smoking gun. Kenya is one of those places because of the resistance of the whites to change. Algeria is another. Portuguese Africa is another one and now Zimbabwe. It is interesting to note that in the historical background of some 52 African countries you can only pick out 4 or 5 that went that route and in every case they went that route because of the recalcitrance of those people who were in power and who wished to continue in power or continue in a privileged position.

Mr. Goodling used a very good expression in the beginning of his inquiry. He said that he had a credibility problem, and so do I, and it is the basis upon which I would like to pose a question first to my distinguished colleague Mrs. Collins who has traveled extensively in Africa and just came back from an important meeting in Houston sponsored by the African American Institute who has considerable contact with Africans both abroad and at the United Nations and here in Washington. I would like to ask her if she knows of any African country, including those that are considered on the conservative side like Malawi, outside of South Africa who is in favor of lifting sanctions. Mrs. COLLINS. Not one.

Mr. DIGGS. Through action on the part of the United States or on the part of the British.

Mrs. COLLINS. No, I do not.

Mr. DIGGS. How do you account for the solidarity of Africans on this particular question? Given reasonableness on their part and an ability to make an assessment of the conditions in that area, would you not think that if these kinds of conditions had any element of equity in it that there would be some defections that one might anticipate?

Mrs. COLLINS. I certainly agree with you. We spoke to them and not a one of the African states feel that sanctions should be lifted. In fact, they feel they should not be lifted for a number of reasons that we have heard before. Given their close proximity to Rhodesia, they have been fighting freedom fights now for more than 14, 15 years and they understand fully what each ramification means. Those that I have spoken to since the April 20 elections are, as you have pointed out, to a man unified on this question.

Mr. DIGGS. Rev. Judge Hooks is the distinguished executive secretary of the greatest civil rights organization in the country. I think the statement that has been made by the chairperson of the NAACP and your presence here is very significant. Although the NAACP has in its testimony alluded to its historical interests in these matters, out of all of the hearings that have been before this committee I don't think the NAACP has appeared very often, maybe less than a half dozen times, so that your presence here today would appear to emphasize your concern in a very unique way. I would like to hear you expound upon the reasons beyond the testimony why you feel that the concern of the NAACP is such that you would appear here despite your preoccupations with domestic issues.

Then second, as I have asked Mrs. Collins, you are in contact with all of the other civil rights groups across the country, you are a personal friend of Dorothy Height and Jesse Jackson and Reverend Lawrey and the whole gamut of civil rights leaderships. Could you indicate if you know of any civil rights leader in this country who is in favor of lifting sanctions?

STATEMENT OF BENJAMIN L. HOOKS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE

Mr. Hooks. Let me just say two things. Occasionally we have to divide the laborers, and Mrs. Wilson who has labored mightly on this whole international--if you just give me another minute, the red light is on. My presence here signifies the fact that I think America would be making a backward step in the wrong direction to lift sanctions. We came with all of our preoccupation with domestic matters to lobby for and work for the ratification of the Panama Canal Treaty because there are some things that are so important in this world that we live in that have to do with the moral leadership of America, that have to do with the status and statutes across the whole board and this is a step that could have repercussions for peace for years and years to come. I think that this would be the wrong time for us to lift the sanctions and for the wrong reasons.

I want to comment just briefly on the question you asked, Mr. Chairman, about the question of changes in the constitution-hypothetical you phrased it. It seems to me that it is, and I don't want to make too close an analysis with the civil rights situation but when we went to the South struggling for certain types of changes it was always a funny thing that the power structure would then make little gestures to a group that had not been particularly involved in trying to bring the changes about.

It seems to me that to put a government in place and to eliminate the people who were involved because of the way you set that government in place and then to make some changes is the wrong way to go about it. So my presence here today along with Chairperson Wilson is to emphasize our great concern that America does not make this great mistake.

I was appalled to read about the Senate action the other day. I could not remember the precipitious haste to lift sanctions without knowing in my judgment just what we were about and the CaseJavits amendment Mr. Goodling referred to and what that meant and what it didn't mean. It seems to me there is no way that we have satisfied majority rule in Rhodesia when you have the reservation of the power of 4 percent for 10 years and maybe forever.

