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Were we to expand this model beyond the Middle East, we could bring both surrogate and VOA programming elements into one, coordinated programming stream. In this context, the surrogates and VOA would be content providers supplying programming within a global broadcasting network. The network would be maintained by the International Broadcasting Bureau, which also operates under the Broadcasting Board of Governors and has had since 1994 the function of consolidating broadcasting operations.

Now, a network framework would in no way diminish the respective missions of the broadcasters; rather, I firmly believe, it would strengthen them. It would let them focus on what they do best, which is produce top-quality programming. Responsibility for signal delivery, research, general administration, etc. would fall to the International Broadcasting Bureau. The network would also serve to eliminate considerable duplication of effort that still plagues U.S. international broadcasting. President Bush has been clear since September 11 that we must anticipate that the war against terrorism will be long and complex. We see in the headlines everyday how central to the overall anti-terrorism effort the public diplomacy component is.

U.S. international broadcasting has played a key role in every major world conflict and crisis in which the United States has been engaged over the last 60 years. In every one of these, World War II and the Cold War especially, our government-supported overseas broadcasting has been a major contributing factor in our country's success. We stand ready and able to contribute further now.

We know how to make U.S. international broadcasting robust in every quarter of the world. We simply have to use the same broadcasting techniques and technologies that drive the best commercial broadcasting today. These have worked everywhere they have been tried.

We also have a vision for how to accomplish this. If we dramatically expand our broadcasting, as I believe we must, we then need to rethink how we are organized to carry out this work.

And so I come full circle. For U.S. international broadcasting to be as effective as I know it can be I believe we must move toward a global, research-driven U.S. government broadcasting network that fulfills the missions of both the surrogate radios and the Voice of America by programming their distinct content in state-of-theart 24/7 formats on the channels-FM, AM, audio and video satellite channels, and shortwave that our audiences use and we control.

I appreciate the opportunity to provide you with my views on how to make U.S. public diplomacy more effective through U.S. international broadcasting. I'd be happy to answer any questions you or other members of the Committee might have. Chairman HYDE. Ambassador Walker.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE EDWARD S. WALKER, JR., PRESIDENT, MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE, AND FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO EGYPT, ISRAEL AND THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, AND FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Ambassador WALKER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I am deeply honored to have this opportunity to appear before you today, and I applaud your determination and the Committee Members' determination to enhance understanding of our country around the world.

This is no easy task. It will require many years of unwavering dedication as well as additional financial commitments. But our success in the "hearts and minds" campaign is absolutely crucial to U.S. national interests in the longer term.

Fortunately, we currently have thousands of Americans and Foreign Service nationals dedicated to this task. They are the men and the woman of our military and foreign services. I firmly believe that, regardless of our political orientations, all of us can recognize that these individuals' unflagging efforts are our first line of defense against forces of fanaticism, intolerance and bigotry worldwide.

But the catastrophes of September 11th have made painfully clear that our defenses, whether homeland, intelligence or public diplomacy, require significant reinforcement as well as a critical assessment of how we can do better.

I will focus my discussion here on the yawning divide that plagues our relations with the Middle East and their perceptions of us.

I returned on Sunday, November 11th, from a 3-week visit to the Middle East that included stops in Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and Saudi Arabia. Let me reassure you, Mr. Chairman, we are being heard in the region, from Cairo to Riyadh. When President Bush speaks, he commands a substantial audience.

The problem is not one of inadequate coverage of our policies, public statements or rationale for the war against terrorism. On the contrary, every statement by every distinguished policymaker in Washington is carried in one way or another and often, unfortunately, inaccurately or out of context by a wide range of media outlets. I have some personal experience with headlines and leads that capture the reader's attention but little of the actual substance of what is being said.

Public diplomacy must be much more than a convenient packaging technique for our foreign policy. It should be a means of promoting two-way communication between the U.S. and diverse peoples of the world, of enhancing our foreign policy through a comprehensive understanding of the world around us. There is absolutely no substitute for listening.

Quite frankly, the refrain throughout the region focuses on our perceived indifference to hearing and understanding viewpoints that differ with ours. We are often accused of being arrogant. In my meetings with senior government officials, business leaders, academics and the press, this seemingly one-sided approach to diplomacy has engendered real frustration with our campaign. Every country in the region has fought terrorism, many for more than two decades. There are genuine shared interests and common causes but a very real reluctance to be more publicly engaged, due in large part to uncertainty about our future objectives and how these may or may not be appropriate to their own national interests.

A second refrain in the region is that our policy is antiseptic and uncaring about its impact on people-civilians in Afghanistan, the suppressed in Iraq, and above all the Palestinians. We may not share the depth of conviction that is present in the Arab and Islamic worlds regarding the plight of the Palestinian people, for example, or the U.S. responsibility to right the perceived wrong, but we have to understand that these sentiments are absolutely genuine and that in this connection we are perceived too often as being uncaring. This we can correct.

