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Of the three labor leaders who appeared before the CommissionSidney Hillman of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America; David B. Robertson, of the Locomotive Fireman & Enginemen; and William Green, of the American Federation of Labor-Mr. Hillman was the only one who laid particular emphasis on the weakness of any instrumentality, constituted to deal with our economic difficulties, which does not include representation of labor. Not only did he disagree with the theory that industry could voluntarily achieve stability, but he insisted that the whole recorded history of industry proves the contrary. "They won't do it, they have not done it, and they will not do it. The only power that can put it into effect is governmental action. There have been promises as to what industry will do. We know that nothing constructive from the large point of view was done when they were in a position to do it."

Mr. Green's objection to privately organized boards, as projected by Mr. Swope and Mr. Harriman, lay primarily in the—

danger that it would lead ultimately to Government price fixing, and that is where labor is interested, because that might be supplemented with the fixing of the rates for labor, and we would certainly be opposed to any plan that would even in a remote way provide for such a condition.

After financiers, engineers, industrialists, came the economists, and among those who appeared before the Commission-John Maurice Clark, Wallace B. Donham, Lewis L. Lorwin, John A. Ryan, George Soule, Leo Wolman, Virgil Jordan, Paul M. Mazur, and J. Russell Smith-none questioned the need for an institution which would keep us continually informed of "the state of the Nation." Walter W. Stewart, our recent representative at the Basle Conference to determine the state of German finances, justified the creation of such a council, however, "only on the assumption that it would be constituted of a personnel that would be of a sufficiently high quality, with the virtues of foresight and of courage to champion an unpopular cause at a time when they think necessary." All felt that without such an institution little could be accomplished along the lines of rationalizing our economic activity. Dean Donham, of the Harvard School of Business, felt that a council could be organized privately by industry, but he agreed with the others that it was only on the initiative of the Federal Government that it was likely to be started. The economists were unanimously agreed further that the immediate function of a council was to serve as a collector and interpreter of all facts that bear in any way on our economic life, and to advise industry whenever possible of the probable trend of events.

And never have the scarcity and shortcomings of existing economic data been more carefully elucidated than in the examination of J. Frederic Dewhurst, chief of economic research of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce. His portrayal, which might well have been entitled "What We Do Not Know About Our Economic Life," showed what data we now have lacks many essential characteristics, and designated wide fields in which we have no information at all. Thus. for example, he pointed out that we know little or nothing about how our physical goods are distributed; whence they emanate; where they go; that we know but little about the stocks of commodities on hand; and that with the exception of department store sales, which cover only 3 percent of our retail trade, we have no data on consumer

purchases. These are mere samples of the fields covered by Mr. Dewhurst, fields in which so many believe we are thoroughly versed. Without the collection and interpretation of this type of data, it was made apparent, we cannot intelligently get very far in stabilizing our economic system.

A definitely formulated plan for an economic council was presented by Prof. J. M. Clark, of Columbia University, as the result of the deliberations of a committee of economists, appointed by the Progressive Conference of 1931. This proposed the creation, by the Federal Government, of a body to gather and analyze economic data and make plans and proposals. To perform this function he suggested that the body be composed of persons "whose qualifications should be defined in terms of things they have expert knowledge about, or experience with, rather than the interests they represent." Since the problems of organization vary between industries, administration should be assigned to industrial councils in each industry made up of representatives of management, labor force, and the consumers of its products. Their duties

to

might run all the way from the mere extension of trade association functions with a more adequate gathering and use of statistical knowledge for the guidance of trade policies, without power to control supply and control prices ** setting up consolidated organizations which would have the status of public utilities and be subject to the same kind of control of price and service, or even beyond that.

Roscoe C. Edlund, representative of the American Soap & Glycerine Producers, saw in an economic council a means for developing "a new conception of the trade association." The latter, he felt, could be made to serve as "a two-way bridge" between the economic planning group and the component parts of the various industries, over which information and advice could pass in both directions. Charles F. Abbott, executive director of the American Institute of Steel Construction, went beyond the Clark proposal and advocated in addition either compulsory membership in trade organizations, or a system of Federal licensing for them.

Thus there passed in array 44 men and women-representatives of a dozen sectors of our economic order. Each had his say about economic planning. Some scoffed; more praised. The fairness of the proceedings was the subject of comment on all sides, and particularly among members of the press. Personal, philosophic, and political disagreements were never allowed to mar the atmosphere. The upshot of it all was, first, a 752-page volume of economic data and opinion which bids fair to serve for many a day as a classic cross section picture of American economic life and American thinking in this era of depression; secondly, reinforced determination on Senator LaFollette's part to see established some Federal body which will at least collect and interpret the information essential to the intelligence guidance of our economic affairs.

Profiting by the advice and criticism of those who testified on the original draft, his revised bill provides for a body of nine members to be "selected on the basis of their acquaintance with and understanding of national economic problems." On this body there shall be "at least one expert in the fields of industry, finance, transportation, labor relations, agriculture, and scientific management." Its powers and

functions are to be the same as those provided in the original bill with the additional mandate that it "shall initiate the organization of councils or associations within the major branches of production, distribution, and finance." The National Council is to consider the recommendations of these bodies and suggest measures for putting such recommendations into effect. No trade body, however, is to be recognized unless it be "truly representative of the economic interests within the particular branch of production, distribution, or finance in which it is organized." When such is not the case, the National Council is to encourage its reorganization or the organization of a new body in its place. Thus there would be provided means whereby the National Economic Council can be in direct touch with representatives of industry, finance and labor, and a way paved for the mutual consideration of economic problems and policies.

