tion which have heretofore been issued in labor disputes will disclose this fact. If, however, the provisions of paragraph (e) are to be limited in their operation to acts of destruction of property, there again the difficulty of establishing proof of neglect or inability of public officers to afford protection may, in some instances, and no doubt will, be impossible to sustain. We can well visualize a situation where the destruction of property has occurred wholly without the knowledge of public officers, and yet in seeking to establish proof that such public officers are unable or unwilling to furnish protection it would be quite impossible to do so. Therefore we submit that the courts, and not the police force, may well be the more effective agency for the peaceful settlement of disputes and that this provision of the bill should be stricken from it. INJUNCTION TO BE ISSUED FOR LIMITED PERIODS By the provisions of section 7, a temporary restraining order may not be effective for more than five days and shall become void at the expiration of such periods. We are heartily in accord with any declaration of policy which will prevent the use of injunctive relief in equity from becoming an in-strument of coercion or unreasonable restraint. Cases have been brought to our attention where through unreasonable delays the cause of respondents has suffered and where no redress has been available to them. But to arbitrarily limit the time during which a restraining order shall be in force, regardless of the circumstances, will in many instances deprive parties to a labor dispute of all equitable remedies to which they are justly entitled. While we are not opposed to a 5-day limit, we believe justice requires that provision be made for successive periods of renewal, each to be limited to a like period of five days, unless in the judgment of the court unjustifiable delay is sought by the complainant. We can well conceive of a situation where it would be quite impossible for notice to be given to all parties involved in a dispute within a period of five days. For instance, where a holiday and a Sunday intervene, then the time within which notice can be served is further limited. Moreover, it might well be that those who are charged with the service of process might not be able to locate the respondents named therein, within the period of five days. We know of no provision of law regulating the procedure either in legal or equitable actions, where any such arbitrary limit is placed as is to be found in this section of the bill. We, therefore, urge that some reasonable extension be provided, all the while guarding against unjustifiable delay. CONDITION PRECEDENT TO ISSUANCE OF RESTRAINING ORDER OR INJUNCTION Section 8 provides that no restraining order or injunctive relief shall be granted unless the complainant has first complied with any obligation imposed by law which is involved in a labor dispute, or who has failed to make every reasonable effort to settle such dispute either by negotiation or with the aid of any available governmental machinery for mediation or voluntary arbitration. We thoroughly indorse the principle of mediation, negotiation and voluntary arbitration. Enactments already on our statate books affirm the belief that settlements of labor disputes may be more readily effected by such peaceful agencies and we believe all legislation having to do with industrial relations should aim to encourage peaceful settlement rather than resort to force. By this section, however, the respondents may, without notice, engage in violence and fraud, and the complainant will be denied relief from such activities unless and until he has first taken all the prescribed steps or negotiations to stop such unlawful acts. Thus the aggressor may act without notice and may not be restrained until the injured party has endured the violence for a sufficient length of time within which to endeavor to secure an adjustment. We repeat that we thoroughly indorse negotiations looking to the settlements of all disputes. very recent times the proof of this procedure has been brought clearly to our attention. Notwithstanding the depressed condition of industry, when ordinarily the flames of discord and dissension would have pervaded the industrial world, we have observed that there have been practically no labor disputes of any kind, all parties having been willing to submit their differences to mediation and to calm discussion through their chosen representatives. Negotiations prior to overt acts is desirable, but this rule should apply to all parties, and particularly to the aggressor. In For these reasons this provision of the bill, which requires no preliminary steps before the unlawful acts are performed and restricts and delays the injured party from securing protection, does not commend itself to our sense of justice. CRIMINAL AND OTHER CONTEMPTS Sections 11 and 12 of the bill relate to punishments for contempt. Section 11 as amended in the Committee on Judiciary provides as follows: The defendant in any proceeding for contempt of court may file with the court a demand for the retirement of the judge sitting in the proceeding, if the contempt arises from an attack upon the character or conduct of such judge and if the contempt occurred elsewhere than in the presence of the court or so near thereto as to interfere directly with the administration of justice. Upon the filing of any such demand the judge shall thereupon proceed no further, but another judge shall be designated in the same manner as is provided by law. The demand shall be filed prior to the hearing in the contempt proceeding. It will be observed that this section brings within the provisions of jury trial contempts committed in violation of an order of a court of the United States. It will be noted, too, that this provision of the section applies to all contempts, whether criminal or civil. The power of Congress to deal with criminal contempts in the manner provided in the Clayton Act was sustained in the case of Michaelson v. United States (266 U. S. 62). In that case the court said: The simple question presented is whether Congress may require a trial by jury, upon demand of the accused in an independent proceeding at law for a criminal contempt which is also a crime. In his discussion of the above case, Mr. Justice Sutherland, who delivered the opinion of the court, observed that the first inquiry was whether the proceeding contemplated by the statute is for a civil or criminal contempt, and added that if it were the latter, since the SR-72-1-VOL 1—20 proceeding for criminal contempt, "unlike that for civil contempt, is between the public and the defendant, and is an independent proceeding at law, there would be no doubt in