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Id., at 58, 62. Finally, we note that there was no evidence that the Hospital had established any reasonable regulation or policy discouraging employees such as Dr. Ortega from storing personal papers and effects in their desks or file cabinets, id., at 44, although the absence of such a policy does not create an expectation of privacy where it would not otherwise exist.

On the basis of this undisputed evidence, we accept the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that Dr. Ortega had a reasonable expectation of privacy at least in his desk and file cabinets. See Gillard v. Schmidt, 579 F. 2d 825, 829 (CA3 1978); United States v. Speights, 557 F. 2d 362 (CA3-1977); United States v. Blok, 88 U. S. App. D. C. 326, 188 F. 2d 1019 (1951).

III

Having determined that Dr. Ortega had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office, the Court of Appeals simply concluded without discussion that the "search . . . was not a reasonable search under the fourth amendment." 764 F.2d, at 707. But as we have stated in T. L. O., "[t]o hold that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches conducted by [public employers] is only to begin the inquiry into the standards governing such searches. . . . [W]hat is reasonable depends on the context within which a search takes place." New Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 U. S., at 337. Thus, we must determine the appropriate standard of reasonableness applicable to the search. A determination of the standard of reasonableness applicable to a particular class of searches requires “balanc[ing] the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion." United States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696, 703 (1983); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S., at 536-537. In the case of searches conducted by a public employer, we must balance the invasion of the employees' legitimate expectations of pri

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480 U. S.

vacy against the government's need for supervision, control, and the efficient operation of the workplace.

“[I]t is settled... that 'except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property without proper consent is "unreasonable" unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant."" Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U. S., at 370 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, at 528-529). There are some circumstances, however, in which we have recognized that a warrant requirement is unsuitable. In particular, a warrant requirement is not appropriate when "the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search." Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, at 533. Or, as JUSTICE BLACKMUN stated in T. L. O., "[o]nly in those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable." 469 U. S., at 351 (concurring in judgment). In Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U. S. 307 (1978), for example, the Court explored the burdens a warrant requirement would impose on the Occupational Safety and Health Act regulatory scheme, and held that the warrant requirement was appropriate only after concluding that warrants would not "impose serious burdens on the inspection system or the courts, [would not] prevent inspections necessary to enforce the statute, or [would not] make them less effective." 436 U. S., at 316. In New Jersey v. T. L. O., supra, we concluded that the warrant requirement was not suitable to the school environment, because such a requirement would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the schools.

There is surprisingly little case law on the appropriate Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness for a public employer's work-related search of its employee's offices, desks, or file cabinets. Generally, however, the lower courts have held that any "work-related" search by an em

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ployer satisfies the Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirement. See United States v. Nasser, 476 F. 2d 1111, 1123 (CA7 1973) ("work-related" searches and seizures are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Collins, 349 F. 2d 863, 868 (CA2 1965) (upholding search and seizure because conducted pursuant to "the power of the Government as defendant's employer, to supervise and investigate the performance of his duties as a Customs employee"). Others have suggested the use of a standard other than probable cause. See United States v. Bunkers, 521 F. 2d 1217 (CA9 1975) (work-related search of a locker tested under "reasonable cause" standard); United States v. Blok, supra, at 328, 188 F. 2d, at 1021 ("No doubt a search of [a desk] without her consent would have been reasonable if made by some people in some circumstances. Her official superiors might reasonably have searched the desk for official property needed for official use"). The only cases to imply that a warrant should be required involve searches that are not work related, see Gillard v. Schmidt, supra, at 829, n. 1, or searches for evidence of criminal misconduct, see United States v. Kahan, 350 F. Supp. 784 (SDNY 1972).

The legitimate privacy interests of public employees in the private objects they bring to the workplace may be substantial. Against these privacy interests, however, must be balanced the realities of the workplace, which strongly suggest that a warrant requirement would be unworkable. While police, and even administrative enforcement personnel, conduct searches for the primary purpose of obtaining evidence for use in criminal or other enforcement proceedings, employers most frequently need to enter the offices and desks of their employees for legitimate work-related reasons wholly unrelated to illegal conduct. Employers and supervisors are focused primarily on the need to complete the government agency's work in a prompt and efficient manner. An employer may have need for correspondence, or a file or report available only in an employee's office while the employee is

Opinion of O'CONNOR, J.

vacy against the government's need for sur and the efficient operation of the workplac

480 C. S

been the case -dentify state with a pending

Lace.

a warrant

oyee's office,

se would seriand would be rant proce- otherwise stres, is simply Constances in which -= dies such as at Bestigating the sared searches Z the agency.

"[I]t is settled... that 'except in certa classes of cases, a search of private prop consent is "unreasonable" unless it has a valid search warrant.' Mancusi v at 370 (quoting Camara v. Munic 528-529). There are some circumstan we have recognized that a warrant re In particular, a warrant requiremen "the burden of obtaining a warran... governmental purpose behind the nicipal Court, supra, at 533. C stated in T. L. O., "[o]nly in tho in which special needs, beyond forcement, make the warrant ment impracticable." 469 U. ment). In Marshall v. Barlo for example, the Court explo quirement would impose or Health Act regulatory scher requirement was appropria rants would not "impose se system or the courts, [wou sary to enforce the statut. effective." 436 U. S., at supra, we concluded tha

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ize the plethan occasion to ectation of prialleged that the -related intrusion suspected workrtake to determine ndard of reasonableployer intrusions and er circumstances.

ng work-related intrucient and proper operaagencies provide myriad .k of these agencies would I to have probable cause bedesk for the purpose of findpondence. Indeed, it is diffibable cause, rooted as it is in text, much meaning when the rieve a file for work-related reaept of probable cause has little itory conducted by public employcuring state property. See ColoS. 367 (1987); Illinois v. Lafayette, To ensure the efficient and proper y, therefore, public employers must e to enter employee offices for worktory reasons.