Second, I don't know, Congressman Diggs, offhand-and I do converse with these people all the time of any of the major civil rights leaders in America who are in favor of lifting sanctions. I discovered, however, the other day that there is coming a new day in the black leadership ranks so if they disagree with the people that you have I am certain there will be some instantly created leaders today who will get a lot of publicity by the recognized groups and what they have stood for except for those instantly created who have no following or credibility. I don't know of any.

Mrs. COLLINS. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I might just have a quick intervention.

Mr. Diggs, in terms of the civil rights organizations that you mention, I think the record should show that the civil rights organizations all met and signed a letter that we sent to the President outlining our reasons for not wanting the sanctions lifted and our very, very grave concern. It should also be noted that these same civil rights organizations are now requesting a meeting with President Carter so we can

tell him face to face how we feel about the sanctions because it is important to all the black skinned people all over the world.

Mr. BONKER. I want to thank each of the witnesses for your appearance today and for your testimony.

I would like to call as our second panel the following witnesses: Dr. Michael Samuels, executive director, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, and the Honorable Robert Good, president of Denison University and former U.S. Ambassador to Zambia.

Mr. Good, I understand you have a plane to catch.

Mr. GOOD. I do, sir.

Mr. BONKER. We will proceed with you then.

I would ask each of the witnesses, as I did the first panel, to try to limit your remarks to 10 minutes. You can see we get into a much more interesting conversation in the question and answer period. I will turn off this timing device and we will just try to keep an eye on the clock. We are pleased to have all of you here.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT C. GOOD, PRESIDENT, DENISON UNIVERSITY, AND FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO ZAMBIA

Mr. GOOD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The problem of Rhodesia has been to effect a transition from colonial to postcolonial rule without an imperial arbiter. Never having deployed forces on the ground in Rhodesia, Britain has never exercised imperial authority.

When UDI occurred in 1965, Britain adjured force. For under these unusual circumstances, the application of force against a rebellious colony by the mother country would have meant mounting an invasion. It could have been done, I am convinced, at acceptable military risk. And I was and remain convinced that such a policy, given the stakes, would have been an act of very considerable statesmanship. Equally true, however, it would have involved high economic and political risks, given the parlous state of Britain's economy and Labor's paper thin majority in Parliament in 1965. And the pragmatic Harold Wilson, particularly when his political fortunes were at risk, has never been accused of high statesmanship.

Britain's response to the Rhodesian problem thus became more a response to the problems created by the Rhodesian problem-both domestically and in relation to the colored Commonwealth. Oil sanctions and then the gradually escalating program of sanctions within the framework of the United Nations were designed, one suspects, not so much to undo the rebels in Salisbury as to keep Britain's international relationships from crumbling, while protecting Wilson from irate back benchers who feared their opportunistic First Minister would sell out to Smith. Wilson's frequent attempts to negotiate a settlement, on the other hand, were designed at least in part to prevent the conservatives from outflanking him on the right.

That there was no settlement during these years was not due so much to Wilson's reluctance to sell as to Smith's reluctance to buy. The reasons have always been difficult to fathom. Smith would have gained immeasurably over his present predicament by the terms of the settlement negotiated on H.M.S. Tiger in 1966 or on H.M.S. Fearless in 1968.

The Tory settlement of 1971 was, much to the credit of Edward Heath and Alex Douglas-Home, submitted to a referendum of sorts within Rhodesia in 1972. It was the first time in history that Africans were given the power of veto over the future of Rhodesia. They voted a resounding "no" in circumstances which brought Bishop Abel Muzorewa into national prominence.

At the end of that same year, 1972, the guerrilla war, which had been sputtering ineffectually for some 7 years, began in earnest. It was the war, not sanctions, that became the engine of change in Rhodesia. Sanctions had only marginal economic impact. They forced up the price of imports and the cost of exports by perhaps 10 percent to handle the charges of the middlemen who facilitated in a variety of ingenious ways the breaking of the sanctions barrier using particularly the South African corridor. Rhodesian whites at one point sported bumper stickers reading "Danke (thank you) South Africaplus 10 percent." And sanctions greatly inhibited Rhodesia's access to international money markets.

