Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S., at 123, this Court consistently has indicated that among the factors of particular significance in the inquiry are the economic impact of the challenged action and the extent to which it interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations. Id., at 124. See also Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U. S., at 1005; Prune Yard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U. S., at 83; Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U. S., at 175. Those factors simply cannot be evaluated until the administrative agency has arrived at a final, definitive position regarding how it will apply the regulations at issue to the particular land in question.

Here, for example, the jury's verdict indicates only that it found that respondent would be denied the economically feasible use of its property if it were forced to develop the subdivision in a manner that would meet each of the Commission's eight objections. It is not clear whether the jury would have found that the respondent had been denied all reasonable beneficial use of the property had any of the eight objections been met through the grant of a variance. Indeed, the expert witness who testified regarding the economic impact of the Commission's actions did not itemize the effect of each of the eight objections, so the jury would have been unable to discern how a grant of a variance from any one of the regulations at issue would have affected the profitability of the development. App. 377; see also id., at 102-104. Accordingly, until the Commission determines that no variances will be granted, it is impossible for the jury to find, on this record, whether respondent "will be unable to derive economic benefit" from the land." 12

12 The District Court's instructions allowed the jury to find a taking if it ascertained that "the regulations in question as applied to [respondent's] property denied [respondent] economically viable use of its property." Tr. 2016. That instruction seems to assume that respondent's taking theory was simply that its property was rendered valueless by the application of new zoning laws and subdivision regulations in 1980. The record indi

Respondent asserts that it should not be required to seek variances from the regulations because its suit is predicated upon 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and there is no requirement that a plaintiff exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a § 1983 action. Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents, 457 U. S. 496 (1982). The question whether administrative remedies must be exhausted is conceptually distinct, however, from the question whether an administrative action must be final before it is judicially reviewable. See FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U. S. 232, 243 (1980); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 669 F. 2d 903, 908 (CA3 1982). See generally 13A C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and

cates, however, that respondent's claim was based upon a state-law theory of "vested rights," and that the alleged "taking" was the Commission's interference with respondent's "expectation interest" in completing the development according to its original plans. The evidence that it was not economically feasible to develop just the 67 units respondent claims the Commission's actions would limit it to developing was based upon the cost of building the development according to the original plan. The expected income from the sale of the 67 units apparently was measured against the cost of the 27-hole golf course and the cost of installing water and sewer connections for a large development that would not have had to have been installed for a development of only 67 units. App. 191-197; Tr. 690; see also id., at 2154-2155. Thus, the evidence appears to indicate that it would not be profitable to develop 67 units because respondent had made various expenditures in the expectation that the development would contain far more units; the evidence does not appear to support the proposition that, aside from those "reliance" expenditures, development of 67 units on the property would not be economically feasible.

We express no view of the propriety of applying the "economic viability" test when the taking claim is based upon such a theory of "vested rights" or "expectation interest." Cf. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U. S. 51, 66 (1979) (analyzing a claim that Government regulations effected a taking by reducing expected profits). It is sufficient for our purposes to note that whether the "property" taken is viewed as the land itself or respondent's expectation interest in developing the land as it wished, it is impossible to determine the extent of the loss or interference until the Commission has decided whether it will grant a variance from the application of the regulations.

Procedure § 3532.6 (1984). While the policies underlying the two concepts often overlap, the finality requirement is concerned with whether the initial decisionmaker has arrived at a definitive position on the issue that inflicts an actual, concrete injury; the exhaustion requirement generally refers to administrative and judicial procedures by which an injured party may seek review of an adverse decision and obtain a remedy if the decision is found to be unlawful or otherwise inappropriate. Patsy concerned the latter, not the former.

