teams was composed, as he testifies, of a stallion and gelding, which were troublesome and very mean, in starting the car with a jerk; that the drivers complained of this team, which he testifies" would draw themselves in the collar and back up the traces, and as soon as the bell would tap, unless the driver held his reins tight, one of the horses would throw himself right forward, and start the car with a jerk." The three other teams, he says, started of their own accord in such a manner as not to produce a jerk to the car. We are not prepared to say that there was error in the admission of Jarrett's testimony in this behalf, requiring a reversal of the judgment in the cause. True he says he does not know that this team was in fact attached, but his testimony further is that the other teams, ordinarily and regularly used with this intractable team in drawing the car in question, were gentle, and started the car when the bell tapped in such manner as not to give the car a jerk, and that this was so even if the driver was himself to some extent negligent and careless. The driver, Lyon, in charge of the car at the time, subsequently testified for defendant that the team in use was a certain team of mares, and he was, we believe, the only witness who attempts to identify directly and positively the particular team in use at the time. But his statement in that behalf was not necessarily undisputed or conclusive. His testimony in his entirety was before the jury, and his credibility was for them. The evidence in the cause indicates that, by means of the reins and the car-brake, the driver could effectually control the horses and the movements of the car; and upon the issue as to defendant's negligence the real question was, we think, whether the defendant had overcome plaintiff's prima facie case, and shown that the driver was without negligence or fault as to his management and control of the motive power. And this was for the jury, under proper instructions. A remaining question urged in the argument is that the damages are excessive. Plaintiff's left hand and arm were, in consequence of the fall given him by the violent jerk of the car, thrust through the glass window of Damages not the car, and a severe and painful wound, and some Excessive. smaller cuts, perhaps, were inflicted upon his left hand. His health for several months was seriously affected, and loss of life was threatened for a time. After ineffectual efforts to save the hand, which was injured in April, it became necessary in the following July to amputate the same, which was done about two inches below the elbow. His sufferings were great, and his expenses and liabilities for medicines, nurse hire, physicians, and surgeons very heavy, amounting to something like $2000. At the time of the accident he was 34 A. & E. R. Cas.—32 manager of the Gold & Stock Telegraph Co., which was engaged in the business of furnishing stock, grain, and provision quotations to brokers and the Merchants' Exchange of St. Louis. His salary amounted to $144 per month, and, being an expert or first-class telegraph operator, he also sometimes earned $50 per month extra. During his sickness his employers continued him his salary, so that he lost no wages during that time, and he continued thereafter and up to the time of trial to earn as much salary as before the accident. There is evidence to show that his value and usefulness as a telegraph operator was greatly impaired, to the extent, perhaps, of one-half. This is, we believe, the substance of the evidence bearing upon the question now before us. The case • it may be observed is free from malice or wanton misconduct on the part of defendant or its servants. The instruction given by the court, in this behalf, limits the recovery to compensating damages, and has not been objected to, and is substantially correct. The verdict was for $12,000. As is said in the case of Waldhier v. Railroad Co., 87 Mo. 37: "It is a matter of much difficulty in such cases as this to tell when the verdict is or is not excessive. The amount of damages must be left to the reasonable discretion of the jury." In that case, where the plaintiff had lost both legs, a verdict for $25,000, after a remittitur for $5000 and the accrued interest, was suffered to stand. In the case of Porter v. Railroad Co., 71 Mo. 66, where the injuries to plaintiff resulted in the amputation of one leg and two toes of the other foot, a verdict for $10,000 was not disturbed. In these and other cases large verdicts have been allowed to stand. In the case at bar, the jury, in the exercise of their sound and reasonable discretion in the matter, might well have returned a verdict for a lower sum; but we are not prepared to say that the sum given is so large as to unmistakably evince prejudice and passion on the part of the jury, and abuse of their discretion in the matter. Some other exceptions were taken at the trial, and are urged here, which have been considered, but which we deem it unnecessary to discuss. This leads to an affirmance of the judgment of the trial court, and it is accordingly so ordered, with the concurrence of all the judges. See Dougherty v. Missouri R. Co., 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 497. Excessive Damages for Personal Injuries. See note 33, Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 520; Norfolk, etc., R. Co. v. Burge (Va.), 32 Ib. 101; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Thompson, 30 Ib. 541; note, 543; Hobson v. New Mexico, etc., R. Co., 28 Ib. 360; South Cov., etc., R. Co. v. Ware, 27 Ib. 206; note, 23 Ib. 308; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Mackey, 22 Ib. 306; Memphis, etc., R. Co. v. Stringfellow, 21 Ib. 374; Kansas Pac. R. Co. v. Peavy, 11 Ib. 260; Klutts v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co, 11 Ib. 639; Funston v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 14 Ib. 640; Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Moore, 15 Ib. 312; Knowlton v. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co., 16 Ib. 330; Sioux City, etc., R. Co. v. Finlayson, 18 Ib. 68; Ferguson v. Wisconsin Cent. R. Co., 19 Ib. 285; Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Shafer, 6 Ib. 421; Delie v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 5 Ib. 464. STEWART V. BOSTON AND PROVIDENCE R. Co. (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, May 4, 1888.) Passenger-Mistake as to Train-Changing Coaches Personal Injuries. -A passenger who has taken the wrong train by his own fault, and, on being informed by the conductor that by taking a rear car he could get off at a station beyond and return to his destination at a later hour, attempts to pass to such car, does so at his own risk as to all accidents not arising from the negligence of the company, and cannot recover for injuries sustained by being thrown from the platform by a lurch of the train such as is inevitably incident to any train moving at the same speed. ON report from Superior Court, Suffolk County. Action of tort by William B. Stewart against the Boston and Providence R. Co. to recover damages for personal injuries. The court directed a verdict for defendant. The facts appear in the opinion. Geo. A. Perkins for plaintiff. George Putnam and Thomas Russell for defendant. risk of acci dent. MORTON, C.J.