implausible to suppose that Congress intended to combat the problem of copyright infringement by the circuitous route hypothesized by the Government. See United States v. Smith, 686 F. 2d 234, 246 (CA5 1982). Of course, the enactment of criminal penalties for copyright infringement would not prevent Congress from choosing as well to criminalize the interstate shipment of infringing goods. But in dealing with the distribution of such goods, Congress has never thought it necessary to distinguish between intrastate and interstate activity. Nor does any good reason to do so occur to us. In sum, the premise of §2314-the need to fill with federal action an enforcement chasm created by limited state jurisdiction-simply does not apply to the conduct the Government seeks to reach here.

C

The history of copyright infringement provisions affords additional reason to hesitate before extending § 2314 to cover the interstate shipments in this case. Not only has Congress chiefly relied on an array of civil remedies to provide copyright holders protection against infringement, see 17 U. S. C. §§ 502-505, but in exercising its power to render criminal certain forms of copyright infringement, it has acted with exceeding caution.

The first full-fledged criminal provisions appeared in the Copyright Act of 1909, and specified that misdemeanor penalties of up to one year in jail or a fine between $100 and $1,000, or both, be imposed upon "any person who willfully and for profit" infringed a protected copyright." This provision

"Act of Mar. 4, 1909, § 28, 35 Stat. 1082. Interestingly, however, the 1909 Act did not extend criminal liability to infringement by unauthorized mechanical reproduction of copyrighted musical compositions subject to compulsory licensing, the category of infringement underlying the § 2314 counts here. See § 25(e), 35 Stat. 1081. Congress did not remove this bar until the Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391, which, while for the first time extending federal copyright coverage to sound recordings, see n. 4, supra, also made willful infringement of copyright in

15

16

was little used. In 1974, however, Congress amended the section, by then 17 U. S. C. § 104 (1976 ed.) by the 1947 revision, substantially to increase penalties for record piracy.' The new version retained the existing language, but supplemented it with a new subsection (b), which provided that one who "willfully and for profit" infringed a copyright in sound recordings would be subject to a fine of up to $25,000 or imprisonment for up to one year, or both. 17 U. S. C. § 104(b) (1976 ed.)." The legislative history demonstrates that in increasing the penalties available for this category of infringement, Congress carefully calibrated the penalty to the problem: it had come to recognize that "record piracy is so profitable that ordinary penalties fail to deter prospective offenders." H. R. Rep. No. 93-1581, p. 4 (1974). Even so, because it considered record piracy primarily an economic offense, Congress, after serious consideration, rejected a proposal to increase the available term of imprisonment to three years for a first offense and seven years for a subsequent offense. Ibid.

musical compositions subject to the general criminal provision. See 85 Stat. 392.

Congress first provided criminal penalties for copyright infringement in the Act of Jan. 6, 1897, 29 Stat. 481, which made a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment for one year, of the unlawful performance or presentation, done willfully and for profit, of a copyrighted dramatic or musical composition. See also Act of May 31, 1790, § 2, 1 Stat. 124 (fixed civil penalties, one-half payable to the United States, for unauthorized copying of copyrighted book, chart, or map). See generally Young, Criminal Copyright Infringement and a Step Beyond, reprinted in 30 ASCAP Copyright Law Symposium 157 (1983); Gawthrop, An Inquiry Into Criminal Copyright Infringement, reprinted in 20 ASCAP Copyright Law Symposium 154 (1972).

15 Act of July 30, 1947, ch. 391, 61 Stat. 652.

16 Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. 93–573, 88 Stat. 1873.

"A second violation subjected the offender to a fine of up to $50,000 or imprisonment for not more than two years, or both. 17 U. S. C. § 104(b) (1976 ed.). See H. R. Rep. No. 93-1581, p. 4 (1974).

When in 1976, after more than 20 years of study, Congress adopted a comprehensive revision of the Copyright Act, see Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U. S. 153, 159–161 (1985); Sony Corp., 464 U. S., at 462-463, n. 9 (dissenting opinion), it again altered the scope of the criminal infringement actions, albeit cautiously. Section 101 of the new Act provided:

"Any person who infringes a copyright willfully and for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both: Provided, however, That any person who infringes willfully and for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain the copyright in a sound recording afforded by subsections (1), (2), or (3) of section 106 or the copyright in a motion picture afforded by subsections (1), (3), or (4) of section 106 shall be fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both, for the first such offense and shall be fined not more than $50,000 or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both, for any subsequent offense." 17 U. S. C. §506(a) (1976 ed., Supp. V).

