234 BRENNAN, J., dissenting Second, the opinion relies heavily on the supposedly "anomalous" result that, if the Eleventh Amendment were read literally, "in cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, a State may be sued in the federal courts by its own citizens, though it cannot be sued for a like cause of action by the citizens of other States, or of a foreign state." Id., at 10. Even if such an "anomaly" existed, it would not justify judicial rewriting of the Eleventh Amendment and Article III and the wholesale disregard of precedents. But in any event a close look at the historical record reveals that the "anomaly" can easily be avoided without a general expansion of a constitutionalized sovereign immunity doctrine. The Eleventh Amendment can and should be interpreted in accordance with its original purpose to reestablish the ancient doctrine of sovereign immunity in state-law causes of action based on the state-citizen and state-alien diversity clauses; in such a state-law action, the identity of the parties is not alone sufficient to permit federal jurisdiction. If federal jurisdiction is based on the existence of a federal question or some other clause of Article III, however, the Eleventh Amendment has no relevance. There is thus no Article III limitation on otherwise proper suits against States by citizens, noncitizens, or aliens, and no "anomaly" that requires such drastic "correction.” The Court has repeatedly relied on Hans as establishing a broad principle of state immunity from suit in federal court." The historical record demonstrates that, if Hans was a con "In Ex parte New York, 256 U. S. 490 (1921), the Court even extended Hans (or its view of Hans) to admiralty jurisdiction, thus overruling Justice Washington's 110-year-old holding that the Eleventh Amendment did not apply to admiralty actions. See United States v. Bright, 24 F. Cas. 1232 (No. 14,647) (CC Pa. 1809), discussed supra, at 292. BLACKMUN, J., dissenting 473 U. S. stitutional holding, it rested on misconceived history and misguided logic. 55 The doctrine that has thus been created is pernicious. In an era when sovereign immunity has been generally recognized by courts and legislatures as an anachronistic and unnecessary remnant of a feudal legal system, see, e. g., Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 57 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P. 2d 457 (1961); W. Prosser, The Law of Torts 984-987 (4th ed. 1971), the Court has aggressively expanded its scope. If this doctrine were required to enhance the liberty of our people in accordance with the Constitution's protections, I could accept it. If the doctrine were required by the structure of the federal system created by the Framers, I could accept it. Yet the current doctrine intrudes on the ideal of liberty under law by protecting the States from the consequences of their illegal conduct. And the decision obstructs the sound operation of our federal system by limiting the ability of Congress to take steps it deems necessary and proper to achieve national goals within its constitutional authority. I respectfully dissent. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE MARSHALL, and JUSTICE STEVENS join, dissenting. I, too, dissent and join JUSTICE BRENNAN's opinion. Its exhaustive historical review and analysis demonstrate the Eleventh Amendment error in which the Court today persists. As JUSTICE BRENNAN shows, if Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890), is a constitutional holding, it then reads into the Amendment words that are not there and that can 55 If Hans was not a constitutional holding, however, its use of the Madison, Marshall, and Hamilton comments would be substantially more justifiable; the relevance of this material was simply to show that the common law did not recognize a cause of action on a debt against a sovereign. Since Congress had not created any such action, the Court justifiably refused to do so itself. 234 BLACKMUN, J., dissenting not be reconciled with any principled view of congressional power; JUSTICE BRENNAN is surely correct when he says, ante, at 302, that the case rests on "misconceived history and misguided logic." Thus, the Court today compounds a longstanding constitutional mistake. The shield against just legal obligations afforded the States by the Court's prevailing construction of the Eleventh Amendment as an "exemplification" of the rule of sovereign immunity, ante, at 239, n. 2, quoting Ex parte New York, 256 U. S. 490, 497 (1921), simply cannot be reconciled with the federal system envisioned by our Basic Document and its Amendments. Indeed, though of more mature vintage, the Court's Eleventh Amendment cases spring from the same soil as the Tenth Amendment jurisprudence recently abandoned in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U. S. 528 (1985). Both in its modern reading of Hans, supra, and in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976), the Court, in derogation of otherwise unquestioned congressional power, gave broad scope to circumscribed language by reference to principles of federalism said to inform that language. The intuition underlying Hans and its contemporary progeny is no truer to the federal structure or to a proper view of congressional power than was that underlying National League of Cities. But I would