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need for conducting body cavity searches. amounts of contraband were being smuggled into the prison despite frequent random strip searches that were conducted on inmates returning from unsupervised absences. However, in that case the court found that the seizure of contraband from the defendant was unreasonable because she had not been notified that her voluntary absences from the prison would potentially subject her to completely random body cavity searches. The court, however, declined to hold that notice was an essential element of reasonableness in every fact situation.

Defendant Lilly had been searched upon her return from a voluntary weekend furlough because two or three persons in the prison had told a correctional supervisor that she had bragged about smuggling marijuana into the prison after her last furlough. The supervisor received authorization from the warden to conduct a body cavity search upon the defendant when she returned to the prison. When an initial strip search did not uncover any contraband, a body cavity search was conducted by a female medical officer. A cellophane envelope containing marijuana and a quaalude pill were removed from the defendant's rectum. The court found that prior notice to the prisoner of the possibility of a body cavity search was not necessary where prison officials had reason to believe that the prisoner was actually hiding contraband in a body cavity. The court noted that the search was conducted by a female medical officer in the prison clinic. Therefore, the search was reasonable and the contraband was properly admitted into evidence.

Similarly, United States v. York, 578 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1978) upheld the body cavity search which revealed a balloon containing marijuana protruding from defendant's rectum. The search was conducted after an orange balloon containing marijuana dropped from plaintiff's brother's pants leg while they were on the visitor's patio. The brothers were separated and both were searched. Nothing was found on plaintiff's brother who was visiting him, but the balloon carrying marijuana was found on plaintiff. The court held that prison officials need not show probable cause to validate a search of a prisoner. Although prisoners retain some degree of protection under the Fourth Amendment, the prison officials need only show reasonableness. The circumstances of a balloon containing marijuana having fallen from plaintiff's brother's pants leg justified the search of plaintiff.

In Hurley v. Ward, 584 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1978), the district court had properly granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting prison officials from requiring prisoners during strip search procedures to lift their genitals and to bend over and spread their buttocks to display their anus, their anus, unless there was cause to believe that contraband was being smuggled into the institution, in which case the officials were required to make a record of the strip search and set forth the reasons why they felt it was necessary. Although that action was brought on an individual basis, the district court improperly applied its order to all inmates of state correctional facilities. The court stated: "Finally,

at this preliminary stage it is particularly inappropriate that an injunction in such sweeping terms should issue since it represents a serious intrusion upon the exercise of informed judgment by those officials charged with the 'complex and difficult' task of operating state penal institutions." 584 F.2d at 612.

Hurley v. Ward, 541 F.Supp. 930 (S.D. N.Y. 1978) denied defendant's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability for damages.

Bell v. Manson, 427 F.Supp. 450 (D. Tenn. 1976) denied plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction enjoining the practice of subjecting them to anal examinations upon their return from court appearances. The plaintiffs were pre-trial detainees. The court found that the correctional officials did not touch the inmates during the examinations and that they did not subject the inmates to verbal humiliation or abuse. Under the circumstances of that case the court found that the strip and rectal searches were not unreasonable. The court noted that the detainee's knowledge that the searches were conducted had a beneficial deterrent effect. The prison officials' interest in maintaining proper security outweighed the inmate's rights to be free from the embarrassing submission to strip searches upon their return from court appearances and outside visits. Plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate a clear showing of likelihood of success at trial and irreparable injury and their request for a preliminary injunction was denied.

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The courts have not yet clearly defined the degree of privacy available to prisoners in their cells. The two relevant Supreme Court decisions appear to be Lanza

v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 82 S.Ct. 1218, 8 L.Ed.2d 384 (1962), and United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 94 S.Ct. 1234, 39 L.Ed.2d 771 (1974). In Lanza petitioner had been convicted of refusing to answer questions directed to him by a committee of the New York legislature which was investigating possible corruption in the state parole system. Petitioner refused to answer the questions, claiming they were based upon a conversation he had with his brother when he visited him in a New York jail and which had been illegally electronically intercepted and recorded by state officials. The Court noted that the question presented did not relate to the use of the intercepted conversation in a criminal prosecution. Rather, it related to plaintiff's refusal to answer questions. The Court noted that the record conclusively showed that at least two of the questions the committee had asked petitioner were not related in any way to the intercepted conversation. Refusal to answer either of those questions fully supported the judgment. dictum the Court stated:

But to say that a public

jail is the equivalent of a man's
"house" or that it is a place
where he can claim constitutional
immunity from search or seizure of
his person, his papers, or his
effects, is at best a novel
[W]ithout

argument

attempting either to define or to
predict, the ultimate scope of
Fourth Amendment protection, it
is obvious that a jail shares none
of the attributes of privacy of a
home, an automobile, an office,
or a hotel room. In prison,

official surveillance has tradition-
ally been the order of the day.
Though it may be assumed that even
in jail, or perhaps especially
there, the relationships which the
law has endowed with particularized
confidentiality must continue to
receive unceasing protection, there
is no claimed violation of any such
special relationship here.

In

370 U.S. at 143-44, 82 S.Ct. at 1220, 8 L. Ed. 2d at 387.

United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 94 S.Ct. 1234, 39 L. Ed. 2d 771 (1974) held that the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated by the removal and seizure of his clothing the morning after his arrest and over his objection. Examination of the clothing revealed paint chips matching the samples taken from the window defendant had been charged with breaking into. The Court noted that since warrantless searches can be made incident to custodial arrests, such searches may also be legally conducted after the arrest, when the accused arrives at the place of detention. The Court noted that petitioner's clothing could have been taken from him when he was taken into custody. However, since it had been late at night and no substitute clothing was available, the actions of the prison officials in purchasing new clothing for him the following morning and then taking the clothing he had been wearing and subjecting it to a laboratory analysis constituted no Fourth Amendment violation. The Court stated:

Holding the Warrant Clause
inapplicable in the circumstances
present here does not leave law
enforcement officials subject to
no restraints . .
We thus

have no occasion to express a
view concerning those circum-
stances surrounding custodial
searches incident to incarceration
which might "violate the dictates
of reason either because of their
number or their manner of
perpetration."

415 U.S. at 808 n. 9, 94 S. Ct. at 1239 n. 9, 39 L.Ed.2d at 778 n. 9.

The Ninth Circuit holds that prisoners have no expectation of privacy in their cells and, therefore, the warrantless search of a cell does not violate the Fourth Amendment. In United States v. Hitchcock, 467 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 916, 93 S.Ct. 973, 35 L. Ed. 2d at 279 (1973), appellant was appealing his conviction for presenting fraudulent income tax refund claims to the Internal Revenue Service. At the time of the offense he had been serving a prison sentence for murder. His prison cell had been searched without a warrant and documentary

evidence found therein had been admitted into evidence in his criminal trial. The court stated:

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467 F.2d at 1108. Subsequently, in United States v. Palmateer, 469 F.2d 273 (9th Cir. 1972), the evidence that formed the basis for the petitioner's conviction had been discovered during a warrantless search of his prison cell. The court found that petitioner's failure to move for suppression of the evidence was a conscious part of his trial strategy and he had thereby waived his Fourth Amendment claim. However, the court noted that even if the merits of his Fourth Amendment claim were reached, his conviction would be affirmed, referring to the holding in Hitchcock, supra, that a warrantless search of a prisoner's cell is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The court added that the need to maintain security and discipline provides another basis for dispensing with the warrant requirement.

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