and what I would challenge you-and I don't mean this personally but you as a collective body in the Congress and all of us, and that's why we call it an insurance policy-on which side would you prefer to err?

We've got this growing body of evidence about the concentrations; we've got the computer simulations. The kinds of policies that we're talking about are, in any event, good energy policy. They're good in terms of efficiency. If we wake up 10 or 15 years from now and this trend which the computer projections indicate is, indeed, happening, we'll be in a hell of a fix. The costs will be much more expensive, much more dramatic, and that's why we say let's act now; let's take out a reasonable policy with a reasonable premium. Let's begin to make some decisions. I mean, this doesn't go into effect until 2008 to 2012, but these concentration increases, and, as you know, as a scientist, there's a lag, I'm told, of about 20 to 30 years between emissions which are already occurring today and tomorrow and the next day in the concentration and temperature increases. So, if you assume that there is a lag of 20 or 30 years, then by not acting now we will have assigned ourselves to go down what could be certainly given the scientific data we have, we're much more, I think, likely to take the right fork in the road if we begin these modest policies-nobody's talking about choking off the economy. We pass the President's tax credits. We get our technology initiative going. We work on getting emissions trading off the ground. We work on getting developing countries involved.

Just think if we sat back I mean, under your own scenario where you talk about the next generation, suppose we just sat back and we said, well, not a problem; go ahead and build all the coalfired plants without the latest technologies, and we'll come back 15 years from now and see what happens. That would be, by your own statement, I think a definition for a really catastrophic event.

We want to engage in that. We need to engage in that. It may take years to get them engaged, but, Lord knows, if we don't start now, it will be much more costly and much more difficult to engage them later.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. I think we do need a second round of questions, and I'll start off.

Secretary Eizenstat, I'd like to get us back to discussing the Protocol that you signed in Kyoto rather than a whole bunch of hypotheticals or suppositions that you just said in response to Mr. Ehlers question.

ABILITY TO AMEND THE KYOTO PROTOCOL

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Mrs. Rivers from Michigan asked some questions. You said, in response, in part, that this Protocol can't be amended until it goes into force. And Article 25.1 says that it goes into force on the 90th day after the date on which not less than 55 parties, incorporating parties, including Annex 1, which accounted for at least 55 percent of the total CO2 emissions in 1990, have signed, ratified, and deposited their instruments of accept

ance.

Now since you have said that we've got to have some amendments relative to LDC participation, as well as clarifications,

to the Protocol, isn't the United States stuck, since it can't propose amendments until the treaty comes into force, in having to deal with this treaty as you signed it until we can get amendments adopted, either by the consensus mechanism or by the three-quarters vote mechanism in Articles 20 and 21?

Mr. EIZENSTAT. Not necessarily. For example

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Then why not necessarily?

Mr. EIZENSTAT. Because we can get a supplemental Protocol passed that would be included in Kyoto. That is one

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. And under what mechanism would that be? Would that be the consensus mechanism that we had in Kyoto or would it be some other mechanism?

Mr. EIZENSTAT. It would probably have to be out of the consensus mechanism.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. And since the LDCs were so successful in knocking out even voluntary ascension with that famous floor amendment that I have referred to a couple of times, what makes you believe that LDCs like China and India would completely reverse a very hard position that they took in Kyoto, in Bonn, and in Berlin, that they were not interested in getting onboard this Protocol?

Mr. EIZENSTAT. I think there is no such certainty. One cannot be certain that they would reverse themselves. I think this is going to be, again, a learning curve for them, and we hope that we can achieve it, but we certainly can't guarantee it.

IF THE ADMINISTRATION FAILS TO AMEND THE KYOTO PROTOCOL, IS IT PREPARED TO WALK AWAY AND DECLARE IT FATALLY FLAWED?

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. And if we fail in this like we failed in Kyoto, then is the Administration prepared to walk away from this process and state that it's fatally flawed?

Mr. EIZENSTAT. Well, we've no reason to walk away from the process

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Why? We've lost once; we've lost twice.

