have to have clear objectives and then bring overwhelming force, the full range of resources that we have available to us, to achieve those objectives.

It is unrealistic and counterproductive, I think, short term, to suggest that we can sell American values to the Arab street. We can, however, make a strong case that Osama bin Laden and the terrorist organizations in the Muslim world haven't just hijacked airplanes, but they are trying to hijack Islam itself.

So, to put it in political terms, the short-term campaign should be a negative one, frankly, designed to put the terrorists in a box. And we need not be shy about it. In a culture that above all values family, bin Laden is estranged from his family. He is ostracized from his tribe. He is a terrorist who murders innocent women and children. We should be widely circulating the stories and pictures, for example, of those Muslim children in the United States who lost a parent as a result of the attacks on September 11th. We need to personalize our communications.

In the long term, our objective should be to encourage a dialogue among Muslims themselves about what are acceptable beliefs and behavior for Islam. We are never going to convince, perhaps, some of the more radical fundamentalists, but we can carefully target those whose opinions are soft, those who are undecided or conflicted. It should be possible to persuade people who are searching for answers that the path these radical elements have chosen is not only incompatible with the teachings of the Koran but antithetical to the kind of world most people want to live in.

Second, we need to reorganize how we manage public diplomacy. Our government apparatus is still caught up in the Cold War when we relied on an infrastructure with assets like Radio Free Europe, the Voice of America and our embassies, primarily, to deliver the message. During those times, we were communicating our values to people willing to acknowledge and able to receive them, people who wanted freedom and democracy.

These are very different times, and I think probably even Norm would agree that just a beefed-up Voice of America alone isn't going to win this war. If we want to bring overwhelming force to the communications battle, we will need a centralized chain of command, not a loose-knit coalition of agencies and departments spread across the government.

I do think, by the way, in that regard that the Coalition Information Center set up by the White House is actually a very important step in the right direction.

Third, we need to tap into the best minds in the field. In our business, we don't make widgets. We depend on the insights and the talents and imagination of individuals. This is a creative process, and every effort needs to be made to recruit the best creative minds to work with the United States government. Reaching out to groups like the Ad Council, creative experts here and creative experts in the Muslim world is critical to this process.

Fourth, no tactic should be overlooked. CNN recently ran a segment apparently on a pro-bin Laden video game that is becoming popular in many Islamic countries. And whether we counter with our own video games, use commercial advertizing, the Internet, posters, pamphlets-you name it every tactical approach should

be considered that can deliver the right message to the right targets with credibility.

Fifth, just like our military campaign, we can't win a communication campaign without troops on the ground. This campaign is not going to be won on the airwaves alone. We must carry it to the street. Traditional institutions, and including our government particularly, lack the credibility to carry that message. So we are going to have to rely on much more sophisticated recruitment and training of credible people on the ground-clerics and youth groups, sports heros and teachers, anyone we can find to help carry the messages.

Finally, we will never succeed without actionable research. I am sure we have warehouses full of research throughout the government. But we need to know more than just what people are hearing and how they are behaving. We need to know what messages and actions can actually change attitudes and behavior and what groups are most receptive to our messages.

So if we do these things, if we commit to using overwhelming force and clear objectives in targeting, if we have centralized planning and a chain of command, if we reach out to the best creative minds here and abroad, if we demonstrate a willingness to employ innovative tactics and sound, actionable research, then I believe America's message will be heard. It is a challenge no less important than any other in the new war on terrorism.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you very much, Mr. Leslie. [The prepared statement of Mr. Leslie follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN W. LESLIE, JR., CHAIRMAN, WEBER SHANDWICK WORLDWIDE

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee.

It's a pleasure to be here today. As you noted, I've spent the better part of my career advising organizations and individuals in developing countries on how best to use communications to achieve their public policy objectives. And so, like many others, I've seen that the events of the past two months have brought into sharp and tragic relief the long-term failure of the United States to communicate effectively with the 1.2 billion people of the Muslim world.

And I use the word “people” deliberately. For, historically as a nation, we've communicated government to government, not people to people. And it has been exacerbated since the Cold War, when we cut back on public diplomacy in the false belief that it was less important to communicate our values. We're good at talking to the heads of nations, but have overlooked their hearts. It would be as if members of this Committee campaigned only to civic leaders in your districts and ignored rank and file voters. There is no better evidence of this phenomenon than the astounding fact that we aren't reminding those who march against America that our nation went to war against Christian fundamentalists to protect Muslim minorities in places like Bosnia and Kosovo.