I should note that I received all of the above criticism from some of our closest Western allies as well. This should not be construed only as the self-serving opinion of a region that is fraught with conflicts and problems whose origins have little to do with U.S. policy. Of course, our natural interests must and should come first. But

that should not exclude a more nuanced understanding of the region in which we are operating.

One clear perception that I had from every country was that the problem was getting worse because the young, those under 25, are more radical and more inclined toward fundamentalism and antiAmericanism than their fathers. This is bad news, indeed, and argues that we must target the next generation in the next steps of our public diplomacy campaign.

In short, our campaign against terrorism needs more than just military support. It needs additional resources to be committed to the public diplomacy effort-more exchanges, more interaction between our peoples.

We have a number of potential suggestions which I have in the larger text but will leave out for time's sake here. In any event, these suggestions are just a few thoughts.

There are many different possibilities. But the key components must be to put a human face on our message, to be sensitive to and address our audience, to focus more on the next generation, and to be perfectly clear about our message, even when it is unpleasant. Nothing damages us more than confusion about our aims and interests.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Ambassador.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Walker follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE EDWARD S. WALKER, JR., PRESIDENT, MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE, AND FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO EGYPT, ISRAEL AND THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, AND FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

I am deeply honored to have this opportunity to appear before you today and I applaud your determination to enhance understanding of our country around the world. This is no easy task. It will require many years of unwavering dedication as Iwell as additional financial commitments. But our success in the "hearts and minds" campaign is absolutely crucial to U.S. national interests in the longer term.

Fortunately, we currently have thousands of Americans and foreign nationals dedicated to this task: they are the men and women of our military and foreign services. I firmly believe that, regardless of our political orientations, all of us can recognize that these individuals unflagging efforts are our first line of defense against forces of fanaticism, intolerance and bigotry worldwide.

But the catastrophes of September 11 have made painfully clear that our defenses, whether homeland or intelligence or public diplomacy, require significant reinforcement as well as a critical assessment of how we can do better. On the public diplomacy front, we are fortunate to have in this room a number of distinguished individuals who had the foresight to begin addressing these shortcomings long before September 11. Their contributions and insights should play a significant role in defining the scope and objectives for our public diplomacy strategy.

I will focus my discussion here on the yawning divide that plagues our relations with the Middle East, and their perceptions of us. I returned on Sunday (November 11, 2001) from a three-week visit to the Middle East that included stops in Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Israel, the Palestinian Authority and Saudi Arabia. And let me reassure you: we are being heard in the region. From Cairo to Riyadh, when President Bush speaks, he commands a substantial audience. The problem is not one of inadequate coverage of our policies, public statements or rationale for the war against terrorism. On the contrary, every statement by every distinguished policymaker in Washington is carried in one way or another, and often inaccurately or out of context, by a wide range of media outlets. I have some personal experience with headlines and leads that capture the reader's attention but little of the actual substance revealed a few paragraphs down the page.

When I went to the region, I was bombarded with opinions assailing the New York Times, Washington Post and Wall Street Journal for their editorials and several specific articles; when I came home, I heard and read incensed opinions on

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similarly negative viewpoints found in Al Ahram, the Jordan Times and the Daily Star.

Some would argue that we must speak louder and slower; others, that one-way communication, from the U.S. to the region will correct for our past inadequacies. In my 34 years of public service, almost all of it spent in the Middle East, I have never found these techniques to be effective. In fact, they are counterproductive. Public diplomacy must be much more than a convenient packaging technique for our foreign policy; it should be a means of promoting two-way communication between the U.S. and diverse peoples of the world, of enhancing our foreign policy through a comprehensive understanding of the world around us. There is absolutely no substitute for listening.

Quite frankly, the refrain throughout the region focuses on our perceived indifference to hearing and understanding viewpoints that differ with ours. We are often accused of being arrogant. In my meetings with senior government officials, business leaders, academics and the press, this seemingly one-sided approach to diplomacy has engendered real frustration with our campaign against terrorism. Every country in the region has fought terrorism, many for more than two decades. There are genuine shared interests and common causes, but a very real reluctance to be more publicly engaged due, in large part, to uncertainty about our future objectives and how these may or may not be appropriate to their own national interests.