Mr. EIZENSTAT. No, sir. Because we have won, first of all-and I don't want to just be repetitive all the things that I've talked about, we've got for developing countries, reasonable reduction rates that are competitive with our competitors, the flexible marketplace mechanisms-all of those things are embedded in this agreement. We don't want to walk away from that.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. But, Mr. Eizenstat-
Mr. EIZENSTAT. Wait a minute.

INCENTIVES FOR EUROPEAN AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TO AGREE TO EMISSIONS TRADING RULES DESIRED BY THE UNITED STATES

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. You said yourself that the emissions mechanism is subject to further definition and clarification at Buenos Aires or at some other place. What happened is that we gave the EU almost complete unfettered emissions trading within the membership of the EU, and then we disadvantaged ourselves

Russians, the Japanese, the Ukrainians, the Australians, the New Zealanders, the so-called "jusscannz" countries. So what incentive is there for either the Europeans or the LDC nations to agree to give us the type of emissions trading that they gave themselves with American acceptance at Kyoto?

Mr. EIZENSTAT. I think two things. First of all, the Europeans themselves have told us-they've told me personally-that they want emissions trading outside their bubble. They want to be able to trade just as much as we want to be able to trade. So they have an incentive to make that efficient, and they've told me again, this is coming from the UC or representatives from the UK, from other countries in the European Union-that they want to be able to do so

THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: A WORK IN PROGRESS OR A FINISHED PRODUCT?

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. But this gets us back that if we don't succeed in that, we are stuck with a treaty which you signed on behalf of the United

Mr. EIZENSTAT. I didn't sign any treaty.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Well, you agreed to on behalf of the United States in Kyoto. And since it's apparent from your testimony that the Administration does not want to face the fact of walking away from this process, then we are kind of caught with something that we agreed to, but which we don't like and which we think needs to be amended, but which has to go into force before we can even propose amendments.

Mr. EIZENSTAT. We will not be binding ourselves legally, even if we sign it. Signing it is a way of indicating that for this first step we've taken a first step; we want to solidify, but we have no binding obligations whatsoever until there is a second step, and that second step is the developing country participation. However long that effort takes, we should pursue it.

I mean, again, Congressman Ehlers said it as well as anybody can-in the sense that they are putting in this next generation. We want to have an impact now on what they do, and we won't have that impact if we walk away from the process.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. But, you know, I practiced law in a small town, and when you agree to a contract, and eventually sign it-you've said that this is going to be signed by March 15th of next year-then that's a deal unless you get the parties to agree to modify the deal. Now you heard from the Chinese with their intransigence just as much as our delegation heard from the Chinese. If they end up preventing consensus from taking place, then we're stuck with a deal that you have said is an incomplete one.

What are our alternatives as a country, either to be stuck with a deal and try to change it, no matter how frustrating or how unsuccessful we may be, or walk away from it?

Mr. EIZENSTAT. I practiced law, too, in a large city, and the contracts are the same in small cities as in large cities. This would be what I would call, at best, a conditional contract or statement of principles. Every country in the world realizes that every other

gally binding any country. The Parliament in the UK is going to pass it, for example.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. But their process is different because the government is in the majority.

Mr. EIZENSTAT. That's correct, and we're not going to do it-we're not going to even submit it, not because of whether the Republicans or Democrats control Congress, but because the Congressthe Senate has said 95 to 0 a very clear statement, and it, by the way, is a statement we agreed to. That is, that you have to get developing countries involved in this process before we will bind ourselves.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. And if we agreed with it, then why didn't you say at 2 a.m. when this amendment was being rammed through, that this is a deal-breaker and walk out?

Mr. EIZENSTAT. Well, we said a lot of unprintable things at 2 a.m. when that happened, I must say, but

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. How about meaning that one?