That said, most of us are well aware that the deep seated hatred in the Muslim world is no more the result of a communications failure by the United States than the destruction of the World Trade Center was the result of an intelligence failure. It is the result of many conditions-widespread poverty, political repression, the ongoing Palestinian-Israeli dispute and America's involvement in these situations, whether real or perceived that are far more responsible for public opinion in the Muslim world than is American public diplomacy. The fact of the matter is that in most of these countries the only acceptable form of political expression has been to be anti-American or anti-Israel.

So while the antagonism we face in the Muslim world is not entirely our fault, September 11 proved that it is our problem. And it is a problem of both immediate and long-term proportions.

I believe that there are six courses of action that are central to communicating the message of America. They are:

• First, apply the Powell Doctrine from the Persian Gulf War to communications;

• Second, reorganize management of public policy;

• Third, tap into the best minds in communications;

• Fourth, don't rule out any tactic;

Fifth, put communications “troops" on the ground; and

• Sixth, conduct actionable research.

I'll touch briefly on each point.

First, we should heed the Powell Doctrine from the Persian Gulf War and apply it now to communications. We must have clear objectives and then we must bring overwhelming force-the full range of resources necessary to achieve those objectives.

It is unrealistic and probably counterproductive to suggest that in the shortterm we can sell America's values to the Arab street. We can, however, make a strong case that Osama bin Laden and terrorist organizations in the Muslim world haven't just hijacked airplanes, they are trying to hijack Islam itself. So, to put it in political terms, the short-term campaign should primarily be a negative one designed to put the terrorists in a box. We need not be shy about it. In a culture that above all else values family, bin Laden is estranged from his family, ostracized from his tribe, a terrorist who murders innocent women and children. We should be circulating widely the pictures of those Muslim children in the United States who lost a parent during the attacks on September 11. We need to personalize our communications.

In the long-term, our objective should be to encourage a dialogue among Muslims about what are acceptable beliefs and behavior for Islam. We are never going to convince radical Islamic fundamentalists of the benefits of a pluralistic society. But we can carefully target those whose opinions are soft, those who are undecided or conflicted. It should be possible to persuade people who are searching for answers that the path these radical elements have chosen is not only incompatible with the teachings of the Koran, but antithetical to the kind of future most people want to live. Second, reorganizing how we manage public diplomacy. Our government apparatus is still caught up in the Cold War when we relied upon an infrastructure with assets like Radio Free Europe, the Voice of America and our embassies to deliver our message. During those times, we communicated our values to people willing to acknowledge and able to receive them-people who wanted freedom and democracy. These are very different times. A beefed up Voice of America isn't going to win this war. If we want to bring overwhelming force to the communications battle, we'll need a centralized chain of command, not a loose-knit collection of agencies and departments spread across the government. The Coalition Information Center set-up by the White House is a major step in the right direction.

Third, we need to tap into the best minds in this field. In our business, we don't make widgets. We depend on the insights and talents of individuals. This is a creative process and every effort must be made to recruit the best creative minds to work with the United States Government. Reaching out to groups like the Ad Council here and creative experts in the Muslim world is critical.

Fourth, no tactic should be ruled out. CNN ran a segment recently on a pro-bin Laden video game becoming popular in many Islamic countries. Whether we counter with our own video games, use commercial advertising, the Internet, posters or pamphlets you name it, every tactical approach should be considered that can deliver the right message to the right targets with credibility. During the democratic revolution in the Philippines, when Corazon Aquino had no access to the media except for Catholic radio, we prompted Ted Koppel on Nightline to run a story about the fact that Marcos bragged about military medals that turned out to be fakes. Marcos was so infuriated, he felt compelled to deny the charge in the Philippine press, making it a campaign issue and a turning point in the campaign. We need to be similarly creative now in using every available tactic at our disposal.

Fifth, just like our military campaign, we cannot win the communications campaign without troops on the ground. This is not a war that will be won on the airwaves alone. We must carry it to the street. Traditional institutions, and certainly our government, lack the credibility needed to carry the message. We must rely on much more sophisticated recruitment and training of credible people on the ground) clerics and youth groups, sports heroes and teachers-anyone we can find who can carry our message.

And finally, we'll never succeed without actionable research. I'm sure we have warehouses full of research throughout the government. But we need to know much more than just what people are hearing and how they are behaving. We need to

know what messages and actions can change attitudes and behavior-and what groups are most receptive to our messages.

If we do these things, if we commit to using overwhelming force with clear objectives and targeting, if we have centralized planning and a chain of command, if we reach out to the best creative minds here and abroad, if we demonstrate a willingness to employ innovative tactics and sound, actionable research then I believe America's message will be heard. It is a challenge no less important than any other in the new war against terrorism.