A second refrain in the region is that our policy is antiseptic and uncaring about its impact on people civilians in Afghanistan, the suppressed in Iraq and above all the Palestinians. The issue of Palestine continues to be an open wound in the Middle East. In September, I stated in my testimony before the HIRC Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia that the Israeli-Palestinian issue has been allowed to fester for far too long. A tour of the region just reinforces that view. We may not share the depth of conviction that is present in the Arab and Islamic worlds regarding the plight of the Palestinian people and the U.S. responsibility to right the perceived wrong, but we have to understand that these sentiments are absolutely genuine and that, in this connection, we are perceived too often as being uncaring. This we can correct.

It is not just "why do they hate us" but "why do we fear them". There is a duality here, a very real set of misconceptions on both sides. We cannot effectively address our image overseas, increasing a more positive understanding of our culture and freedoms without first recognizing that we have substantial work to do ourselves in understanding and empathizing with the concerns of others.

I should note that I have received all of the above criticism from some of our closest Western allies as well. This should not be construed only as the self-serving opinion of a region that is fraught with conflicts and problems whose origins have little to do with U.S. policy. Of course, our national interest must and should come first. But that should not exclude a more nuanced understanding of the region in which we are operating. It is complicated, its history is rife with tortuous internecine conflicts that, in many cases, have only recently been resolved. And one clear perception I had from every country was that the problem was getting worse because the young, those under 25, are more radical and inclined toward fundamentalism and anti-Americanism than their fathers. This is bad news indeed and argues that we must target the next generation in the "next steps" of our public diplomacy campaign.

In short, our campaign against terrorism needs more than just military support, it needs additional resources to be committed to the public diplomacy effort: more exchanges, more interaction between our peoples. For example, at MEI we are working with the Ford Foundation on a proposal that would establish an exchange program for Egyptian and U.S. journalists. The impact of such exchanges, including ones between Hollywood and the film and TV industries of the region, cannot be underestimated. A member of my staff was a Fulbright recipient, and she attests to its tremendous impact both on her life and that of those she interacted with in Damascus, Syria.

That is one aspect of a longer-term approach. Some short-term actions we should consider include:

• Coordination between Hollywood and VOA to develop professional-grade programming for local broadcast outlets.

• Involving Hollywood with film industry in Cairo and Beirut, for example: designing PSAs for broadcast on state-run TV, exchanges of technical/creative staffs.

• Greater engagement with multiple local outlets-Al Jazeera is not the only station: work with state-run media for guest bookings.

• Design supplemental materials in Arabic on American studies for elementary and secondary school students.

• Expand programs of email Pen pals, establishing networks of communication between US and Middle Eastern schools.

• Tell the human interest story: remove restriction on USAID from advertising their good works; advance and publicize the good work of U.S.-based NGOs. Develop a resource base of prominent Americans, including Arab-Americans, who can be our informal ambassadors.

• Ensure that we speak to the local audience, differentiating between countries- -one size does not fit all—and stop addressing Washington when we are trying to address Riyadh.

These are just a few thoughts with many more possibilities out there. The key components must be to put a human face on our message, to be sensitive to and address our audience, to focus more on the next generation, and to be perfectly clear about our message even when it must be unpleasant. Nothing damages us more than confusion about our aims and intentions. Thank you.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Leslie.

STATEMENT OF JOHN W. LESLIE, JR., CHAIRMAN, WEBER SHANDWICK WORLDWIDE

Mr. LESLIE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Committee. It is a pleasure to be here today.

As you have noted, I spent the better part of my career working in developing countries with individuals and organizations who sought how best to use communications to achieve their public policy objectives. So, like many others, I have watched with some frustration the consequences of our failure to effectively communicate with the 1.2 billion people of the Muslim world.

And I use the world "people" deliberately. You made this point, Mr. Chairman, in your opening remarks. Historically as a Nation we have communicated government to government and not people to people. And that has been exacerbated, I think since the end of the Cold War when we cut back on public diplomacy in the false belief that it was somehow less important to communicate our values. It would be as if Members of this Committee campaigned only to civic leaders in their districts and not to the rank and file voters. Nothing better illustrates this point than the fact that we have apparently convinced leaders in the Muslim world that bin Laden was responsible for September 11th, but poll after poll shows that 80 to 90 percent of the people in the region don't believe that he was responsible.

That said, all of us are aware that the deep-seated hatred in the Muslim world is no more the result of a communications failure by the United States than the destruction of the World Trade Center was the result of an intelligence failure. It is the result of many conditions: widespread poverty, political repression, the ongoing Palestinian-Israeli dispute. America's involvement in these, whether real or perceived, is more responsible for public opinion in the Muslim world than is American public diplomacy. The fact of the matter is that in most of these countries, as you know, the only acceptable form of political expression has been to be anti-American or anti-Israel.

So what do we do about it? I think there are six courses of action that are central to communicating the message of America.

First, we should heed, I think, the Powell Doctrine from the Persian Gulf War and apply it now to communications. That means we

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