-The plaintiff took the wrong train through his own fault. After the train had started, the conductor discovered this, and informed the plaintiff that he could not stop at the point to which he wished to go; but that, by taking one of the two rear cars, he could Plaintiff took get off at a station beyond, and return to his destination at a later hour. This was not a command or direction by the conductor that the plaintiff should go from the car he was in to the rear car, which justified him in doing so at the risk of the defendant. By going from one car to another of a rapidly moving train, merely for his own. convenience, the plaintiff took upon himself the risk of all accidents not arising from any negligence of the defendant. While crossing over one of the platforms between the cars, the plaintiff came in collision with another passenger crossing the platform in an opposite direction, "the train gave a lurch to the left," and he was thrown from the platform. There is nothing to show that the lurch was extraordinary, or anything more than a usual and inevitable incident of a swiftly-moving train. The evidence fails to show any negligence of the defendant which caused the accident, and the superior court therefore rightly directed a verdict for the defendant. Judgment on the verdict. Passing Over Platform of Moving Train by Direction of Conductor.Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Kelley, 13 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 1. LAKIN ข. OREGON PACIFIC R. Co. (Oregon Supreme Court, June 13, 1887.) Passengers--Personal Injuries Contributory Negligence.-A passenger who returns to a train which has stopped to allow passengers to dine, before the conductor has called upon the passengers to re-enter the cars, is not, in so doing, guilty of negligence contributing to personal injuries sustained before the other passengers had been required to board the train. Same-Engineer-Employment-Scope of Authority.-A carrier owes to its passengers the duty of carrying them to their journey's end, and protecting them from injury from any source that human judgment and foresight are capable of providing against, and a railroad company is responsible to a passenger for injuries caused through the negligence of an engineer placed upon the engine“ to learn the road" by the managing agent of the company, although the latter had no authority to employ any person, such engineer being aboard the engine serving the company in the transportation of passengers at the request and at the acquiescence of its servants and agents. Same-Evidence-Competency.-In an action to recover damages for injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of defendant's servants, the plaintiff may, for the purpose of showing how she received the injuries, testify as to the construction of the car, and the position in which she was at the time of the accident. Same-Evidence-Defective Appliances-Competency. In an action for damages for injuries alleged to have been caused by negligence in the management of a train, it is not error to allow the engineer in the course of his narrative of how the accident happened to state that the engine boiler leaked steam. Same--Instruction-Scope of Employment.-A railroad company being bound to exercise the highest degree of care that human foresight can provide in carrying passengers to their journey's end, an instruction, in an action to recover damages for injuries alleged to have been caused by a company's servants, that if the employees of the company, i.e., the fireman and brakeman, moved or permitted the engine to be moved, without the consent of the engineer, whether within the scope of their employment or not," the company would be liable for injuries arising therefrom, will not be a ground for reversal, if the circumstances are such that the company would be liable for the acts of the fireman and brakeman in any event. APPEAL from Circuit Court, Benton County. Action to recover damages for injuries received by plaintiff while a passenger upon a train of the defendant company. The opinion states the case. John Kelsay and J. J. Walton for respondent. Case stated. THAYER, J.-This appeal is from a judgment of the circuit court for the county of Benton recovered in an action in said court, brought by the respondent against the appellant on account of damages for personal injuries received while a passenger upon the appellant's line of railroad, en route from Yaquina City to Corvallis, in said county, alleged to have been occasioned through the appellant's negligence. The case was tried in the círcuit court by jury, and resulted in a verdict for the respondent for the sum of $1650. The grounds of the appeal are alleged errors in the rulings of the court made during the trial, and in the instructions given to the jury. The following is the gravamen of the complaint: "That while the plaintiff was such passenger at or near the station called The Summit,' on the line of said railroad, a collision occurred by running the engine or locomotive of said railroad against the passenger cars while said passenger cars were detached from said engine or locomotive, and while the said passenger cars were standing on the track of said railroad, with such force that the plaintiff was precipitated forward and thrown down on said cars, whereby the plaintiff was badly wounded, bruised, and injured about her person, and put in imminent danger of her life; and plaintiff was for a long time confined, and unable to attend to her usual business, and is yet, and has sustained permanent injury, and was obliged to, and did, pay large sums of money for doctoring and attendance, to wit, the sum of $300; that the said collision was caused by the negligence of the defendant and its servants." This was denied by the answer, and the following matter alleged therein: "That on the thirty-first day of August, 1885, near the Summit station, on the railroad mentioned in the complaint, in Benton county, Oregon, the defendant was causing a train of cars to pass over said railroad from Yaquina City to Cor |