Mr. EIZENSTAT. But the reason we didn't walk away from the process is because we had already achieved so much else, No. 1, and, No. 2, because we said we want everybody to be on notice, the United States is not going to legally bind itself unless and until you play in this game. If you don't play, we don't legally bind ourselves. Chairman SENSENBRENNER. But you've announced that you're not going to walk away from the process. So

Mr. EIZENSTAT. We want to have an influence on the process, Mr. Chairman. We will lose our influence on the developing countries, we'll lose our influence on the capacity to get good trading rights, if we take our marbles and walk home.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Well, without the developing country participation, our marbles are never going to be in play because you and I both know that the Senate isn't going to ratify it after a 95-to-nothing vote.

Mr. EIZENSTAT. Not only will they not ratify it, we won't even submit it.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. I thank the Secretary.

The gentleman from Maryland.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

GLOBAL WARMING OR GLOBAL COOLING?

Mr. BARTLETT. I'd like to return, as the second scientist in Congress, to a discussion of some of the scientific aspects of this. I think from a scientific perspective, we can't be sure that we are moving toward general global warming or moving toward another ice age. You could argue both of those. As a matter of fact, about 20 years ago, the same people arguing for global warming were contending we were moving to an ice age.

Mr. EIZENSTAT. Neither one is a terribly attractive option, if I may say so.

Mr. BARTLETT. That is correct, sir, and it may be that these are simply some little instabilities and we are not moving in either direction. If we're moving to a modest global warming, then I think, clearly, our world would be different. I think you would be hardpressed to say that it would be worse, since in the past we have

er. I think that Canada and Russia might benefit from a little global warming. Our cornbelt would move north. Clearly, we would have changes, and I'm not sure that we could now say that we would have a better or a worse world because of that.

ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND FOSSIL FUELS

Mr. BARTLETT. You mentioned energy efficiency, and I think, sir, that there may be another approach that one could use in achieving the same objectives that you want to achieve, and it is by looking at where we get our CO2. Most of it comes from fossil fuels. Fossil fuels are not forever. We do not have a limitless supply of fossil fuels. We have an enormous petrochemical industry that uses fossil fuels; in large measure, one could say that oil, and particularly gas, are too good to burn because they form the basis of a very large and important petrochemical industry.

If we were predicating our energy efficiency initiatives on the basis that this was necessary in order to one day, and maybe sooner or later, depending on who you talk to, run out of fossil fuels, which brings us to a very uncertain energy future in the world, I think you might have a more usable argument that you could get more people onboard. You'd meet exactly the same objectives, but you're riding a different horse and an easier one to sell, I think, to get there.

Mr. EIZENSTAT. Okay, let me respond to both. First, in terms of not making things worse, I think if I may say so, with all deference, that is simply not the case. A warmer Earth would speed up the global water cycle the exchange of water among the oceans, atmospheres, and the land. Higher temperatures would cause more evaporation. The soils would tend to dry out faster. Increased amounts of water in the atmosphere would need more rain or snow overall.

In addition, we have already measured an increase of 4 to 10 inches over the last 100 years in the mean sea level. Because global warming will increase sea level concentrations, sea levels even more, for two reasons-first, because simply water expands when heated, but also because discernible, measurable melting of glaciers is occuring this will put low-lying areas at risk.

I think it was you, Congressman Bartlett, that mentioned-if not, it was perhaps Congressman Ehlers-the methane problem with formerly frozen soils, the perma-frost in Alaska and the Siberian Arctics have already begun to melt. Again, this is measurable. This is scientific. This will damage ecosystems and infrastructures, but it also will release more methane.

There also would be a human health problem. This warming with exacerbate air quality problems. You, yourself, talked about the increased pollutants. Diseases that thrive in warmer climates, like malaria and yellow fever, would increase. It's been estimated by scientists, by the end of the next century, that there will be an additional 50 to 80 million cases of malaria each year that this climate change continued unabated. So these are all measurable.

One other thing is in terms of evidence. Between 1981 and 1991, the length of the growing season in the northern high latitudes increased by a total of up to 12 days, while in other areas that has