this instance was disallowed because the hospitalization was not rendered for a service connected disability and the services performed by the Indiana State Sanatorium are not covered by an award of compensation for the disability on account of which hospitalization was necessary. In the case of Brij Van Gookins (Benjamin C. Van Gorkom), C-1162966, claim for compensation was filed November 21, 1923. An award of compensation was approved September 19, 1924, effective June 7, 1924. The claimant's disability is pulmonary tuberculosis. The rating grants service connection under section 200 of the World War veterans' act. Claim filed by the Indiana State Sanatorium in this case is for $252, covering 84 days' hospitalization at the rate of $3 per diem during the period from December 8, 1923, to February 29, 1924. As this period is prior to June 7, 1924, the effective date of the award of compensation, it was necessary that this item be disallowed. In the case of Clarence N. Young, C-802367, the date of filing claim is not shown in the central office folder. An award of compensation, however, was approved September 1, 1922, effective May 15, 1921, for pulmonary tuberculosis. Claim of the Indiana State Sanatorium in this case is for $2,019, covering 673 days' hospitalization at $3 per diem during the period from August 4, 1921, to June 8, 1923. In this case hospitalization through the United States Veterans' Administration was offered this claimant with a refusal of such hospitalization noted as of December 2, 1921. Therefore, there has been allowed in this case to the Indiana State Sanatorium the amount of $363 for the period from the commencing date of hospitalization, August 4, 1921, up to the date of refusal, December 2, 1921. In no instance is reimbursement authorized under existing law for the cost of treatment of a nonservice connected disability, neither is reimbursement authorized for the treatment of a service-connected disability for any period beyond the retroactive date on which the claimant would be entitled to compensation for a compensable disability. Reimbursement under section 202 (9) of the World War veterans' act, as amended, for the cost of emergency medical treatment necessary for the relief of a service-connected disability is limited to those cases where Government facilities are not available and delay would have been hazardous. It seems, therefore, that if an act on the part of a claimant in refusing Government treatment in section 202 (9) cases bars him from reimbursement under the provisions of that section that any beneficiary whose condition is not one of emergency and who fails or otherwise refuses to accept governmental treatment, going instead to a State institution, should likewise be barred from reimbursement for such hospitalization under the provisions of section 202 (3), or if the State hospital makes the claim, such hospital should be barred from payment notwithstanding the very liberal provisions of that section. After giving careful consideration to the proposed bill, S. 1528, this office feels constrained to suggest that the passage of this proposed measure would establish an extremely bad precedent, since it would open the way for the introduction of similar bills in the Congress that would cover thousands of claims that have been disallowed for lack of merit. A copy of this letter is inclosed for your use. Very truly yours, O FRANK T. HINES, Administrator. Mr. SMOOT, from the Committee on Finance, submitted the following REPORT [To accompany S. 623] The Committee on Finance, to whom was referred the bill (S. 623) providing for the payment by the Government of attorneys' fees in certain suits growing out of governmental insurance policies issued to service men or ex-service men, having considered the same, report it back to the Senate and recommend that the bill do not pass. The report of the Veterans' Administration is as follows: Hon. REED SMOOT, VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION, United States Senate, Washington, D. C. DEAR SIR: Receipt is acknowledged of your letter of December 17, 1931, with which you forwarded for report a copy of S. 623, Seventy-second Congress, "A bill providing for the payment by the Government of attorneys' fees in certain suits growing out of governmental insurance policies issued to service men or ex-service men." This bill provides for attorneys' fees in insurance suits under section 19 of the World War veterans' act, as amended, to be fixed by the court, such fee not to be less than 10 per cent nor more than 25 per cent, and said fee to be charged against the United States Government in the event that the decision is adverse to the claim of the Government. This bill is identical in substance with S. 1826, Seventy-first Congress, on which report was made by this office to your committee on October 24, 1929. As a result of the amendment of July 3, 1930, to section 19 of the World War veterans' act, 1924, providing that "No suit on yearly renewable term insurance shall be allowed under this section unless the same shall have been brought