dissent from the Court's spare opinion and predictable result on other grounds as well. There is no *See Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542, 557 (1975) (dissenting opinion) ("As it was not the Eleventh Amendment by its terms which justified the result in Hans, it is not the Tenth Amendment by its terms that prohibits congressional action which sets a mandatory ceiling on the wages of all state employees. Both Amendments are simply examples of the understanding of those who drafted and ratified the Constitution that the States were sovereign in many respects, and that although their legislative authority could be superseded by Congress in many areas where Congress was competent to act, Congress was nonetheless not free to deal with a State as if it were just another individual or business enterprise subject to regulation"). STEVENS, J., dissenting 473 U. S. need to expatiate on them here, where so much already has been written. It suffices to say that I adhere to the views expressed in the dissenting opinion in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 688 (1974). See also Florida Dept. of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 U. S. 147, 151 (1981) (dissenting statement). Thus, I would affirm the judgment here on the ground that California, as a willing recipient of federal funds under the Rehabilitation Act, consented to suit when it accepted such assistance. And a fair reading of the statute and its legislative history indicates for me that Congress produced the Act in exercise of its power under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and thereby abrogated any claim of immunity the State otherwise might raise. JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting. Because my decision to join JUSTICE BRENNAN's dissent is a departure from the opinion I expressed in Florida Dept. of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 U. S. 147, 151 (1981), a word of explanation is in order. As I then explained, notwithstanding my belief that Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974), was incorrectly decided, see 450 U. S., at 151, n. 2, I then concluded that the doctrine of stare decisis required that Edelman be followed. Since then, however, the Court has not felt constrained by stare decisis in its expansion of the protective mantle of sovereign immunity— having repudiated at least 28 cases in its decision in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U. S. 89, 165-166, n. 50 (1984) (STEVENS, J., dissenting)—and additional study has made it abundantly clear that not only Edelman, but Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890), as well, can properly be characterized as "egregiously incorrect." 450 U. S., at 153. I am now persuaded that a fresh examination of the Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence will produce benefits that far outweigh "the consequences of further unraveling the doctrine of stare decisis" in this area of the law. Id., at 155. Syllabus WALTERS, ADMINISTRATOR OF VETERANS' AFFAIRS, ET AL. v. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF RADIATION SURVIVORS ET AL. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA No. 84-571. Argued March 27, 1985-Decided June 28, 1985 Title 38 U. S. C. § 3404(c) limits to $10 the fee that may be paid an attorney or agent who represents a veteran seeking benefits from the Veterans' Administration (VA) for service-connected death or disability. Appellees (two veterans' organizations, three individual veterans, and a veteran's widow) brought an action in Federal District Court claiming that the fee limitation denied them any realistic opportunity to obtain legal representation in presenting their claims to the VA and hence violated their rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and under the First Amendment. The District Court agreed and entered a nationwide "preliminary injunction" barring appellants from enforcing the fee limitation. Held: 1. This Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1252, which grants the Court jurisdiction over an appeal "from an interlocutory or final judgment, decree or order of any court of the United States ... holding an Act of Congress unconstitutional in any civil action . . . to which the United States or any of its agencies, or any officer or employee thereof, as such officer or employee, is a party." McLucas v. DeChamplain, 421 U. S. 21. The injunction at issue creates precisely the problem to which § 1252 was addressed-to have this Court directly review decisions involving the exercise of judicial power to impair the enforcement of an Act of Congress on constitutional grounds, where the decision has effects beyond the controversy before the court belowsince it enjoins the operation of the fee limitation on constitutional grounds across the country and under all circumstances. Whether or not the injunction is framed as a "holding" of unconstitutionality is irrelevant, as long as it enjoined the statute's operation. Pp. 316-319. 2. The fee limitation provision of § 3404(c) does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Pp. 319-334. (a) Invalidation of the fee limitation would frustrate Congress' principal goal of wanting the veteran to get the entirety of the benefits award without having to divide it with an attorney. Invalidation would |