305 STEVENS, J., dissenting tory entitlement, the citizen's right of access to the independent, private bar is itself an aspect of liberty that is of critical importance in our democracy." Just as I disagree with the present Court's crabbed view of the concept of "liberty," so do I reject its apparent unawareness of the function of the independent lawyer as a guardian of our freedom. 24 23 In my view, regardless of the nature of the dispute between the sovereign and the citizen-whether it be a criminal trial, a proceeding to terminate parental rights, a claim for social security benefits, a dispute over welfare benefits, or a pension claim asserted by the widow of a soldier who was killed on the battlefield-the citizen's right to consult an independent lawyer and to retain that lawyer to speak on his or her behalf is an aspect of liberty that is priceless. It The Solicitor General cavalierly states that "[n]othing in the First Amendment suggests that the fee limitation is unconstitutional because it restricts a claimant in hiring a private lawyer where other, adequate representation is available without charge." Brief for Appellants 47. This statement misses a principle so plain and fundamental that I would think it would not need to be stated: Every citizen in this country is presumed to be unrestricted in consulting or employing an attorney on any matter, or in making the decision that legal representation for any purpose is not needed. As to this proposition, it makes no difference whether, as the Solicitor General claims, "the existing VA claims procedure is fair and adequate without privately retained attorneys," ibid., a conclusion that the District Court rejected. The statute, moreover, on the one hand, recognizes and allows legal representation, but on the other hand restricts the veteran's right to choose and to consult a legal representative in any meaningful manner, thus virtually reducing the right to counsel to nonexistence. 23 Compare Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S. 215, 225–226 (1976), with id., at 230 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). "That function was, however, well understood by Jack Cade and his followers, characters who are often forgotten and whose most famous line is often misunderstood. Dick's statement ("The first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers") was spoken by a rebel, not a friend of liberty. See W. Shakespeare, King Henry VI, pt. II, Act IV, scene 2, line 72. As a careful reading of that text will reveal, Shakespeare insightfully realized that disposing of lawyers is a step in the direction of a totalitarian form of government. STEVENS, J., dissenting 473 U. S. should not be bargained away on the notion that a totalitarian appraisal of the mass of claims processed by the Veterans' Administration does not identify an especially high probability of error. 25 Unfortunately, the reason for the Court's mistake today is all too obvious. It does not appreciate the value of individual liberty. I respectfully dissent. 25 According to the Court, "process which is sufficient for the large majority of a group of claims is by constitutional definition sufficient for all of them." Ante, at 330. Syllabus SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF GRAND RAPIDS ET AL. v. BALL ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT No. 83-990. Argued December 5, 1984-Decided July 1, 1985 Petitioner School District adopted two programs - Shared Time and Community Education-that provide classes to nonpublic school students at public expense in classrooms located in and leased from the nonpublic schools. The Shared Time program offers classes during the regular schoolday that are intended to supplement the "core curriculum" courses required by the State. The Shared Time teachers are full-time employees of the public schools, but a "significant portion" of them had previously taught in nonpublic schools. The Community Education program offers classes at the conclusion of the regular schoolday in voluntary courses, some of which are not offered at the public schools but others of which are. Community Education teachers are part-time public school employees who for the most part are otherwise employed full time by the same nonpublic school in which their Community Education classes are held. Of the 41 private schools involved in these programs, 40 are identifiably religious schools. The students attending both programs are the same students who otherwise attend the particular school in which the classes are held. Respondent taxpayers filed suit in Federal District Court against the School District and certain state officials, alleging that both programs violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. The court agreed, entered a judgment for respondents, and enjoined further operation of the programs. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: The Shared Time and Community Education programs have the "primary or principal" effect of advancing religion, and therefore violate the dictates of the Establishment Clause. Pp. 381-398. (a) Even the praiseworthy, secular purpose of providing for the education of schoolchildren cannot validate government aid to parochial schools when the aid has the effect of promoting a single religion or religion generally or when the aid unduly entangles the government in matters religious. Pp. 381-383. (b) The challenged programs have the effect of impermissibly promoting religion in three ways. First, the state-paid teachers, influenced by the pervasively sectarian nature of the religious schools in which they work, may subtly or overtly indoctrinate the students in particular religious tenets at public expense. Second, the symbolic union of church and state inherent in the provision of secular state-provided public instruction in the religious school buildings threatens to convey a message of state support for religion to students and to the general public. Third, the programs in effect subsidize the religious functions of the parochial schools by taking over a substantial portion of their responsibility for teaching secular subjects. Pp. 384-398. 718 F.2d 1389, affirmed. BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. BURGER, C. J., post, p. 398, and O'CONNOR, J., post, p. 398, filed opinions concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. WHITE, J., post, p. 400, and REHNQUIST, J., post, p. 400, filed dissenting opinions. Kenneth F. Ripple, Special Assistant Attorney General of Michigan, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were William S. Farr, John R. Oostema, Stuart D. Hubbell, Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Louis J. Caruso, Solicitor General, and Gerald F. Young, Assistant Attorney General. Michael W. McConnell argued the cause pro hac vice for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Lee, Acting Assistant Attorney General Willard, Deputy Solicitor General Bator, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Kuhl, Anthony J. Steinmeyer, and Michael Jay Singer. A. E. Dick Howard argued the cause for respondents. On the brief was Albert R. Dilley.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs (COLPA) by Nathan Lewin, Dennis Rapps, and Daniel D. Chazin; and for the United States Catholic Conference by Wilfred R. Caron and John A. Liekweg. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Jewish Congress et al. by Marc D. Stern, Ronald A. Krauss, Jack D. Novik, Burt Neuborne, Charles S. Sims, Justin Finger, and Jeffrey Sinensky; for Americans United for Separation of Church and State by Lee Boothby; and for the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs et al. by John W. Baker. 373 Opinion of the Court JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. The School District of Grand Rapids, Michigan, adopted two programs in which classes for nonpublic school students are financed by the public school system, taught by teachers hired by the public school system, and conducted in "leased" classrooms in the nonpublic schools. Most of the nonpublic schools involved in the programs are sectarian religious schools. This case raises the question whether these programs impermissibly involve the government in the support of sectarian religious activities and thus violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. I At issue in this case are the Community Education and Shared Time programs offered in the nonpublic schools of Grand Rapids, Michigan. These programs, first instituted in the 1976-1977 school year, provide classes to nonpublic school students at public expense in classrooms located in and leased from the local nonpublic schools. The Shared Time program offers classes during the regular schoolday that are intended to be supplementary to the "core curriculum" courses that the State of Michigan requires as a part of an accredited school program. Among the subjects offered are "remedial" and "enrichment" mathematics, "remedial" and "enrichment" reading, art, music, and physical education. A typical nonpublic school student attends these classes for one or two class periods per week; approximately "ten percent of any given nonpublic school student's time during the academic year would consist of Shared Time instruction." Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. School Dist. of Grand Rapids, 546 F. Supp. 1071, 1079 (WD Mich. 1982). Although Shared Time itself is a program offered only in the nonpublic schools, there was testimony that the courses included in that program are offered, albeit perhaps in a somewhat different form, in the |