respect of the authority of Congress to set aside the settled rule that a suit in equity is to be tried by the chancellor without a jury." In order that a contempt case may be tried before a jury, the Supreme Court in this case declares in effect that the act or thing charged must be of such character as also to constitute a crime. The only substantial difference between such a proceeding as we have here an i a criminal prosecution by indictment or information, is that in the latter the set complained of is the violation of a law, and in the former the violation of a decree. In the case of the latter, the accused has a constitutional right of trial by jury, while in the former he has not. A study of the opinion in the case above referred to (Michaelson v. United States) has aroused grave doubts in our minds as to whether the provisions of section 11 as they now appear in the bill, would be sustained. With some limitation upon its provisions, however, we would favor its enactment. CONCLUSION This bill has for its primary purpose the relief from certain abuses growing out of the issuance of injunctions in labor disputes. In this proposal we are in accord with the majority of the committee. It is needless to point out, however, that it will have no effect upon the permanent judgments already entered. In many of its aspects, we believe it to be desirable legislation, If, in its operation, it will afford the employee that freedom of action to associate with his fellow workers, to deal on a basis of equality with those by whom he is employed, to share equitably in the product of labor and capital, to relieve him and his employer from any unlawful interference, restraint, or coercion, then it is a measure worthy of the consideration of any legislative body. It is feared by those who make this report that some of its provisions will not only not be effective, but will not stand the test of constitutionality, and therefore, will result in a mere gesture. Our aim has been, in the consideration of this measure, to suggest changes which, if enacted into law, will make it effective in carrying out the purposes of Congress, and one which, while doing justice to one element of our population, will not work injustice upon any other. With these objects in mind, the foregoing observations and suggestions are submitted. They are not made for the purpose of delay or to hinder the enactment of the measure, but rather to expedite its consideration and to bring its provisions more in accord with established principles of jurisprudence and the spirit of our institutions. FELIX HEBERT. With many of the provisions contained in the bill (S. 935) reported by the majority of the committee, I am in accord. However, there are some provisions that do not meet my views, and several, the constitutionality of which, I have some doubt. With the foregoing minority views, I am in substantial agreement. WILLIAM H. KING. O SENATE 72D CONGRESS 1st Session } { REPORT No. 164 IMPROVEMENT OF WILLAMETTE RIVER BETWEEN OREGON CITY AND PORTLAND, OREG. FEBRUARY 4, 1932.-Ordered to be printed Mr. McNARY, from the Committee on Commerce, submitted the following REPORT (To accompany S. 959] The Committee on Commerce, to whom was referred the bill (S. 959) relating to the improvement of the Willamette River between Oregon City and Portland, Oreg., having considered the same, report favorably thereon and recommend that the bill do pass without amendment. The bill has the approval of the War Department, as will appear by the annexed communication, which is made a part of this report. Hon. HIRAM W. JOHNSON, Chairman Committee on Commerce, United States Senate, Washington, D. C. WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington, January 22, 1932. DEAR SENATOR: Reference is made to your letter of the 14th ultimo, requesting the views of this department on Senate bill No. 959, relating to the improvement of the Willamette River between Oregon City and Portland, Oreg. In the river and harbor act of July 3, 1930, Congress authorized the improvement of Willamette River between Oregon City and Portland, as set forth in House Document No. 372, Seventy-first Congress, second session, subject to the condition that local interests contribute $50,000 to the cost of the improvement. The object of the bill is to waive this condition. The same act of Congress directed a further examination of this portion of the river. Additional information obtained from this examination led to the conclusion that it would be advisable to eliminate the aforesaid requirement of local cooperation. Formal report on the examination setting forth this conclusion and the reasons for it was transmitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives with my letter of February 9, 1931, and has been printed as House Document No. 748, Seventy-first Congress, third session. In the circumstances no objection is seen to the enactment of the bill S. 959. Sincerely yours, F. H. PAYNE, Acting Secretary of War. Mr. VANDENBERG, from the Committee on Commerce, submitted the following REPORT [To accompany S. 3237] The Committee on Commerce, to whom was referred the bill (S. 3237) to legalize a bridge across the Mississippi River at Grand Rapids, Minn., having considered the same, report favorably thereon, and recommend that the bill do pass without amendment. The bill has the approval of the Departments of War and Agriculture, as will appear by the annexed communications, which are made a part of this report. WAR DEPARTMENT, January 27, 1932. Respectfully returned to the chairman Committee on Commerce, United States Senate. So far as the interests committed to this department are concerned, I know of no objection to the favorable consideration of the accompanying bill (S. 3237), Seventy-second Congress, first session, to legalize a bridge across the Mississippi River at Grand Rapids, Minn. PATRICK J. HURLEY, Secretary of War. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, Hon. HIRAM W. JOHNSON, Chairman Committee on Commerce, United States Senate. DEAR SENATOR: Receipt is acknowledged of your letter of January 23, transmitting a copy of a bill, S. 3237, with the request that the committee be furnished with such suggestions touching its merits and the propriety of its passage as the department might deem appropriate. This bill would legalize the bridge now being constructed by the State of Minnesota across the Mississippi River at Grand Rapids, Minn., on trunk highway No. 35 if completed in accordance with the plans accepted by the Chief of Engineers and the Secretary of War. The bridge is located on the system of Federal-aid highways approved for Minnesota. Favorable action on the bill is recommended. C. F. MARVIN, Acting Secretary. Sincerely, O |