The success or failure of S. 2390 as a piece of legislation will depend on whether or not we in the United States have reached the stage where we are willing to undertake a moderate initial step in the direction of information and orderliness, yet a step which may prove the threshold to coordinating and revolutionizing the controls of our economic life.

[From "The Survey"-Nov. 1, 1931]

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE

AN AMERICAN PLAN TO PROTECT WORKERS AND AVOID THE DOLE

(BY FRANCES PERKINS)

Miss Perkins, New York State industrial commissioner, came back from England with a plan for setting up unemployment insurance in the United States in a way she believes would be fair to workers, to employers, and to the public-a plan free from politics and organized on a pattern of public work which has been proved a success in this country. She sets it forth here for the first time. Not as a research worker investigating Britain's experiment with unemployment insurance, but as an administrative official seeking light on the aims, the accomplishments, and the technique of that vast project, I recently spent 6 weeks in England. I visited the southern counties where there is no abnormal unemployment and where there has been none during England's decade of depression, and also the Midlands, the coal area, and the Clydeside, where men and women formerly employed in mining, textiles, and shipbuilding have been jobless, some of them for years. My wanderings took me through country lanes, along village roads, through fine city streets, into the slum districts of London, Plymouth, Liverpool, Manchester. I had chances to talk with bankers, government officials, industrial managers, professional people, trade union leaders, merchants, workmen. I visited local unemployment insurance offices, sat in at sessions of referees, and umpire's courts, where doubtful and "refused" claims for benefits are reviewed.

I soon drew a line between insurance itself, an active, going, mutual scheme, and the dole which carries the load of those who drop through and constitutes national mass relief. What I saw convinced me that compulsory insurance against the ordinary hazards of industrial unemployment is sound in principle. I should like to set down here what struck me as the values in unemployment insurance to the community as well as to the workers themselves. It is, of course, only fair in such a discussion to point out some of the administrative difficulties involved. Finally, I want to suggest a possible method of so setting up an American plan of unemployment insurance as to keep the administration of the fund out of politics, and cut down the risk of penalizing employers doing business across State lines through the enactment of compulsory legislation.

On my last visit to England, before the war, I brought back memories of widespread human misery so vivid that they have remained with me through all the crowded years since 1913. At that time, poverty was an inescapable part of the British scene. People who were cold

because they had only rags to wear were seen on the streets-men and women with bare feet or feet wrapped in old bits of cloth, and with tattered garments pinned and tied together. Drunkenness was a familiar part of the picture, for desperate people will often spend a few coppers for liquor and forgetfulness rather than for inadequate food.

But the England of 1931 is not the England of 1913. I went from town to town, through one city after another and never saw people in rags or shoeless. I did not encounter that drawn look that comes from years of underfeeeding and despair, except on the faces of a few aged unemployables. The English in general wear clothes that seem to an American dull and monotonous but people on the streets have good, warm durable clothes these days and they all have shoes. Housing is also better than it used to be, both in comfort and in sanitation. The only drunken person I saw in England this summer was an American girl in a hotel lobby. The pubs were well filled but even on Saturday nights in the poorer sections of large cities I saw no drunks. Coming to England freshly after so long an absence, I was continually impressed by the rise in the standard of living in spite of postwar adjustments and the long depression. This I believe to be due in large part to measures which, wise or unwise in method, have lifted some of the unemployment burden from the backs of the wage earners and spread it out on industry and the country.

The whole philosophy and method of social insurance are, of course, products of the complex age in which we live. In a simpler society the individual made his own economic plan. He was the master of his tools of labor, and his own strength, ingenuity, and willingness to work were all he needed to keep himself and his family fed, clothed, sheltered, and provided with the elements his concept of the good life required.

But the individual is a far less independent unit in modern capitalistic society. He does not own the machine he uses. The factors that determine the work he does and his return for it are largely outside his control. The insurance principle, devised long ago to protect helpless dependents from the most severe economic effects of their breadwinner's death, has been extended to cover other hazards before which the individual in a machine age is partly or wholly helpless. Thus we have workmen's compensation to cushion the burden and spread the cost of industrial accident. We have old-age pensions to provide for the years when the worker can no longer keep pace with modern industry. Unemployment insurance is another extension of this same principle.

The present English scene gives a muddled picture of unemployment insurance in action because British unemployment insurance has been almost smothered by the dole to the postwar unemployed. The dole as has frequently been pointed out (see the Survey, April 1, 1929, p. 60) is badly entangled with the unemployment insurance setup, but it is not a part of it. British unemployment insurance is a threeway scheme, with contributions from the employer, the employee, and the state, under an act originally passed in 1911. The dole, officially known as uncovenanted benefit or extended benefits, has been paid through the unemployment insurance machinery to people who have through prolonged unemployment lost their footing as partici

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