more harshly on adherents of one faith than another, the courts will scrutinize the reasonableness of such regulations.' 463 F.2d at 113-14. The court of appeals noted that plaintiff objected to the "unreasonable and unjustified" test applied by the district court and stated: "[S]ubstantial interest' or compelling need' are, in the context submitted by appellant, solely standards of law, for use by the court to determine preliminarily before the reasonableness issue is submitted to the jury." 463 F.2d at 114. The reasonableness of the regulations was a jury question and the district court had instructed the jury fairly and accurately.103 O'Malley v. Brierley, 477 F.2d 785 (3d Cir. 1973) was an action brought by prisoners and Catholic priests, claiming the abridgement of First Amendment rights when state prison officials withdrew the priests' privileges to conduct religious services and counsel prisoners. The court affirmed the summary judgment for the defendants as to the claim of the priests, but reversed as to the claim of the prisoner plaintiffs. Although the court held that the priests did not have a constitutional right to enter the prison, nevertheless, prison officials were to be prevented from unreasonably attempting to curtail the practice of religion by prison inmates: [W]here a state does afford prison inmates the opportunity of practicing a religion, it may not, without reasonable justification, curtail the practice of religion by one sect. The inmates' complaint that the curtailment of the visitation privileges of Fathers O'Malley and 103. See also Cochran v. Rowe, 438 F.Supp. 566 (N.D. Ill. 1977). The court held that a First Amendment claim was stated when prison officials unreasonably restricted the practice of Islamic religion by (1) disproportionate funding, (2) failing to provide access to religious material, (3) prohibiting Islamic activities, and (4) establishing more stringent procedures to attend religious services than required for other religions. Taylor constituted religious district court. 477 F.2d at 795. The conflicts in the opposing affidavits required that the reasonableness of the regulation be determined by a fact finder; therefore, a remand was required: [W]e emphasize that the state may presence of the priests constituted 477 F.2d at 796. Two plaintiffs alleged that they had been transferred to other institutions as punishment for their religious activities in Fajeriak v. McGinnis, 493 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1974). The court of appeals reversed the district court's dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. One of the plaintiffs was allegedly suspected of teaching the Black Muslim religion to fellow prisoners, and the other plaintiff alleged that he believed his transfer resulted from his activities as a Christian Scientist. The court found that if the transfers were for the sole purpose of penalizing the plaintiffs for their religious . beliefs, they were unconstitutional. The district court in Kennedy v. Meachum, 540 F.2d 1057 (10th Cir. 1976) had dismissed the action without service of process. The court of appeals remanded for further proceedings. The plaintiffs alleged that their practice of the Satanic religion was restricted by defendants in violation of the First Amendment. Plaintiffs alleged that they were denied the right to possess the necessary ritual items in their cells, such as candles, robes, a holy water sprinkler, parchment, a gong, a chalice, incense, and a bell; that they were prohibited from posting religious information on the inmate bulletin board; that disciplinary measures were initiated against one of the plaintiffs for abuse of a "legal paper" he had attempted to post containing religious information; that one of the plaintiffs was subjected to disciplinary measures in retaliation for his beliefs; that the officials had not permitted plaintiffs to have a religious study group of the Satanic religion; and that Satanic inmates had been discriminated against in prison employment and had been generally harassed because of their religious practices. The court observed that the allegations claiming that "religion" was involved could not be dismissed in the absence of a responsive pleading or affidavits. Further, there was no basis for the finding that defendants' actions were merely lawful limitations on the practice of religious belief and that no infringement of rights under the free exercise clause had occurred: We are persuaded that the asserted justification of such restrictions on religious practices based on the State's interest in maintaining order and discipline must be shown to outweigh the inmates' First Amendment rights. If it is determined that the practice of a religious belief is involved, and that there are restrictions imposed on its exercise, then the court should only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion." 540 F.2d at 1061. Similarly, in Theriault v. Silber, 547 F.2d 1279 (5th Cir. 1977) the court of appeals remanded for a determination whether plaintiff's church, the "Church of the New Song, a religion within the scope of the First Amendment. The court directed the district court as follows: "When reconsidering what constitutes a religion, a thorough study of the existing case law should be accompanied by appropriate evidentiary exploration of philosophical, theological, and other related literature and resources on this issue." 547 F.2d at 1281. On remand the district court determined that "The Church of the New Song" was not entitled to First Amendment protection as a religion. Theriault v. Silber, 453 F.Supp. 254 (W.D. Texas 1978). The plaintiff's second attempt to appeal was dismissed with prejudice because both notices of appeal contained vile and insulting references to the trial judge. Theriault v. Silber, 579 F.2d 302 (5th Cir. 1978). 5. Other Cases on Freedom of Speech, Expression of Beliefs, and Association and Assembly A prisoner may not be punished for his beliefs or for the mere written expression of them. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 202 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub nom. Sostre v. Oswald, 404 U.S. 1049, 92 S.Ct. 719, 30 L. Ed. 2d 740 (1972), and Oswald v. Sostre, 405 U.S. 978, 92 S.Ct. 1190, 31 L.Ed.2d 254 (1972). However, institution officials may confiscate a prisoner's writings expressing his beliefs where they have reason to believe that the writings may be circulated among other prisoners and may subvert prison discipline. 104 United States ex rel. Larkins v. Oswald, 510 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1975) affirmed a judgment entered on a jury verdict granting the plaintiff an award of $1,000 against the commissioner of corrections and the warden for the plaintiff's placement in isolation as punishment for having inflammatory and revolutionary papers in his possession. Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 97 S.Ct. 2532, 53 L.Ed.2d 629 (1977) held that regulations promulgated by the state department of corrections prohibiting inmates from soliciting other inmates to join an inmate labor union and which barred all meetings of the union did not violate inmates' First Amendment rights: "[T]he inmate's 'status as a prisoner' and the operational realities of a prison dictate restrictions on the associational rights among inmates." 433 U.S. at 126, 97 S.Ct. at 2538, 53 L.Ed.2d at 638. The Court further stated: First Amendment associational penal management. As already noted, environment. 433 U.S. at 132, 97 S.Ct. at 2541, 53 L.Ed.2d at 642. 1973). 104. See also Remmers v. Brewer, 475 F.2d 52 (8th Cir. 160 |