STEVENS, J., dissenting

III

480 U. S.

Finally, the Court seems to rest on the rationale that because this respondent has already been tried, immediate review in this particular case will expedite the termination of the litigation. See ante, at 48-49, n. 7. I am not persuaded that this is so-if we had not granted certiorari, the trial court might have reviewed the documents and found that they are harmless a year ago-but even if it were, the efficient enforcement of the finality rule precludes a case-by-case inquiry to determine whether its application is appropriate. Only by adhering to our firm rules of finality can we discourage time-consuming piecemeal litigation.

Of course, once the case is here and has been heard, there is natural reluctance to hold that the Court lacks jurisdiction. It is misguided, however, to strain and find jurisdiction in the name of short-term efficiency when the long-term effect of the relaxation of the finality requirement will so clearly be inefficient. If the Court's goal is expediting the termination of litigation, the worst thing it can do is to extend an openended invitation to litigants to interrupt state proceedings with interlocutory visits to this Court.

I would therefore dismiss the writ because the judgment of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania is not final.

the District Court's rejection of his assertion of executive privilege. As Judge Friendly explained, the rationale of that decision is unique to the Presidency and is “wholly inapplicable" to other government agents. See National Super Suds, Inc. v. New York Mercantile Exchange, 591 F. 2d 174, 177 (CA2 1979); see also Newton v. National Broadcasting Co., 726 F. 2d 591 (CA9 1984); United States v. Winner, 641 F. 2d 825, 830 (CA10 1981); In re Attorney General of the United States, 596 F. 2d 58, 62 (CA2), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 903 (1979); but see In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Wright II), 654 F. 2d 268, 270 (CA3), cert. denied, 454 U. S. 1098 (1981); Branch v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 638 F. 2d 873, 877–879 (CA5 1981).

Syllabus

MARYLAND v. GARRISON

CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 85-759. Argued November 5, 1986-Decided February 24, 1987 Baltimore police officers obtained and executed a warrant to search the person of one McWebb and "the premises known as 2036 Park Avenue third floor apartment" for controlled substances and related paraphernalia. The police reasonably believed that there was only one apartment on the described premises, but in fact the third floor was divided into two apartments, one occupied by McWebb and one by respondent. Before the officers became aware that they were in respondent's apartment, they discovered the contraband that provided the basis for respondent's conviction for violating Maryland's Controlled Substances Act. The trial court denied respondent's motion to suppress the evidence, and the Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial. Held:

1. On the basis of the information that the officers disclosed, or had a duty to discover and to disclose, to the issuing Magistrate, the warrant, insofar as it authorized a search that turned out to be ambiguous in scope, was valid when it issued. The validity of the warrant must be judged in light of the information available to the officers at the time they obtained the warrant. The discovery of facts demonstrating that a valid warrant was unnecessarily broad does not retroactively invalidate the warrant. Pp. 84-86.

2. The execution of the warrant did not violate respondent's rights under the Fourth Amendment. The validity of the search of his apartment pursuant to the warrant depends on whether the officers' failure to realize the overbreadth of the warrant was objectively understandable and reasonable, and it unquestionably was. The objective facts available to the officers at the time suggested no distinction between McWebb's apartment and the third-floor premises. Whether the premises described in the warrant are interpreted as the entire third floor or as McWebb's apartment, the officers' conduct was consistent with a reasonable effort to ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 86-89.

303 Md. 385, 494 A. 2d 193, reversed and remanded.

STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and WHITE, POWELL, O'CONNOR, and SCALIA, JJ., joined. BLACK

MUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 89.

Stephen H. Sachs, Attorney General of Maryland, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Deborah K. Chasanow and Anne E. Singleton, Assistant Attorney General.

Gerald A. Kroop argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.*

JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.

Baltimore police officers obtained and executed a warrant to search the person of Lawrence McWebb and "the premises known as 2036 Park Avenue third floor apartment."1 When the police applied for the warrant and when they conducted the search pursuant to the warrant, they reasonably believed that there was only one apartment on the premises described in the warrant. In fact, the third floor was divided into two apartments, one occupied by McWebb and one by respondent Garrison. Before the officers executing the warrant became aware that they were in a separate apartment occupied by respondent, they had discovered the contraband that provided the basis for respondent's conviction for violating Maryland's Controlled Substances Act. The question presented is whether the seizure of that contraband was prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.

