M.P.Dewa: Rhodesian Front which will be in power while the blacks are only in power here in Parliament..." (Hansard 32-2431). "...Since it is not a black majority rule Constitution it cannot last because it is going to work against the interest of the majority of the poeple who are the blacks. It will please the whites for the time being but it will not please the blacks, and the blacks will subvert it by fair and foul means...' (Hansard 33-2511). The issue before these Subcommittees, the full Congress and the President is whether the US shall act unilaterally rejecting the considered judgment of the UN Security Council (April 30, 1979), the OAU and the African Front-Line States to end US compliance with international sanctions against Rhodesia. I urge the Congress to staunchly oppose all efforts to end US compliance with international sanctions against Rhodesia until an all-parties negotiated settlement is reached, including the contending parties and with international supervision, (as under the original Anglo American proposals). If it is the political will of this Congress that sanctions be lifted, let's be very clear about the costs involved. For the Rhodesian people the lifting of sanctions will mean the Rhodesian government will have access to US arms and munitions. Commercial arms sales from the US to the Rhodesian government will stoke the war, permit escalation of Rhodesian bombing of neighbor states and multiply the human suffering. Lifting sanctions will likely result in the Patriotic Front armies turning to the Cubans and Soviets for additional assistance. Lifting sanctions would push the Lifting Front-Line States towards the Soviet Union and away from the West. Lifting sanctions would reward South African recalcitrance over Namibia, encourage South Africa to continue rejecting the UN plan for a negotiated settlement for Namibia and to continue with its own "internal settlement" for that country. Lifting sanctions in the wake of the UN Security Council vote 12-0 April 30 calling on member states to strengthen sanctions would severely damage the U.N.'s ability to act in the world effectively. sanctions will be perceived as a US declaration that it stands with continued white minority dominance in Rhodesia. Outside Washington, D. C. the decision will not be understood as a matter of "domestic politics" or as part of the internal politics of the Senate or House. It will be understoood as a statement of white solidarity and will shatter the fragile Anglo-AmericanAfrican cooperation which developed in the common search for an all-parties settlement. I urge you to oppose the ending of sanctions against Rhodesia and thereby keep the U.S. out of the Rhodesian war. GE/mr APPENDIX 4 STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD GORDON HATCHER, MAYOR, Thank you Mr. Chairman for inviting me to testify today on the subject of Rhodesian sanctions. I am appearing today in several capacities. As Chairman of TransAfrica and as President of the National Conference of Black Mayors, I present to you the views of those two organizations as well as my own. I shall not make an extended detailed analysis of the history of the Rhodesian crisis. Much of that has already been done. Similarly, the Congressional Record is replete with comprehensive closely reasoned reports on the relative fairness or unfairness of the recent Rhodesian elections. On the question of the election mechanics, taken alone, evidence can be marshaled on either side to fit the argument for profound unfairness as well as relative fairness. Election mechanics however are not the issue here. The real, but unacknowledged issue here is whether or not the United States is going to lift sanctions against and give support to a new Rhodesian regime that is rested on a constitution so blatantly discriminatory as to grievously offend all of Africa, black America and the virtual balance of the world. Certain incontrovertible facts can be set forth as background for my thoughts: 1. The Rhodesian constitution explicitly reserves for whites in over 100 entrenched clauses control for at least ten years over all the important agencies of government thus radically circumscribing the powers of the Parliament in which whites are disproportionately represented. 2. Despite the abolition of the Land Tenure Act, the white minority comprising 4 percent of the population will continue to control half of the Rhodesian land mass because of entrenched clauses requiring compensation. 3. The only election of any real consequence, the referendum on the constitution, was held in January for whites only. Blacks have had no opportunity to pass on the constitution much less write their own. 4. The Internal Settlement solution for the foregoing among other reasons cannot achieve the long sought objectives of the Zimbabwean people: genuine political equality and self determination. Hence the Internal Settlement government has not and cannot bring an end to the war against the Patriotic Front. 5. Lifting of sanctions now would align the United States squarely with South Africa against the rest of Africa and virtually the entire family of nations. Mr. Chairman, it appears plain to me that no elections based on the Rhodesian constitution could possibly be free and fair. That much must be by definition beyond dispute. What then could motivate the Senate without hearings and with no formal review of any evidence to vote overwhelmingly that the sense of the Senate is to lift sanctions? Why has the President not shown strong public leadership to the nation on this issue? Why do liberals in the Senate and the House appear less well organized and vigorous than do conservatives moving apace to give America's blessing to the new Rhodesian government? Black Americans are troubled, greatly disappointed and angry over what we perceive as dangerous slippage in this nation's commitment to racial equality. While racism remains poisonous to our own society, it has at the very least been constructively redressable through enlightened instruments of law. Now we see our nation rapidly moving toward support for a government whose seminal instrument of law, its very constitution, expressly reserves real power and privilege to a tiny minority of whites over against the vast majority of blacks. I have wondered long and thoughtfully on how we have reached this pass in our Rhodesian policy. Clearly we can't perceive ourselves to be defending strategic interests. The lifting of sanctions