toward plaintiff in bad faith or with personal malice and the court found that they were shielded from liability for damages by the qualified executive privilege recognized in Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 98 S. Ct. 885, 55 L. Ed. 2d 24 (1978). The plaintiff in Franklin v. Fortner, 541 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1976) alleged that he was transferred to a wing of the institution which included inmates who were under psychiatric care. Plaintiff alleged, "I was constantly subjected to physical harm and I underwent great mental pain because many of the inmates under psychiatric care constantly threw urine, excrement, glass, water, fire, other harmful objects and they hardly ever stopped screaming and hollering. 541 F.2d at 496 n. 2. The court found the complaint stated a claim and reversed the district court's dismissal. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972) reversed the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint where he alleged that he had suffered aggravation of a preexisting foot injury and a circulatory ailment as a result of having to sleep on the floor of his solitary confinement cell with only blankets. Where a female prisoner was temporarily placed in a solitary cell in an all male prison, for security reasons, the district court did not err in denying preliminary injunctive relief. Chesimard v. Mulcahy, 570 F.2d 1184 (3d Cir. 1978). In discussing classification of pretrial detainees, Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1978) stated: "Although the state may legitimately vary the conditions of confinement for maximum security inmates, it may not use security classifications as a license to harm pretrial detainees. The court affirmed the district court's order to the prison officials to establish a classification system which would make it possible to determine which pretrial detainees required maximum security confinement and which ones could enjoy contact visits without jeopardizing security. 5. Prisoners Placed in Segregation or Protective Custody at Their Own Request The fact that a prisoner requests placement in administrative segregation for his own protection does not justify unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Sweet v. South Carolina Dept. of Corrections, 529 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1975). In a concurring opinion, Judge Butzner stated: Though Sweet's assignment to a punitive cell is labeled administrative or segregative, his treatment is tantamount to punishment. Confining him as though he has breached prison rules, when in fact he has not, is so arbitrary and capricious that it deprives him of due process of law. And placing him in the same class as lawless prisoners, though he is not lawless, denies him the equal protection of the law. 130 529 F.2d at 868. In Little v. Walker, 552 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1977), the plaintiff alleged that even when he was placed in segregation-safekeeping at his own request he was subjected to sexual assaults by gang-affiliated inmates who served him his meals. Defendants made no distinction between disciplinary and protective segregatees and plaintiff complained of the conditions of confinement 130. But see Crowe v. Leeke, 540 F.2d 740 (4th Cir. 1976). Although prisoner suits for medical treatment may be based on federal habeas corpus, the Federal Tort Claims Act, 133 or the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the majority of actions are brought under section 1983 and are based on a violation of the Eighth Amendment 1977). 131. See generally Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 561 F.2d 411 (1st Cir. 132. This chapter was written by Vicki Thompson, Editor-inChief of Vol. 17, Duquesne Law Review, 1978-79. A more analytical discussion of prisoners' right to medical treatment will be published in an article by Ms. Thompson in Issue 3-4 of Volume 17 of the Duquesne Law Review 1979. 133. See, e.g., Plummer v. United States, 580 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1978). Eight federal penitentiary prisoners brought suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act to recover for the negligence of prison officials who exposed them to the active tuberculosis of a fellow inmate. The court held that the impingement of the tubercle bacilli on the prisoners' lungs and the fear of contracting or transmitting it constituted compensable mental suffering. |