Mr. BONKER. Thank you, Mr. Good.

Now we call on Mr. Samuels who is the executive director of the third world studies program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University and formerly U.S. Ambassador to Sierra Leone.

Mr. Samuels, it is a real privilege to have you with us.

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL A. SAMUELS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR THIRD WORLD STUDIES, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, AND FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO SIERRA LEONE

Dr. Michael A. Samuels is Executive Director for Third World Studies of the Center for Strategic and International Studies of Georgetown University. From 1975 to 1977 he served as U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Sierra Leone. Prior to his appointment to Sierra Leone, Ambassador Samuels was a member of the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State, Executive Assistant to the President's Counselor for Economic Policy, Executive Assistant to Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush from 1973 to 1974, and from 1970 to 1973, Legislative Management Officer in the State Department's Bureau of Congressional Relations. From 1968 to 1970, Dr. Samuels was at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, where he served as Director of African Programs.

Dr. Samuels holds a Ph.D. in African History from Columbia University where he also received his M.A., and holds a B.A. from Yale University. He taught in a secondary school in Nigeria from 1962 to 1964. While doing his doctoral research, Dr. Samuels lived in the United Kingdom, Portugal, and Angola.

Dr. Samuels has several books to his credit: "Portuguese Africa—A Handbook” (Praeger, 1969), co-author; "History of Education in Angola, 1878 to 1914" (Teacher's College Press, 1970); and "The Nigeria-Biafra Conflict" (CSIS, 1970), editor; as well as several articles on southern Africa, Angola, Portugal and U.S. trade problems. In 1978 he edited a special White Paper on The Horn of Africa that served as a supplement to The Washington Review of Strategic and International Studies and has authored reports on a number of countries in Africa. Mr. SAMUELS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you this afternoon concerning a vital aspect of U.S. foreign policy and behavior-our actions toward Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

I would like to preface the substance of my position by sharing with you the general framework within which my views should be assessed. The United States has moved beyond an era when there was a national consensus about our policy. Our global policy is now fragmented, with no mutually agreed upon goals. The Vietnam experience, the growth of congressional involvement in foreign policy, the domestic American sensitivity over matter of race projected internationally, the limited number of tools available to us for constructive influence, and other tangibles are part of the current atmosphere. That atmosphere is the domestic reality within which U.S. actions should, in my opinion, be devised.

Let me turn specifically to Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. I have presented my view on this troubled country previously, have attached two articles setting out my previous views and request that they be made part of the permanent record. One fact is clear: The emotions on both sides of this problem are high.

Were the elections free and fair? Obvservers have made their reports, and I was not there. But without doubt large numbers of black

Zimbabweans went to the polls and voted for their own leaders. They could have refrained from voting; some did. Those that were coerced to vote, and some no doubt were, could have left their ballots blank; it was after all a secret ballot. The Patriotic Front chose not to participate in the elections; can their self-exclusion, later their being excluded, cancel the results?

Having watched other elections in Africa, I have no doubt that these elections were at least as free and at least as fair as elections that have brought to power leaders whom we already recognize and against whom we would consider it ludicrous to apply sanctions. Thus, in my opinion, if the only issue were merely whether the elections were free and fair, then the United States should both lift sanctions and recognize Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

But there are other issues. A major one is whether the elections should be considered valid since they took place under a constitution that the majority did not have an opportunity to approve. Only the 5 percent of the population that is white had an opportunity to vote in the referendum to approve the constitution. Yet it has not been unusual in Africa for countries making the transition from colonial (in this case, minority) rule for the leaders of the majority to bargain as best they could for the best possible constitution.

Furthermore, constitutions are alterable. I can't understand why the United States would stand in judgment of the constitution of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia any more than we stand in judgment of the constitutions of the Soviet Union, China, South Korea, Canada, or Zambia, with all of whom we have continuing relations. The people of Zimbabwe must determine for themselves the extent of their approval of their constitution. In my opinion, the large turnout in the Rhodesian election indicates that a large portion of the people are prepared to accept that constitution-at least at this time.

It would be a mistake, however, for us to view the current situation. as static. The constitution reflects a series of compromises and does protect the interests of the white minority far beyond pure equity. Who are we to say that Bishop Muzorewa and his colleagues were wrong to have compromised in the manner they did? Perhaps they desired to retain a white presence for economic or military reasons or perhaps because they believed the whites deserved citizenship and wanted to avoid devising a system that was sure to cause them either to rebel or to depart.