The difference is best illustrated by comparing the procedure for seeking a variance with the procedures that, under Patsy, respondent would not be required to exhaust. While it appears that the State provides procedures by which an aggrieved property owner may seek a declaratory judgment regarding the validity of zoning and planning actions taken by county authorities, see Fallin v. Knox County Bd. of Comm'rs, 656 S. W. 2d 338 (Tenn. 1983); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 27-8-101, 27-9-101 to 27-9-113, and 29-14-101 to 29-14113 (1980 and Supp. 1984), respondent would not be required to resort to those procedures before bringing its §1983 action, because those procedures clearly are remedial. Similarly, respondent would not be required to appeal the Commission's rejection of the preliminary plat to the Board of Zoning Appeals, because the Board was empowered, at most, to review that rejection, not to participate in the Commission's decisionmaking.

Resort to those procedures would result in a judgment whether the Commission's actions violated any of respondent's rights. In contrast, resort to the procedure for obtaining variances would result in a conclusive determination by the Commission whether it would allow respondent to develop the subdivision in the manner respondent proposed. The Commission's refusal to approve the preliminary plat does not determine that issue; it prevents respondent from developing its subdivision without obtaining the necessary variances, but leaves open the possibility that respondent

may develop the subdivision according to its plat after obtaining the variances. In short, the Commission's denial of approval does not conclusively determine whether respondent will be denied all reasonable beneficial use of its property, and therefore is not a final, reviewable decision.

B

A second reason the taking claim is not yet ripe is that respondent did not seek compensation through the procedures the State has provided for doing so. 13 The Fifth Amendment does not proscribe the taking of property; it proscribes taking without just compensation. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U. S., at 297, n. 40. Nor does the Fifth Amendment require that just compensation be paid in advance of, or contemporaneously with, the taking; all that is required is that a "reasonable, certain and adequate provision for obtaining compensation"" exist at the time of the taking. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U. S. 102, 124-125 (1974) (quoting Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas R. Co., 135 U. S. 641, 659 (1890)). See also Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U. S., at 1016; Yearsley v. W. A. Ross Construction Co., 309 U. S. 18, 21 (1940); Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U. S. 95, 104 (1932). If the government has provided an adequate process for obtaining compensation, and if resort to that process "yield[s] just compensation," then the property owner "has no claim against

"Again, it is necessary to contrast the procedures provided for review of the Commission's actions, such as those for obtaining a declaratory judgment, see Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-14-101 to 29-14-113 (1980), with procedures that allow a property owner to obtain compensation for a taking. Exhaustion of review procedures is not required. See Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents, 457 U. S. 496 (1982). As we have explained, however, because the Fifth Amendment proscribes takings without just compensation, no constitutional violation occurs until just compensation has been denied. The nature of the constitutional right therefore requires that a property owner utilize procedures for obtaining compensation before bringing a § 1983 action.

the Government" for a taking. Monsanto, 467 U. S., at 1013, 1018, n. 21. Thus, we have held that taking claims against the Federal Government are premature until the property owner has availed itself of the process provided by the Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1491. Monsanto, 467 U. S., at 1016-1020. Similarly, if a State provides an adequate procedure for seeking just compensation, the property owner cannot claim a violation of the Just Compensation Clause until it has used the procedure and been denied just compensation.

The recognition that a property owner has not suffered a violation of the Just Compensation Clause until the owner has unsuccessfully attempted to obtain just compensation through the procedures provided by the State for obtaining such compensation is analogous to the Court's holding in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S. 527 (1981). There, the Court ruled that a person deprived of property through a random and unauthorized act by a state employee does not state a claim under the Due Process Clause merely by alleging the deprivation of property. In such a situation, the Constitution does not require predeprivation process because it would be impossible or impracticable to provide a meaningful hearing before the deprivation. Instead, the Constitution is satisfied by the provision of meaningful postdeprivation process. Thus, the State's action is not "complete" in the sense of causing a constitutional injury "unless or until the state fails to provide an adequate postdeprivation remedy for the property loss." Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U. S. 517, 532, n. 12 (1984). Likewise, because the Constitution does not require pretaking compensation, and is instead satisfied by a reasonable and adequate provision for obtaining compensation after the taking, the State's action here is not "complete" until the State fails to provide adequate compensation for the taking."

"The analogy to Parratt is imperfect because Parratt does not extend to situations such as those involved in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U. S. 422 (1982), in which the deprivation of property is effected pursu