Subsequently Main Road v. Aytch, 565 F.2d 54 (3d Cir. 1977) affirmed the district court's finding that the new regulations did not violate due process, but remanded for entry of declaratory judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. "We agree with the district court's conclusion that prison inmates have no constitutional rights to hold group press conferences where other means of communication are available." 565 F.2d at 56. Following remand of Main Road v. Aytch, 522 F.2d 1080, the defendant had adopted regulations banning group press conferences and regulating individual interviews. The regulations required that an inmate who wished to meet with a reporter must give the warden certain information in writing about the proposed discussion. Requests could be denied by the warden, or his designee, if the superintendent of the Philadelphia prisons, or his designee, determined that the interview would present a clear and present danger to the safety or security of the institution, the inmates, the personnel, or the visitors. Within five days the inmate could request a hearing before a special board composed of the deputy superintendent, director of inmate services, and a warden other than the one denying the request. The hearing was to be held within ten days of the request. The board acted as a fact finder and was required to prepare written findings of fact as well as a disposition. Its action was administratively final. The court held that "Plaintiffs here have failed to demonstrate that the prison officials' prohibition of group press conferences does not have a legitimate relationship to security within the prisons. The fact that many of the inmates have not been convicted does not reduce the importance of security considerations." 565 F.2d at 57. While the possibility of review of the warden's decision by his subordinates was not endorsed, the court found that it did not violate due process. d. Pretrial Detainees i. Visitation privileges. Although contact visits were held not constitutionally compelled in the case of convicted prisoners in Feeley v. Sampson, 570 F.2d 364 (1st Cir. 1978) (subsection a, supra), the court reversed the district court to the extent that it required that pretrial detainees have physical contact and communication with their visitors. "The question is simply whether consideration of jail security and order make it reasonable for the authorities to refuse visits of this nature." The fact that contact visits were allowed at the state prison, although a relevant consideration, was not conclusive since the state prison could have been constructed in such a way that contact visits would be more manageable: Miller v. Carson, 563 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1977) affirmed the district judge's order requiring that plaintiffs, pretrial detainees, be permitted contact visits. "We have said that for convicted prisoners 'visitation privileges are a matter subject to the discretion of prison officials.' . . We reserved, however, the question whether convicted prisoners have a constitutional right to visitation in some form." 563 F.2d at 748. The court noted that the defendants had failed 94. Accord, Owens-El v. Robinson, 442 F.Supp. 1368, 1389 (W.D. Pa. 1978); Collins v. Schoonfield, 344 F. Supp. 257, 279 (D. Md. 1972) (no constitutional violation to deny contact visits). to present evidence of threats to institutional security, but added: "Of course, prison authorities are under a duty to adopt reasonable measures to prevent visitors from smuggling weapons or contraband to prisoners, whether the prisoners are convicted or unconvicted and whether they are classified as maximum or minimum security risks."95 563 F.2d at 749. Similarly, Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333, 338 (2d Cir. 1974) affirmed the district court's order requiring the prison officials to permit pretrial detainees who were shown not to require maximum security custody to have contact visits. See also Forts v. Malcolm, 426 F.Supp. 464 (S.D. N.Y. 1977); Dillard v. Pitchess, 399 F.Supp. 1225 (C.D. Cal. 1975). ii. Press interviews. When pretrial detainees are permitted press interviews, the determination must be based upon predetermined regulations which delineate precise and objective tests. See the discussion of Main Road v. Aytch, 522 F.2d 1080 (3d Cir. 1975) in subsection c, supra. 4. Freedom of Religion96 The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof 95. See also Duran v. Elrod, 542 F.2d 998 (7th Cir. 1976) (error to dismiss complaint alleging infrequency of visits and limited visiting hours); Jordon v. Walker, 450 F.Supp. 213 (E.D. Wisc. 1978) (court ordered contact visitation and modification of physical facilities to accomplish it); Ambrose v. Malcolm, 440 F.Supp. 51, 52 (S.D. N.Y. 1977) ("Except where security of the institution is at stake, all visits to inmates shall be contact visits."); O'Bryan v. County of Saginaw, Mich., 437 F.Supp. 582, 589 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (denial of contact visit unconstitutional as matter of law unless security reasons justify); Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Prison officials required to establish a classification system which would enable them to determine which pre-trial detainees could enjoy contact visits without jeopardizing the security of the facility. However, the court did not mandate contact visits.) 96. For a complete discussion of prisoners and freedom of religion, see Comment, The Religious Rights of the Incarcerated, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 812 (1977). The First Amendment right to free exercise of religion97 and the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause are the sources of causes of action relating to prisoners' rights to practice their religion. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 1079, 31 L.Ed.2d 263 (1972) reversed a judgment dismissing the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. The plaintiff alleged that he was a Buddhist and was not permitted to use the prison chapel although other prisoners, who were members of other religious sects, were permitted to use the chapel; that he was punished for sharing Buddhist religious material with other prisoners; that he was prohibited from corresponding with his religious advisor; that inmates were encouraged to participate in other religious programs, which were provided at state expense; and that prisoners were able to get points of good merit as rewards for attending orthodox religious services. The Court stated: "We are not unmindful that prison officials must be accorded latitude in the administration of prison affairs, and that prisoners necessarily are subject to appropriate rules and regulations." 405 U.S. at 321, 98 S.Ct. at 1081, 31 L.Ed.2d at 267. The Court further noted: If Cruz was a Buddhist and if he was denied a reasonable opportunity of pursuing his faith comparable to the opportunity afforded fellow prisoners who adhere to conventional religious precepts, then there was palpable discrimination by the State against the Buddhist religion, established 600 B.C., long before the Christian era. 405 U.S. at 322, 92 S.Ct. at 1081, 31 L. Ed. 2d at 268. However, the Court noted: 97. Applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 31 L.Ed.2d 263 (1972). place of worship need not be regardless of size; nor must a 405 U.S. at 322 n. 2, 92 S.Ct. at 1081 n. 2, 31 L.Ed.2d at 268 n. 2. After trial on the merits, Lareau v. MacDougall 473 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878, 94 S. Ct. 49, 38 L. Ed. 2d 123 (1973) found that the prison authorities had a substantial reason for denying segregated prisoners the right to attend Mass. The Catholic chaplain made himself available to administer the sacraments in the segregation unit and testified that he had taken care of plaintiff's spiritual needs adequately and "to the best of (his) ability."98 A federal prisoner brought a mandamus action seeking an order requiring the prison administrator to conform the conditions of his incarceration to the plaintiff's Orthodox Jewish religious beliefs concerning diet and prayer in Kahane v. Carlson, 527 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1976). The court of appeals found that the relief granted by the district court was broader than required and ordered that plaintiff be provided with a diet sufficient to sustain him in good health without violating the Jewish dietary laws. The court declined to mandate specific items of diet. In Mukmuk v. Com'r. of Dept. of Correctional Services, 529 F.2d 272, 275 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 911, 96 S.Ct. 2238, 48 L.Ed.2d 838, the plaintiff claimed that he had been placed in solitary confinement for twelve days for possessing religious literature and setting up a school for Muslims. 98. Accord, Sweet v. South Carolina Dept. of Corrections, 529 F.2d 854, 863 (4th Cir. 1975) (refusal to allow attendance at Mass is reasonable judgment where individual ministration by chaplain is permitted). |