The Political Economy of Regulation: The Case of InsuranceState University of New York Press, 1988 M07 8 - 230 pages This is the first comprehensive study of the history, politics, and economics of the insurance industry in the United States. It is designed as a theoretical challenge to the conventional wisdom in political economy which says that regulation benefits the regulated. In fact, Meier shows that because the insurance industry is far too divided to impose its will on the regulatory system, the political economy of regulation is actually the product of a complex interaction of industry interests, consumer groups, insurance regulations, and political elites. Using both historical and quantitative approaches, the author examines a variety of insurance issues including the development of insurance regulation; the impact of regulation on the availability and price of insurance; the stringency of state regulation; and the product liability insurance crisis of 1985-86. The book concludes with a series of recommendations for reforming the regulation of insurance. |
Contents
The Insurance Industry | 1 |
A Theory of Government Regulation | 18 |
State and Federal Government Roles | 37 |
State Regulation of Insurance | 43 |
From Free Markets | 49 |
The Liability Insurance Crisis of 198586 | 89 |
External Demands on the Political System | 95 |
The Results of the Tort Reform Effort | 101 |
An Empirical Examination of State | 137 |
Regulatory Stringency | 143 |
Regulating Insurance Prices | 150 |
The Impact of Regulation on Price | 156 |
The Political Economy of Insurance | 167 |
Notes | 179 |
Bibliography | 201 |
221 | |
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The Political Economy of Regulation: The Case of Insurance Kenneth J. Meier No preview available - 1988 |
Common terms and phrases
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