557 F.2d at 1262.

Money damages may be denied when the facts indicate that none of the defendants acted in bad faith or with personal malice toward plaintiff. Wycoff v. Brewer, 572 F.2d 1260 (8th Cir. 1978).

In Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Association, 580 F.2d 1222 (4th Cir. 1978), a corporate director was not liable under section 1983 when he did not participate in, and in fact opposed, the constitutional violation: "If a director does not personally participate in the corporation's tort, general corporation law does not subject him to liability simply by virtue of his office." 580 F.2d at 1224, n. 5.

F.

Extradition:

Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1

79

Article IV, section 2, clause 1 of the United States Constitution provides:

A person charged in any State with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another State, shall on demand of the executive authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the

State having jurisdiction of the crime.

Failure to comply with extradition laws may be actionable under section 1983. Wirth v. Surles, 562 F.2d 319 (4th Cir. 1977) held that a complaint alleging plaintiff had been arrested in Georgia and turned over to a South Carolina highway patrolman who transported him into South Carolina to answer pending charges, without extradition proceedings, stated a claim under section 1983 since the officer was acting under color of state

79. See Michigan v. Doran, L.Ed.2d

47 U.S.L.W. 4067 (1978), for the Supreme Court's latest formulation of the substantive law of extradition. In this case, the court held that if extradition papers were in prima facie good order, the receiving state could not question the sending state's determination of probable cause.

law. 80

Siegel v. Edwards, 566 F.2d 958 (5th Cir. 1978), discussed the problem of waiver of extradition:

Appellant first contends that
the extradition papers are illegal
because they were rubber stamped
with the signature of state off-
icials, instead of being person-
ally signed. Although the extra-
dition papers of which appellant
complains were never executed,
appellant's return to Louisiana
was not the result of those ex-
tradition papers. Appellant was
returned to Louisiana because of
his voluntary waiver of extradi-
tion. Once a fugitive has been
brought within custody of the
demanding state, legality of
extradition is no longer [a]
proper subject of any legal
attack by him . .

Appellant next contends that
he could not be charged with
murder or armed robbery because
he fought extradition on those
charges. He argues that since
he voluntarily waived extradi-
tion on the burglary charges, he
was exempt from trial on other
offenses. This contention is
meritless. Rights granted under
federal provisions for extradi-

80. See also Sanders v. Conine, 506 F.2d 530, 532 (10th Cir. 1974) (complaint which charged police officer and sheriff with abuse of extradition power by noncompliance with applicable federal law stated § 1983 claim which may not be summarily dismissed as frivolous); Pierson v. Graut, 357 F.Supp. 397, 399 (N.D. Iowa 1973) (extradition is not merely a matter of comity but is also a means of protecting citizens); Brozozowski v. Randall, 281 F.Supp. 306, 311 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (section 1983 relief is available to one unlawfully kidnapped and taken from state by police officer without extradition proceedings).

tion are granted to the state
rather than to fugitives who
might be the subject of extra-
dition. Such fugitives, when
returned to the demanding
state, are not exempt for
trial for any criminal act
committed in that state.

566 F.2d at 959-60.

Although the plaintiff in Maynard v. Rhodes,

580 F.2d 237 (6th Cir. 1978) appeared to be alleging that the governor of Ohio and his assistants extradited plaintiff solely at the insistence of his bondsman, the record disclosed that he had been indicted in Ohio at the time the governor's request for extradition was forwarded to California. Plaintiff had subsequently been tried, convicted and sentenced in Ohio. Therefore, the district court had properly dismissed the complaint.

1.

G. First Amendment

The First Amendment provides:

Congress shall make no law

respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;
or abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of

grievances.

General Considerations

The framework for analyzing First Amendment claims was identified in Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 2804, 41 L.Ed.2d 495, 501 (1974), where the Court stated:

[A] prison inmate retains those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system. Thus, challenges to prison restrictions that are asserted to inhibit

First Amendment interests must be
analyzed in terms of the legitimate
policies and goals of the corrections
system, to whose custody and care
the prisoner has been committed in
accordance with due process of law.

The legitimate penal objectives identified in Pell were deterrence of crime by the rehabilitation process and by the confinement of criminal offenders in a facility isolated from the rest of society, and the maintenance of internal security within the institution.

The unique importance of First Amendment rights in the prison setting was emphasized by the court in Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 129-30 (2d Cir. 1978) cert. granted, 99 S.Ct. 76, (1978):

U.S.

In the close and restrictive atmosphere of a prison, first amendment guarantees taken for granted in society at large assume far greater significance. The simple opportunity to read a book or write a letter, whether it expresses political views or absent affections, supplies a vital link between the inmate and the outside world, and nourishes the prisoner's mind despite the blankness and bleakness of his environment. Accordingly, courts have jealously protected the inmate in his exercise of first amendment

prerogatives.

L. Ed. 2d

The prison official's burden of justifying restrictions on prisoners' First Amendment rights was outlined in Aikens v. Jenkins, 534 F.2d 751 (7th Cir. 1976):

justifying restrictions on First
Amendment rights is on those who
seek to impose the restrictions.
To justify a prison censorship
regulation, prison officials must
show that it "furthers one or more
of the substantial governmental
interests of security, order, and
rehabilitation.
. In

addition, "the limitation of First
Amendment freedoms must be no greater
than is necessary or essential to the
protection of the particular govern-
mental interest involved."

i. Convicted prisoners. Censorship (actual withholding) of prisoner mail may be justified where the regulation or practice in question furthers an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression, but the limitation must be no greater than necessary to protect the governmental interest involved. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974). Procunier found that the prison mail regulations involved were properly invalidated by the district court since they authorized "censorship of statements that 'unduly complain' or 'magnify grievances', expression of 'inflammatory political, racial, or religious or other views', and matter deemed 'defamatory' or otherwise 'inappropriate'." 416 U.S. at 415, 94 S. Ct. at 1812, 40 L. Ed. 2d at 241. The regulations invited prison officials and employees to apply their own personal prejudices and opinions as standards for prisoner mail censorship. Upon finding a letter to be objectionable, the employee could refuse to mail or deliver it and return it to the author, or submit a disciplinary report which could lead to suspension of mail privileges or other sanctions, or he could place a copy of the letter in the prisoner's file, where it might be a factor in determining work or housing assignments or eligibility for parole. The Court specifically stated that its decision was not based upon the rights of prisoners, but included consideration of the rights of persons outside the institution to communicate with prisoners.