But sanctions also placed under forced draft Rhodesia's drive toward economic self-sufficiency, again pursued with great imagination, producing the Rhodesian economic miracle. From 1965 until 1974 the gross domestic product rose by over 80 percent in real terms. Industrial output doubled. Mining and manufacturing rose by twothirds. There was a fairly substantial net immigration of whites.

The real significance of the sanctions program was not economic, it was political. Using the U.N. as the vehicle, international sanctions lent international legitimacy to the African struggle for independence. Since UDI, and especially since the end of 1972, that struggle increasingly has been violent in character as African nationalist forces, understandably enough, despaired of achieving substantial change either through negotiation or through effective British or international intervention.

The impact of guerrilla war on the economy has grown increasingly serious. The dip in the economy last year was about 7 percent. It is estimated at roughly the same this year. There has been a heavy drain on the white population with substantial net outmigration of whites and more and more of the remainder called into military service. The cost of prosecuting the war is running high. Estimates range between $750,000 and $1.5 million a day.

To sum up, the agency of change in Rhodesia has been the guerrilla war mounted by Rhodesian African nationalists. Sanctions have had only a marginal economic impact but have served an important political function, making it difficult for governments apart from South Africa and, until 1975, Portugal-to give economic assistance to Salisbury and, either implicitly or explicitly, awarding to the African struggle for independence a form of international legitimacy. These were the forces that Ian Smith responded to when, in the fall of 1976 and in the wake of Secretary Kissinger's intervention, he talked suddently of a transition to majority rule within 2 years-a rather surprising statement for the man who had persisted in announcing that there would be no majority rule in his lifetime or in that of his children.

We now confront a terrible irony. The object all along was to force the Salisbury Government to the negotiating table. That could be done by a combination of pressures: The war and its escalating eco

nomic impact, continuing international ostracism, and pressure from Pretoria to reach a settlement. These combined forces have at last obliged the Rhodesian white establishment to confront the inevitability of a transition to majority rule but at precisely the time the African Nationalists have splintered-and splintered so seriously that an Angloan-type civil war seems to lie somewhere between a possibility and probability.

The splintering has occurred between the external forces headed by Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe and along the lines of the rival groupings of ZAPU and ZANU which have characterized the Rhodesian African Nationalist movement for more than 15 years. The splintering has also occurred between the leaders within the country and those outside, as well as between the leaders inside.

Blame for this chaotic situation may be apportioned about equally between the fractious Nationalist leaders (three of whom now think they smell victory, each viewing himself in the catbird seat) and Ian Smith who might well have "caught up with history" had he been willing to settle 21⁄2 years ago for what he is settling for today, and certainly if he had been willing to settle in 1972 for what he was willing to consider in 1976.

A more elaborate calculus of blame would, of course, also include the inability of Pretoria to assess with sufficient precision the real options and its own long-term interests, and the Western powers for their failure, too, to bring as much pressure to bear on Salisbury as might have been the case. But all of that is behind us.

We are now being told by the opposing sides in the current policy debate that the recognition of the new African government in Salisbury and the lifting of sanctions on the one hand, and the failure to recognize that government and the maintenance of sanctions on the other, will each lead to the further intensification of the war and the deeper involvement of the Soviets and Cubans. This is the second irony. Because both are right. The time for negotiation and compromise leading to a viable settlement is now past. Whether it will reemerge is problematic. More about that in a moment. We are now confronting two baneful choices, either to recognize and lift sanctions or to maintain the status quo.

My own strong preference lies with the advice we used to give John Foster Dulles: "Foster, don't just do something. Stand there!"

Neither sending election observers nor the recognition of the resulting government and the lifting of sanctions are called for. This is not because the constitution is inherently evil. It probably compares favorably with those transitional penultimate constitutions that immediately preceded independence in many African countries. And it is not because of gross improprieties in the election. In fact, there was a substantial turnout as many of us had predicted. Observers saw large numbers of Africans placing white pieces of paper into large boxes with oblong holes cut in their tops.

Rather, we should not support the resulting government because the context, the structures of the situation, cannot at present be supported. And we should not support the resulting government because the consequences of doing so would be prejudicial to our interests. Conceivably conditions might change. But it will take time to determine that. Let me explain. I will speak first to the context or the structure of the situation.