The drafters of the current constitution performed a service by calling their country Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. That name, a joining of both the black preference and the white preference, might be viewed as a symbol for the transitory nature of the current stage until a true Zimbabwe is established. There is room for further compromise and a new constitution in negotiations with the Patriotic Front, or some parts of it, as parts of the political process.

When will such a Zimbabwe be established? Can it come under Bishop Muzorewa's leadership when other competing leaders and parties are fighting a Civil War? Here the spotlight must rest on Muzorewa's government. Will he pursue policies that will encourage his citizens to believe his rule is in their interest? Only time will tell.

Surely, however, his decision to pursue a Civil War to defend the country and his leadership against attacks by the Patriotic Front is understandable. A wise and prudent leader might choose to extend the olive branch to his opponents. Here we will have to watch how he acts to determine whether he views the current status quo as transitory. In 1966 the U.N. Security Council voted to place economic sanctions on Rhodesia. The orginal purpose was punitive-against an illegally claimed independence by Ian Smith, leader of the white minority. Smith is no longer in control; Muzorewa is. Rhodesia doesn't even exist; Zimbabwe-Rhodesia does. Thus, in my opinion, the original reasons for the sanctions no longer hold. In principle, if the world wanted sanctions against Muzorewa's government, wanted to punish it, the Security Council should debate that issue now. In fact, however, it will not. Thus, most of the world continues to support an outmoded policy.

The obvious question then is--Why should the United States continue to do likewise? This is the difficult one. My response to it may satisfy no one, since it urges both patience and nuance, both values not found frequently on Capitol Hill, and it urges a changed stance by an administration that shares some responsibility for bringing us to our current dilemma.

The Rhodesian crisis is first a Zimbabwean problem, second an African problem, and third an international problem. By joining the British to take the lead in seeking a peaceful, all parties solution, the Carter administration made a brave attempt. Its failure has been all the more obvious because of the fanfare and optimism given it by its supporters. It failed for many reasons, one of which was that it did not represent enough of a consensus to be pursued at the low level and laggard pace that the administration pursued it.

Both Zimbabweans and Americans have been led astray by the leaders of Africa who supported Joshua Nkomo's and Robert Mugabe's Patriotic Front to the exclusion of Muzorewa and his colleagues. All had credentials to claim unbiased support as nationalist leaders. Yet the Organization of African Unity preferred to let nonAfrican nations, the United Kingdom and the United States, bring Africans together. Hopefully, Muzorewa's election has shocked some of these leaders out of their one-side lethargy; how can anyone deny at least that Muzorewa excites many Zimbabweans, is respected, and may in fact be even more popular than other leaders on the continent. Since Zimbabwe is an African, not an American problem, Africans should be given a chance to react to the election and Muzorewa's government. The first chance for such a reacton will come at the July OAU summit in Monrovia. There are strong indications that several countries intend to encourage the OAU to recognize Muzorewa's victory and to urge a change in OAU policy. If the United States were to lift sanctions before Africa has had a chance to deal with the problem in July, the OAU debate would focus on the U.S. position rather than Zimbabwe. We could become a target, the excuse for a failure to revise the OAU position. That would be a serious mistake from the vantage point of Zimbabwe, Africa, and the United States.

Legally, Rhodesia has always been a British foreign policy problem. The United Kingdom, as the colonial power, requested the United Nations to enact sanctions. There are some indications that U.S.

involvement during the Kissinger era really was an attempt to reinvigorate the weary British in their involvement; in many ways the Carter administration has pursued that approach. Now, a new British Government promises a new approach to the problem. It has to wrestle with an impending meeting of Commonwealth heads of state in Zambia in August and the need to reestablish sanctions in November. They will probably change their approach. Why, I ask, should the United States act first?

Should the United States ever act unilaterally to end United Nations-imposed sanctions? As one who values abiding by the law and commitments, I would normally say no. In this case, however, as I said above, enough has happened to justify the unilateral breaking of sanctions as long as sufficient and appropriate diplomatic dialogs have preceded such a move.