Two features of this provision are noteworthy: first, Congress extended to motion pictures the enhanced penalties applicable by virtue of prior § 104 to infringement of rights in sound recordings; and, second, Congress recited the infringing uses giving rise to liability. It is also noteworthy that despite the urging of representatives of the film industry, see Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H. R. 2223 before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 716 (1975) (statement of Jack Valenti, president of the Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.), and the initial inclination of the Senate,

see S. Rep. No. 94-473, p. 146 (1975), Congress declined once again to provide felony penalties for copyright infringement involving sound recordings and motion pictures.

Finally, by the Piracy and Counterfeiting Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-180, 96 Stat. 91, Congress chose to address the problem of bootlegging and piracy of records, tapes, and films by imposing felony penalties on such activities. Section 5 of the 1982 Act revised 17 U. S. C. § 506(a) to provide that "[a]ny person who infringes a copyright willfully and for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain shall be punished as provided in section 2319 of title 18." Section 2319(b)(1), in turn, was then enacted to provide for a fine of up to $250,000, or imprisonment of up to five years, or both, if the offense "involves the reproduction or distribution, during any one-hundred-and-eighty-day period, of at least one thousand phonorecords or copies infringing the copyright in one or more sound recordings [or] at least sixty-five copies infringing the copyright in one or more motion pictures or other audiovisual works." Subsection (b)(2) provides for a similar fine and up to two years' imprisonment if the offense involves "more than one hundred but less than one thousand phonorecords or copies infringing the copyright in one or more sound recordings [or] more than seven but less than sixty-five copies infringing the copyright in one or more motion pictures or other audiovisual works." And subsection (b)(3) provides for a fine of not more than $25,000 and up to one year's imprisonment in any other case of willful infringement. The legislative history indicates that Congress set out from a belief that the existing misdemeanor penalties for copyright infringement were simply inadequate to deter the enormously lucrative activities of large-scale bootleggers and pirates. See 128 Cong. Rec. 9158-9159 (1982) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier); The Piracy and Counterfeiting Amendments Act of 1981: Hearings on S. 691 before the Subcommittee on Criminal Law of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 8 (1981) (statement of Renee

L. Szybala, Special Assistant to the Associate Attorney General). Accordingly, it acted to "strengthen the laws against record, tape, and film piracy" by "increas[ing] the penalties . . . for copyright infringements involving such products," thereby "bring[ing] the penalties for record and film piracy

.. into line with the enormous profits which are being reaped from such activities." S. Rep. No. 97-274, pp. 1, 7 (1981).18

Thus, the history of the criminal infringement provisions of the Copyright Act reveals a good deal of care on Congress' part before subjecting copyright infringement to serious criminal penalties. First, Congress hesitated long before imposing felony sanctions on copyright infringers. Second, when it did so, it carefully chose those areas of infringement that required severe response-specifically, sound recordings and motion pictures-and studiously graded penalties even in those areas of heightened concern. This step-bystep, carefully considered approach is consistent with Congress' traditional sensitivity to the special concerns implicated by the copyright laws.

In stark contrast, the Government's theory of this case presupposes a congressional decision to bring the felony provisions of § 2314, which make available the comparatively light fine of not more than $10,000 but the relatively harsh

18 The Act also substantially increased penalties for trafficking in counterfeit labels affixed to sound recordings, motion pictures, and other audiovisual works. 18 U. S. C. § 2318.

The dissent suggests that by providing that the new penalties "shall be in addition to any other provisions of Title 17 or any other law," 18 U. S. C. § 2319(a), Congress "implicitly" approved the interpretation of § 2314 urged by the Government. Post, at 233. Neither the text nor the legislative history of either the 1982 Act or earlier copyright legislation evidences any congressional awareness, let alone approval, of the use of § 2314 in prosecutions like the one now before us. In the absence of any such indication, we decline to read the general language appended to § 2319(a) impliedly to validate extension of § 2314 in a manner otherwise unsupported by its language and purpose.