statute contained a provision for "legal or equitable" relief that was described in both the Senate and House Committee Reports as authorizing "the full range of legal and equitable remedies available in both state and federal courts." H. R. Rep. No. 93-533, p. 17 (1973), 2 Leg. Hist. 2364; S. Rep. No. 93–127, p. 35 (1973), 1 Leg. Hist. 621. But that language appeared in Committee Reports describing a version of the bill before the debate on the floor and before the Senate-House Conference Committee had finalized the operative language." In the bill passed by the House of Representatives and ultimately adopted by the Conference Committee the reference to legal relief was deleted. The language relied on by respondent and by the Court of Appeals below, therefore, is of little help in understanding whether Congress intended to make fiduciaries personally liable to beneficiaries for extracontractual damages.

The six carefully integrated civil enforcement provisions found in § 502(a) of the statute as finally enacted, however, provide strong evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate expressly. The assumption of inadvertent omission is rendered especially suspect upon close consideration of ERISA's interlocking, interrelated, and interdependent remedial scheme, which is in turn part of a "comprehensive and reticulated statute." Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, 446 U. S. 359, 361 (1980). If in this case, for example, the plan administrator had adhered to his initial determination that respondent was not entitled to disability benefits under the plan, respondent would have had a panoply of remedial devices at her disposal. To recover the

"This provision, which was part of H. R. 2 as passed by the Senate, provided for "[c]ivil actions for appropriate relief, legal or equitable, to redress or restrain a breach of any responsibility, obligation, or duty of a fiduciary." H. R. 2, § 693, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (Mar. 4, 1974), 3 Leg. Hist. 3816. (It was also part of earlier bills. See S. 4, § 603, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (Apr. 18. 1973), 1 Leg. Hist. 579; see also S. 1179, § 501(d), 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (Aug. 21, 1973), 1 Leg. Hist. 950.)

benefits due her, she could have filed an action pursuant to §502(a)(1)(B) to recover accrued benefits, to obtain a declaratory judgment that she is entitled to benefits under the provisions of the plan contract, and to enjoin the plan administrator from improperly refusing to pay benefits in the future. If the plan administrator's refusal to pay contractually authorized benefits had been willful and part of a larger systematic breach of fiduciary obligations, respondent in this hypothetical could have asked for removal of the fiduciary pursuant to §§ 502(a)(2) and 409. Finally, in answer to a possible concern that attorney's fees might present a barrier to maintenance of suits for small claims, thereby risking underenforcement of beneficiaries' statutory rights, it should be noted that ERISA authorizes the award of attorney's fees. See §502(g), 88 Stat. 892, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 1132(g)(1).

We are reluctant to tamper with an enforcement scheme crafted with such evident care as the one in ERISA.

As we stated in Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U. S. 11, 19 (1979): "[W]here a statute expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of reading others into it." See also Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S. 560, 571-574 (1979). "The presumption that a remedy was deliberately omitted from a statute is strongest when Congress has enacted a comprehensive legislative scheme including an integrated system of procedures for enforcement." Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U. S., at 97.15

15 See Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1, 14–15 (1981); Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U. S. 630, 639–640 (1981); California v. Sierra Club, 451 U. S. 287, 295, n. 6 (1981); National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. National Assn. of Railroad Passengers, 414 U. S. 453, 458 (1974); Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U. S. 373, 375–376 (1958); Switchmen v. National Mediation Board, 320 U. S. 297, 301 (1943); Botany Worsted Mills v. United States, 278 U. S. 282, 289 (1929).

BRENNAN, J., concurring in judgment

473 U. S.

In contrast to the repeatedly emphasized purpose to protect contractually defined benefits, there is a stark absence-in the statute itself and in its legislative history-of any reference to an intention to authorize the recovery of extracontractual damages." Because "neither the statute nor the legislative history reveals a congressional intent to create a private right of action . . . we need not carry the Cort v. Ash inquiry further." Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U. S., at 94, n. 31.