Mr. Chairman, there is a lesson here and one upon which I urge your committee to act. At a time when there is no domestic consensus behind U.S. foreign policy, it may be a mistake for the United States. to support any Security Council vote for sanctions. A veto of any such vote will cause less international embarrassment than will erratic compliance. The U.S. adherence to Rhodesian sanctions has been. erratic-on, off, on again, perhaps off again. This is damaging. May I suggest you consider a sense of the Congress resolution urging the executive branch not to vote for a sanctions resolution without appropriate prior consultation with the Congress.

Lifting sanctions would no doubt help the Muzorewa government, probably more psychologically than economically. After all, even with sanctions for over a decade, the Rhodesian economy has managed quite well.

Lifting sanctions, however, is not the key issue. Recognition is. And it would be possible to recognize a Muzorewa-led ZimbabweRhodesia while at the same time still maintaining sanctions.

What goes into diplomatic recognition? Do we need to like the regime? No. Does the regime have to control its government? Yes. Must the country be free from a civil war? Obviously not. Must we be sure that the views of all contending parties are incorporated into either the rule or the ruling style of the government? No. Must we be sure that other countries, using their own criteria for recognition, recognize? No.

Based on the above, had Muzorewa come to power in the manner that he has in a country we already recognized, we would have recognized his government by now. The only issue here is whether his regime is "illegal." If we are lucky, Margaret Thatcher may remove that problem. If she does not, we should answer that question for ourselves. But impatience should not cause us to do so before the new British Government decides its policy.

Basically, I believe the United States should have recognized all Governments. This is as true for Zimbabwe- Rhodesia and Angola as it is for Finland and Iraq. The question is one of timing and diplomatic maneuvering.

What should the United States do now? I think it is wrong for the United States unilaterally to lift sanctions or recognize ZimbabweRhodesia at this time. Let's wait for the OAU Conference, for the Commonwealth Conference, and for British action. That doesn't mean

being passive. The Muzorewa government needs to be encouraged. The Patriotic Front should be encouraged to seek a peaceful solution and join Muzorewa. African leaders should be encouraged to be pragmatic and take the lead in finding a solution. Meanwhile, the Carter administration should not commit the United States to an activity the extent, if not the direction, of which does not have domestic support. That means a lower profile and an end to American attempts to solve the problem as if it were our own.

Some would argue that my recommendation would put the United States on the side of Muzorewa. I believe we should stay on the side. of peace. If some of the parties involved choose to break the peace as their tactic to power, then we should oppose them. It is erroneous to adopt the Vietnam syndrome of assuming that guerrillas always win. Such a view has no historical accuracy, is not true in contemporary Africa, and the realities on the ground do not support that view.

Some would say that the Soviets and Cubans are sure to increase their support for the Patriotic Front while we do nothing to support Muzorewa. This is a worry. But I am sure that Kenneth Kaunda and Samora Machel are at least as anxious to avoid a large Soviet and Cuban presence in their countries as we. Furthermore, wouldn't our indicating to the Soviet Union that we have washed our hands of Muzorewa encourage them to expand their involvement?

Some would caution against siding with the same side that is supported by South Africa. This caution has merit. Hopefully, we learned our lesson in Angola. The United States would be unwise to be alone with South Africa in support of any issue or country. That is why I argue so strongly for active diplomacy to get moderate African leaders to pave the way for us.

The challenge to Congress is whether it has patience and can understand nuance. I understand the impatience now on the Hill. The Congress, by passing the Case-Javits amendment, tried to move administration policy by giving it a stick, something new. The administration failed to take advantage of this diplomatically. The Congress has reason to be unhappy with and not to trust the administration on this issue. Nevertheless, this is not the time for the United States to act unilaterally. Let's wait until September and see where events have moved. Meanwhile, the administration should encourage the Muzorewa government, urge Africans to show pragmatism and leadership, and be prepared to move unilaterally in the fall if necessary.

Finally, there is an important lesson for U.S. policy and behavior. On international issues of intense and opposite feeling within our national body politic, where our strategic interests are so minor that the application of more than minimal governmental resources is unlikely, we should stay in the background, keep a lowered profile. Let others solve the problems which, after all, it is not ours to solve. Thank you.

Mr. BONKER. Thank you, Mr. Samuels.

Our last witness is Prof. Lewis Gann who is a senior fellow of the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, who has written a history of Africa. Perhaps, Mr. Gann, you have a last chapter in your history to share with us today. You may proceed.