Again, thank you for your invitation to be here today and I would be happy to answer any questions you might have.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Wehling.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT L. WEHLING, FORMER CHAIRMAN, ADVERTISING COUNCIL, AND RETIRED GLOBAL MARKETING OFFICER, PROCTER & GAMBLE

Mr. WEHLING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Committee Members, guests.

I currently serve as co-Chair of the Ad Council Advisory Committee which coordinates the bulk of public service ads in the United States. Prior to that, I was Chairman of the Ad Council; and I retired from Procter & Gamble after 41 years in Marketing and Advertising, as Global Marketing Officer.

My experience with both P&G and the Ad Council proves conclusively that advertising can change attitudes and practices. You need look no further than the Ad Council's success with seat belt usage and drunk driving, or P&G's success with Pampers, Pantene and Tide to see hard evidence of this.

I also believe the Ad Council's current "I am an American" campaign is having an impact on attitudes toward others in the wake of the September 11th attack.

I am also convinced that an advertising and communications campaign can be effective in the Middle East, but only if a number of important guidelines are followed. Procter & Gamble has had several successes in the region as a result of following some pretty clear principles.

First, clearly lay out the objective of the effort in writing and state how and when success will be measured.

Second, I cannot overstate the importance of alignment and consistency. Whatever we say must be perceived as messages the entire Administration and Congress support.

Third, our experience suggests that it is very unlikely that there is a single message that will resonate throughout the Arab world. I would urge you to work with a team of Arab Americans here and local professionals in each country to craft messages which are culturally appropriate for each country in the region.

Fourth, don't start writing any messages before getting up-todate research in each country regarding how people feel, why they feel that way, and what it would take to change their minds-the same basic point that Jack just made.

Fifth, just as there is no single appropriate message for all of the countries in the region, there is probably no one message that is right for all of the people in a country. Picking the most important target audience for the messages is crucial. Procter & Gamble's success in this region has principally come about because of our focus on women, particularly mothers. That same focus may make

sense in this case, because surely the women of the region have had enough of violence and bloodshed.

Sixth, while there is very difficult for many of us to understand, but I think necessary if we are to be successful in any ad campaign, messages which appeal to us here in the United States may not be the most persuasive in the Middle East. For example, while the message of freedom is essential to all in the U.S. and the Western world, it may not be the optimum message over there. While everyone values freedom, there are some who equate excesses and abuses of freedom with excessive consumption and other negative aspects of Western culture.

Seventh, our actions must be fully consistent with our words. If we send messages to the Arab world that communicate friendship and peace, it won't mean anything unless it is accompanied by a major humanitarian effort, a major push for a Palestinian state, and similar activities. And if we aren't willing to deliver this kind of effort, I think we should carefully consider how broadly we want to go with that advertising or PR campaign.

Eighth, we should employ the services of a global ad agency with a proven track record in the Middle East, and be willing to work directly their local offices in the region. Any campaign should be developed and executed by people living in the area and intensely familiar with the people, culture and current attitudes in each

area.

Let me give you two quick examples of why using people on the ground in these countries is key.

Many of you may recall some old campaigns for P&G's Tide detergent. We often used white tablecloths to illustrate how effective Tide was at cleaning. Fortunately, research with local Arab consumers showed that tablecloth usage was in fact very low, and place mats were often used instead. Thus, we were saved from spending lots of money on completely irrelevant advertising.

Likewise, in Pakistan, locals there convinced us to run a detergent campaign which never mentioned cleaning but which instead supported a drive to raise money for needy children; and it was very, very successful because of the commitment to families in that region.

Finally, while I agree with the point you made about bin Laden being a threat to Islam itself, I have most often seen communications efforts succeed when they focus on the positive benefits of our product rather than on the negative aspects of a competitor. Thus, focusing on the evil of bin Laden may not be as compelling to the average person as a real commitment to help improve standards of living, safety and security of the home, food and health care, education and religious freedom.

I would be happy to answer questions.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you very much, Mr. Wehling.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wehling follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT L. WEHLING, FORMER CHAIRMAN, ADVERTISING COUNCIL, AND RETIRED GLOBAL MARKETING OFFICER, PROCTER & GAMBLE

Chairman Hyde, Committee Members, Guests

My name is Bob Wehling. I currently serve as co-chair of the Ad Council Advisory Committee which coordinates the bulk of public service ads in the U.S. Prior to that I was Chairman of the Ad Council. I retired from Procter & Gamble in August after