will only serve to expand Soviet and Chinese involvement in the war with the United States positioned on both the wrong and losing side. Any leverage we might have had on the internal settlers toward a serious negotiation will have been lost. Any credibility we might have enjoyed with the rest of Africa will have even more quickly evaporated. One is left only to conclude that here at the crossroads of Amercian/African relations, our nation's policies and commitments are again crippled by an all exclusive sympathy for the Rhodesian white minority or, less euphemistically, by racism. Over a year ago, the Patriotic Front accepted in large part the terms of the Anglo American Proposal. The Front agreed then, and again more recently, to accept the notion of internationally supervised elections. I appeal to this committee today to fight to retain sanctions until the internal settlers similarly commit themselves to the process of negotiation, until a sincere willingness is shown in Salisbury to transfer real power to the majority of Zimbabweans. To do otherwise would pitch America down the road toward a protracted and internationalized war. Already Members of Congress have discussed the prospect of United States military assistance to the Internal Settlement government. One can logically project from this dangerous momentum a full blown American involvement five years hence on the African subcontinent. Such an eventuallty would be catastrophic for Africa, perhaps even more so for an America torn apart by racial conflict. Consistent with our centuries old struggle in America, black Americans are committed to a Zimbabwean society rested on the ideal of political and social equality. Can America afford at home or abroad to be less committed? I am optimistic about chances for maintenance of the sanctions. If however there is any real hope at all, it turns on the willingness of the President and Members of Congress to publicly, with enthusiasm and vigor, fight for a Rhodesia policy that is nothing short of fair and just. APPENDIX 5 STATEMENT OF LEON WEAVER,1 PROFESSSOR, SCHOOL OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY The recent Common-Roll elections in what will be known as Zimbabwe Rhodesia (ZR), although controversial in some quarters, exhibited several features which have not been seriously questioned by informed and responsible critics: (1) The ballot was secret. (2) The count was honest. (3) The election was based on a broad and multi-racial electorate. (4) Five parties competed vigorously-four on a nation-wide basis, apparently giving many voters a sense of significant choice, at least in terms of personalities and parties, and to some extent in terms of policy choice, at least on the issue of federalism. Nowhere else in Africa-black, white, or brown-can similar generalizations be truthfully and accurately applied. Nor can they be applied truthfully and accurately in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union; most of Asia, with the exceptions of India and Japan; most of the Middle East, with the exceptions of Israel and Turkey; and most of Latin America, with the exception of Venezuela and perhaps Colombia. To the above generalizations can be added one more that is also uncontroversial among even the severest of the informed and responsible critics of the election processes: the large majorities given to Bishop Muzorewa and his party by the largely black Common-Roll electorate cannot be explained away by the admitted defects in the electoral and representation system. More than anything else, the election results constitute expression of a yearning for peace, and the widely shared preception of Bishop Muzorewa and his party as the most viable leaders for the internal political forces in the quest for peace. Although the remarks of some critics seem to imply otherwise, the Freedom House conclusions to the above effects were reached despite a wide-eyed awareness of the observed and perceived limitations and defects of the constitution and representational system as well as the observed electoral processes, and were commented on specifically in its report-for example: "Whites will continue to exercise power disproportionate to their numbers" (p. 5) "The constitution inhibits major changes for at least ten years in the command of the security forces, judiciary, and civil services". (p. 18) "Although asked to return to take part in the settlement and to offer slates in the election, they [the guerrilla leaders] refused on the grounds that the constitution was unfairly biased in favor of the white minority and that the holding of free elections while the administration and security forces remained essentially under white control was impossible." (p. 20) The report takes cognizance explicitly (pp. 25 and 26) of the departures of the representational system from the one-person-one-vote principle and the fact that the black electorate was given no opportunity to ratify or reject the Constitution in a referendum as the whites were, and comments (correctly in my view) on the implications of these facts for judging the significance of the election: . . since both constitution and election were opposed by external political leaders well known in the country, a large, uncoerced turnout at the polls would be considered by most observers to represent tacit acceptance of the internal settlement's version of majority rule." Lest the subtleties of some of my suggestions below lend themselves to misunderstanding and misrepresentation, I declare at the outset that I believe the new British Government is on the right track: their objective is (and I believe ours should be) to achieve the "widest possible recognition" of ZR, and their apparent belief is that this will involve careful bargaining and diplomacy with all of the significant political actors both outside and inside ZR. I trust that extremists to whom any modification of the status quo regarding sanctions and ultimate recognition is analthema will not be allowed to use the candor of some of my judgments as sticks with which to beat reasonable proposals for the conciliation of differences in and about ZR. 1 Professor, School of Criminal Justice, Michigan State University, and a member of the Freedom House group observing the recent elections in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. This testimony is rendered in Professor Weaver's individual capacity, not as a representative of the University or Freedom House. (244) |