8 contraction of the perceptual field, a heightened concentration on the task at hand, a feeling of control leading to elation and finally to a transcendent loss of self-awareness. Flow, in contrast to classical leisure, occurs during intense activity when the environment seems to provide clear, non-contradictory demands for action and subsequent unambiguous feedback. Flow, or play, is perhaps the active phase of leisure while contemplation is the passive phase. Both phases, however, are intrinsically rewarding and enjoyable, and both build a sense of personal choice and freedom from extrinsic reward or coercion. What is the relevance of the leisure ideal for outdoor recreation and ultimately for user fees? First, perhaps, it should be said that true play or the classical leisure ideal is difficult to achieve anywhere, but especially through the highly structured, externally motivated recreation common in America. As Csikszentmihalyi (1978) has pointed out, the performance of behavior for external rewards (in work or recreation) is so much the dominant motivational model in western societies that emergent, intrinsic rewards are often completely overshadowed. Much of our recreation is motivated by the desire to make business contacts, meet sex partners or be seen doing something prestigious, rather than by curiosity, exploration and intense involvement, activity done for its own sake (Cheek and Burch 1976). The classical leisure ideal has been perpetuated in our culture to a large extent through the transcendental concept of the "wilderness experience", a fragile fantasy involving a pioneer heritage, perceived risk and great natural beauty. Scott (1974) points out the similarities between psychologies of self 9 actualization and the descriptions of wilderness experiences offered by George Catlin, John Muir, Loren Eiseley and Colin Fletcher. The state of consciousness Scott describes emphasizes depersonalization and an altered sense of time. It bears many similarities to the neo-classical conception of leisure. Leisure, self-actualization and the wilderness experience seem closely related psychological phenomena. In a study of these similarities, Young (1983) found midwestern wilderness users to be slightly more self-actualized than a sample of non-wilderness users from the general public. Respondents in this study with high leisure ethics were also more likely to be wilderness users and to use wilderness more often. Positive gains in self-actualization, self-concept, internal locus of control and other related variables have often been found in participants of wilderness education programs as well (Gibson 1979, Crompton and Sellar 1977.) Accounts of fragile, transcendent contacts with nature over the 120 years from Olmsted to Scott may partially explain our societal reluctance to put a price tag on the experience. Now, one might argue, the payment of a $5 user fee is hardly a sufficient constraint to dissipate the pioneer fantasy of a challenging wilderness trip. However, Neulinger (1974:18) concluded that as constraint of an individual's behavior increases, the experiences of perceived freedom and leisure diminish. In some way Kleiber (1979) proposed that a user fee may entail such constraint. individuals who attribute the causes of events to their own actions will not feel externally controlled and will feel more freedom than those who attribute events to others. Kleiber concluded that persons who believe people can personally change things will hold 10 more positive leisure attitudes. The more constraints placed upon the recreationist by such regulatory management techniques as fees, the less likely it may be that the recreationist will achieve true leisure. The argument is clearly speculation at this point, but there is a need to speculate. In a study of willingness to pay for a wild river trip on the Big South Fork of the Cumberland River, McDonald, Hammitt and Dottavio (1985) found 21.5% of their 233 respondents unwilling to pay an entry fee. Willingness to pay was negatively correlated with age, education, income, and (most strongly) with the number of rivers floated previously. It may be that experienced, self-actualized users are resistant to the imposition of an external constraint on their leisure experience. Just as Olmsted's ethical argument for parks included both individual and social dimensions, contemporary sociologists have elaborated social as well as individual benefits from outdoor recreation. Kelly (1982) has pointed out that many people see themselves first of all as rock climbers, builders and pilots of small aircraft or folk singers, even when their employment is something quite different. For these "amateurs" (Stebbins 1979), the leisure subculture becomes the primary source of self-definition and direction, i.e. it becomes the meaningful community. The sense of community generated by social leisure can, in turn, be an important contributor to individual self-actualization (Wilkinson 1979). Support for the creative behaviors essential to self-actualization is provided by the community. Perhaps 01msted's pan-cultural sense of community was a 19th century pipe dream, but 20th century American recreationists sometimes derive primary social 11 identities from their leisure affiliations. In our view, nurturance of leisure subcultures is as important as any professional activity in the parks and recreation field. The impact of user fees on leisure subcultures is, of course, difficult to assess. Perhaps there will be no effect. But Manning and Baker (1981) found "loftering in parking lots" of a local developed park to decrease from 26 percent to 6 percent total park use following initiation of user fees. This was, of course, reported as a desirable outcome of the fees program. But we are compelled to ask why that leisure group chose to move to an alternate site when fees were imposed. Did they decide their activity was not worth the price of admission? What other leisure behaviors are not worth the price of admission and would be displaced by fees? Did the fee communicate a management desire to restrict their behavior? Will wilderness users be reluctant to "loiter" in the backcountry when they have to pay to do so? Clearly, wilderness areas are different from local parks in some ways. The point is that we do not currently understand how vulnerable leisure groups are to external constraints. Driver (Crandall and Driver 1984) acknowledges this information gap in his discussion of "priceless values": ...the difficult question is whether excessive fees In sum, we believe there are philosophical, psychological and social reasons why a democratic society should provide parks and recreation opportunities for its populace at negligible cost to the user. Leisure is integrally bound to freedom, and therefore 12 recreation managers and programmers should build a focus on personal freedom into their policies. Recreation's contribution to freedom and democracy was recognized as far back as Olmsted. The promotion of intrinsic motivation, self-actualization and leisure subcultures is the work of the parks and recreation profession, and our policies must reflect that commitment. To relate revenues generated from timber sales to revenues from recreation is a non-sequitur. It is precisely because most resources in American society are processed at a price that recreation should not be. CONCLUSIONS Many of the ideas in this paper echo the position taken by Dustin, McAvoy and Schultz in their Stewards of Access, Custodians of Choice (1982). These authors suggest that parks and recreation professionals can lead a fundamental shift in American values, cultivating environmental awareness through education. While Dustin, McAvoy and Schultz rest their case for public recreation on ecological imperatives, we base ours on the freedom, intrinsic motivation and leisure subcultures important to the successful functioning of our democratic system of government. We agree with Dustin and his colleagues that the parks and recreation profession must constantly reexamine its ethical base. We also feel that user fee structures are one important avenue for realizing the values we profess. It would be premature to propose concrete management objectives based on the philosophical argument presented here. Much of this argument is reasoned speculation, in need of corroboration 50-792 0-85--7 |