The trial court denied respondent's motion to suppress the evidence seized from his apartment, App. 46, and the Mary

*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of California by John K. Van de Kamp, Attorney General, Steve White, Chief Assistant Attorney General, and Ronald E. Niver and Clifford K. Thompson, Jr., Deputy Attorneys General; and for Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., et al. by Fred E. Inbau, Wayne W. Schmidt, James P. Manak, David Crump, Daniel B. Hales, and Jack E. Yelverton.

'App. 9, 41. The warrant was issued and executed on May 21, 1982. It authorized the Baltimore police to search the person of McWebb and "the premises known as 2036 Park Avenue third floor apartment" for "Marihuana, related paraphernalia, minies, books, papers, and photographs pertaining to the illegal distribution of Marihuana... Id., at 9.

land Court of Special Appeals affirmed. 58 Md. App. 417, 473 A. 2d 514 (1984). The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed and remanded with instructions to remand the case for a new trial. 303 Md. 385, 494 A. 2d 193 (1985).

There is no question that the warrant was valid and was supported by probable cause. Id., at 392, 494 A. 2d, at 196. The trial court found, and the two appellate courts did not dispute, that after making a reasonable investigation, including a verification of information obtained from a reliable informant, an exterior examination of the three-story building at 2036 Park Avenue, and an inquiry of the utility company, the officer who obtained the warrant reasonably concluded that there was only one apartment on the third floor and that it was occupied by McWebb. App. 41; 58 Md. App., at 433, 473 A. 2d, at 522; 303 Md., at 387-390, 494 A. 2d, at 194-195. When six Baltimore police officers executed the warrant, they fortuitously encountered McWebb in front of the building and used his key to gain admittance to the first-floor hallway and to the locked door at the top of the stairs to the third floor. As they entered the vestibule on the third floor, they encountered respondent, who was standing in the hallway The police could see into the interior of both McWebb's apartment to the left and respondent's to the right, for the doors to both were open. Only after respondent's apartment had been entered and heroin, cash, and drug paraphernalia had been found did any of the officers realize that the third floor contained two apartments. App. 41-46. As soon as they became aware of that fact, the search was discontinued. Id., at 32, 39. All of the officers reasonably believed that they were searching McWebb's apartment.2 No further search of respondent's apartment was made.

area.

'While the search was in progress, an officer in respondent's apartment answered the telephone. The caller asked for "Red Cross"; that was the name by which McWebb was known to the confidential informant. Id., at

Neither respondent nor McWebb indicated to the police during the search that there were two apartments. Id., at 38, 39-40.

The matter on which there is a difference of opinion concerns the proper interpretation of the warrant. A literal reading of its plain language, as well as the language used in the application for the warrant, indicates that it was intended to authorize a search of the entire third floor. This is the construction adopted by the intermediate appellate court, see 58 Md. App., at 419, 473 A. 2d, at 515, and it also appears to be the construction adopted by the trial judge. See App. 41. One sentence in the trial judge's oral opinion, however, lends support to the construction adopted by the Court of Appeals, namely, that the warrant authorized a search of McWebb's apartment only. Under that interpretation, the Court of

"The warrant states:

"Affidavit having been made before me by Detective Albert Marcus, Baltimore Police Department, Narcotic Unit, that he has reason to believe that on the person of Lawrence Meril McWebb. . . [and] that on the premises known as 2036 Park Avenue third floor apartment, described as a three story brick dwelling with the numerals 2-0-3-6 affixed to the front of same in the City of Baltimore, there is now being concealed certain property....

"You are therefor commanded, with the necessary and proper assistants, to search forthwith the person/premises hereinabove described for the property specified, executing this warrant and making the search...." Id., at 9.

'Immediately before ruling on the suppression motions made by McWebb and Garrison, the court observed that a search of two or more apartments in the same building must be supported by probable cause for searching each apartment. The court added, "[t]here is an exception to this general rule where the multiple unit character of the premises is not externally apparent and is not known to the officer applying for or executing the warrant." Id., at 45. The trial court then ruled, "It is clear that the warrant specified the premises to be searched as the third floor apartment of the Defendant McWebb. . . ." Id., at 46. This statement only makes sense as a rejection of Garrison's claim that "the warrant was a general warrant as it did not specify which apartment was to be searched on the third floor," id., at 40, and as a recognition that the search was not invalid for lack of specificity in the warrant as to the premises to be searched. We interpret the trial court's statement as a ruling that the search of a subunit of the building—which he referred to as "the third floor