within six years after the right accrued for which the claim is made or within one year after the date of approval of this amendatory act, whichever is the later date, and no suit on United States Government life (converted) insurance shall be allowed under this section unless the same shall have been brought within six years after the right accrued for which the claim is made, * **"the number of pending suits filed against the Government has increased to approximately 7,300 and are increasing at the rate of 100 suits per week. Furthermore, approximately 56,000 claims for insurance benefits are pending before the insurance claims council. It may be conservatively estimated that at least 50 per cent of these claims will eventually develop into suits against the Government. The assumption by the Government in the event plaintiff is successful in court, of the cost of prosecuting these suits against the Government with a maximum attorney's fee of 25 per cent of the amount recovered, whereas plaintiff's attorneys are allowed under the present law a maximum of only 10 per cent of the amount recovered (deducted from the insurance), would give an additional incentive to the plaintiff's attorneys and particularly those attorneys who have been specializing in this class of litigation and have already become overzealous in soliciting these cases. In this connection, the estimated possible cost of this legislation can not be accurately determined, but an approximation indicates that the sum of $1,296,000 would be required for the calendar year 1932. This amount is based upon my opinion that approximately 2,000 suits will be tried during the year 1932 and that in 36 per cent of these suits, or 720 suits, the plaintiffs will be successful, it being assumed that $10,000 insurance is involved in each suit or a total of $7,200,000, and that the court will allow an average attorney's fee of 18 per cent of the amount recovered. It should also be noted that attorneys' fees are likewise payable as to those claims for insurance benefits which have been denied upon which suit is brought and subsequently submitted for administrative review and paid. I believe that at least 200 such claims will be paid during the calendar year 1932, and again assuming that $10,000 insurance is involved in each suit or a total of $2,000,000, and an average attorney's fee of 18 per cent is paid, there would be an additional liability of $360,000 for attorneys' fees under the proposed bill. Furthermore, the courts are inclined to be more liberal in granting attorneys' fees when payable by the Government and experience indicates that only in unusual cases have the courts failed to allow the attorneys the maximum fee when judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff. For the reasons indicated above, I can not recommend this proposed measure to your favorable consideration. A copy of this letter is inclosed for your use. FRANK T. HINES, Administrator. O TO AMEND SECTION 126, JUDICIAL CODE FEBRUARY 24, 1932.-Ordered to be printed Mr. HEBERT, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the following REPORT [To accompany S. 2232] A bill (S. 2232) to amend section 126 of the Judicial Code, as amended, so as to provide for the holding of a term of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit at Salt Lake City, and all appellate proceedings arising in Utah to be heard and disposed of at that place, having considered the same, report favorably thereon with an amendment. Following is the text of bill: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 126 of the Judicial Code, as amended, is hereby further amended (a) by inserting after the word "Wichita" in the first sentence thereof ", Salt Lake City," and (b) by inserting at the end thereof the following new sentence: "All appeals and other appellate proceedings which may be taken or prosecuted from the district court of the United States in the State of Utah to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Judicial Circuit shall be heard and disposed of by said court at the terms of court held at Salt Lake City, except that appeals in cases of injunctions and in all other cases which, under the statutes and rules, or in the opinion of the court, are entitled to be brought to a speedy hearing, may be heard and disposed of wherever said court may be sitting.' The committee recommends that the bill be reported favorably with the following amendments: Page 1, line 4, strike out "(a)." Strike out all after the word "city" in line 5, page 1 to the period in line 15, so that the bill as amended will read as follows: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 126 of the Judicial Code, as amended, is hereby further amended by inserting after the word "Wichita" in the first sentence thereof, "Salt Lake City." This bill was the subject of a hearing before a subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, at which a number of lawyers from the city of Salt Lake appeared as proponents. It was urged that in the absence of sessions of the circuit court in their city, many cases |