III

Thus, the relevant text of ERISA, the structure of the entire statute, and its legislative history all support the conclusion that in § 409(a) Congress did not provide, and did not intend the judiciary to imply, a cause of action for extracontractual damages caused by improper or untimely processing of benefit claims.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore

Reversed.

JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE WHITE, JUSTICE MARSHALL, and JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, concurring in the judgment.

Section 502(a) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U. S. C. § 1132(a), provides a wide array of measures to employee-benefit plan participants and beneficiaries by which they may enforce their rights under ERISA and under the terms of their plans. A partici

16 See, e. g., Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, 446 U. S. 359, 374-375 (1980); 120 Cong. Rec. 29196 (1974), 3 Leg. Hist. 4665; 119 Cong. Rec. 30041 (1973), 2 Leg. Hist. 1633.

17

Indeed, Congress was concerned lest the cost of federal standards discourage the growth of private pension plans. See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 93-533, 1, 9 (1973), 2 Leg. Hist. 2348, 2356; 120 Cong. Rec. 29949 (1974), 3 Leg. Hist. 4791; 120 Cong. Rec. 29210-29211 (1974), 3 Leg. Hist. 4706-4707.

134

BRENNAN, J., concurring in judgment

pant or beneficiary may file a civil action, for example, (1) “to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan," § 502(a)(1)(B); (2) "for appropriate relief under section 409," § 502(a)(2); and (3) "to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this title or the terms of the plan, or ... to obtain other appropriate equitable relief. . . to redress such violations,” § 502(a)(3) (emphasis added).'

This case presents a single, narrow question: whether the § 409 "appropriate relief" referred to in § 502(a)(2) includes individual recovery by a participant or beneficiary of extracontractual damages for breach of fiduciary duty. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that, because §409 broadly authorizes "such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate," participants and benefi

'Section 502(a), 88 Stat. 891, 29 U. S. C. § 1132(a), provides in full: "A civil action may be brought

"(1) by a participant or beneficiary—

“(A) for the relief provided for in subsection (c) of this section, or

"(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan;

"(2) by the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary for appropriate relief under section 409;

"(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this title or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this title or the terms of the plan; "(4) by the Secretary, or by a participant, or beneficiary for appropriate relief in the case of a violation of [section] 105(c);

"(5) except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), by the Secretary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this title, or (b) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violation or (ii) to enforce any provision of this title; or

"(6) by the Secretary to collect any civil penalty under subsection (i)." 'Section 409, 88 Stat. 886, 29 U. S. C. § 1109, provides:

“(a) Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries

BRENNAN, J., concurring in judgment

473 U. S.

ciaries may recover such damages under that section. 722 F.2d 482, 488-489 (1983). I agree with the Court's decision today that §409 is more fairly read in context as providing "remedies that would protect the entire plan" rather than individuals, ante, at 142, and that participants and beneficiaries accordingly must look elsewhere in ERISA for personal relief. Indeed, since §502(a)(3) already provides participants and beneficiaries with "other appropriate equitable relief... to redress [ERISA] violations," there is no reason to construe §409 expansively in order to bring these individuals under the penumbra of "equitable or remedial relief."

This does not resolve, of course, whether and to what extent extracontractual damages are available under § 502(a)(3). This question was not addressed by the courts below and was not briefed by the parties and amici. Thus the Court properly emphasizes that "we have no occasion to consider whether any other provision of ERISA authorizes recovery of extracontractual damages." Ante, at 139, n. 5. Accordingly, we save for another day the questions (1) to what extent a fiduciary's mishandling of a claim might constitute an actionable breach of the fiduciary duties set forth in § 404(a), and (2) the nature and extent of the "appropriate equitable relief... to redress" such violations under § 502(a)(3).

There is dicta in the Court's opinion, however, that could be construed as sweeping more broadly than the narrow ground of resolution set forth above. Although the Court

by this title shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate, including removal of such fiduciary. A fiduciary may also be removed for a violation of section 411 of this Act.

"(b) No fiduciary shall be liable with respect to a breach of fiduciary duty under this title if such breach was committed before he became a fiduciary or after he ceased to be a fiduciary."