"No," as far my knowledge extends. And I add that if you can give any tangible evidence upon the subject, I will thank you to come to this city and do so. Very truly your friend, A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL A. E. BURNSIDE

EXECUTIVE MANSION,

WASHINGTON, November 25, 1862. 11:30 A. M. Major-General Burnside, Falmouth, Virginia: If I should be in a boat off Aquia Creek at dark to-morrow (Wednesday) evening, could you, without inconvenience, meet me and pass an hour or two with me? A. LINCOLN.

NOTE TO SECRETARY CHASE

EXECUTIVE MANSION,

WASHINGTON, November 25, 1862.

Dear Sir: Please remember to confer with the Secretary of the Interior, so as to clear the discrepancy as to amounts derived from sale of public lands. Yours truly,

A. LINCOLN.

LETTER TO GEORGE ROBERTSON

EXECUTIVE MANSION,

WASHINGTON, November 26, 1862.

My dear Sir: A few days since I had a 'despatch from you which I did not answer. If

I were to be wounded personally, I think I would not shun it. But it is the life of the nation. I now understand the trouble is with Colonel Utley: that he has five slaves in his camp, four of whom belong to rebels, and one belonging to you. If this be true, convey yours to Colonel Utley, so that he can make him free, and I will pay you any sum not exceeding five hundred dollars. Yours, etc., A. LINCOLN.

DRAFT OF LETTER TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK STEAMER "BALTIMORE,"

OFF AQUIA. CREEK, VA., Nov. 27, 1862. Sir: I have just had a long conference with General Burnside. He believes that General Lee's whole army, or nearly the whole of it, is in front of him, at and near Fredericksburg. General Burnside says he could take into battle now any day about 110,000 men; that his army is in good spirit, good condition, good morale, and that in all respects he is satisfied with officers and men; that he does not want more men with him, because he could not handle them to advantage; that he thinks he can cross the river in face of the enemy and drive him away; but that, to use his own expression, it is somewhat risky. I wish the case to stand more favorably than this in two respects: First, I wish his crossing of the river to be nearly free from risk;

and, secondly, I wish the enemy to be prevented from falling back, accumulating strength as he goes, into his intrenchments at Richmond. I therefore propose that General Burnside shall not move immediately; that we accumulate a force on the south bank of the Rappahannockat, say, Port Royal-under protection of one or two gunboats, as nearly up to 25,000 strong as we can; at the same time another force of about the same strength as high up the Pamunkey as can be protected by gunboats. These being ready, let all three forces move simultaneously: General Burnside's force in its attempt to cross the river, the Rappahannock force moving directly up the south side of the river to his assistance, and ready, if found admissible, to deflect off to the turnpike bridge over the Mattapony in the direction of Richmond; the Pamunkey force to move as rapidly as possible up the north side of the Pamunkey, holding all the bridges, and especially the turnpike bridge immediately north of Hanover Court House; hurry north and seize and hold the Mattapony bridge before mentioned, and also, if possible, press higher up the streams and destroy the railroad bridges. Then if General Burnside succeeds in driving the enemy from Fredericksburg, he (the enemy) no longer has the road to Richmond, but we have it, and can march into

the city. Or, possibly, having forced the enemy from his line we could move upon and destroy his army. General Burnside's main army would have the same line of supply and retreat as he has now provided. The Rappahannock force would have that river for supply, and gunboats to fall back upon; and the Pamunkey force would have that river for supply, and a line between the two rivers-Pamunkey and Mattapony-along which to fall back upon its gunboats. I think the plan promises the best results, with the least hazard, of any now conceivable.

NOTE. The above plan proposed by me was rejected by General Halleck and General Burnside on the ground that we could not raise and put in position the Pamunkey force without too much waste of time.

A. L.

LETTER TO ATTORNEY-GENERAL BATES

EXECUTIVE MANSION,

WASHINGTON, November 29, 1862. My dear Sir: Few things perplex me more than this question between Governor Gamble and the War Department, as to whether the peculiar force organized by the former in Missouri are State troops or United States troops. Now, this is either an immaterial or a mischievous question. First, if no more is desired than

to have it settled what name the force is to be called by, it is immaterial. Secondly, if it is desired for more than the fixing a name, it can only be to get a position from which to draw practical inferences; then it is mischievous. Instead of settling one dispute by deciding the question, I should merely furnish a nestful of eggs for hatching new disputes. I believe the force is not strictly either "State troops" or "United States troops." It is of mixed character. I therefore think it is safer, when a practical question arises, to decide that question directly, and not indirectly by deciding a general abstraction supposed to include it, and also including a great deal more. Without dispute Governor Gamble appoints the officers of this force, and fills vacancies when they occur. The question now practically in dispute is: Can Governor Gamble make a vacancy by removing an officer or accepting a resignation? Now, while it is proper that this question shall be settled, I do not perceive why either Governor Gamble or the government here should care which way it is settled. I am perplexed with it only because there seems to be pertinacity about it. It seems to me that it might be either way without injury to the service; or that the offer of the Secretary of War to let Governor Gamble make vacancies, and he (the Secretary)