"take[n] the risk of acquiring only surface rights." 260 U. S., at 416. Here, by contrast, the Commonwealth is acting to protect the public interest in health, the environment, and the fiscal integrity of the area. That private individuals erred in taking a risk cannot estop the Commonwealth from exercising its police power to abate activity akin to a public nuisance. The Subsidence Act is a prime example that "circumstances may so change in time . . . as to clothe with such a [public] interest what at other times. . . would be a matter of purely private concern." Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135, 155 (1921).

In Pennsylvania Coal the Court recognized that the nature of the State's interest in the regulation is a critical factor in determining whether a taking has occurred, and thus whether compensation is required." The Court distinguished the case before it from a case it had decided eight years earlier, Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 531 (1914). There, "it was held competent for the legislature to require a pillar of coal to be left along the line of adjoining property." Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U. S., at 415. Justice Holmes explained that unlike the Kohler Act, the statute challenged in Plymouth Coal dealt with "a requirement for the safety of employees invited into the mine, and secured an average reciprocity of advantage that has been recognized as a justification of various laws." 260 U. S., at 415.

Many cases before and since Pennsylvania Coal have recognized that the nature of the State's action is critical in takings analysis. 18 In Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623

"In his dissent, Justice Brandeis argued that the State has an absolute right to prohibit land use that amounts to a public nuisance. Id., at 417. Justice Holmes' opinion for the Court did not contest that proposition, but instead took issue with Justice Brandeis' conclusion that the Kohler Act represented such a prohibition. Id., at 413-414.

18 Of course, the type of taking alleged is also an often critical factor. It is well settled that a "taking' may more readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, see, e. g., United States v. Causby, 328 U. S. 256 (1946), than

(1887), for example, a Kansas distiller who had built a brewery while it was legal to do so challenged a Kansas constitutional amendment which prohibited the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors. Although the Court recognized that the "buildings and machinery constituting these breweries are of little value" because of the Amendment, id., at 657, Justice Harlan explained that a

"prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the community, cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking or appropriation of property. . . . The power which the States. have of prohibiting such use by individuals of their property as will be prejudicial to the health, the morals, or the safety of the public, is not—and, consistently with the existence and safety of organized society cannot beburdened with the condition that the State must compensate such individual owners for pecuniary losses they may sustain, by reason of their not being permitted, by a noxious use of their property, to inflict injury upon the community." Id., at 668-669.

when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good." Penn Central Tranportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104, 124 (1978). While the Court has almost invariably found that the permanent physical occupation of property constitutes a taking, see Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U. S. 419, 435-438 (1982), the Court has repeatedly upheld regulations that destroy or adversely affect real property interests. See, e. g., Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, 475 U. S. 211 (1986); Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S., at 125; Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U. S. 668, 674, n. 8 (1976); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U. S. 590, 592-593 (1962); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926); Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U. S. 603, 608 (1927); Welch v. Swasey, 214 U. S. 91 (1909). This case, of course, involves land use regulation, not a physical appropriation of petitioners' property.

See also Plymouth Coal Co., supra; Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U. S. 394 (1915); Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U. S. 171 (1915); Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678 (1888).

We reject petitioners' implicit assertion that Pennsylvania Coal overruled these cases which focused so heavily on the nature of the State's interest in the regulation. Just five years after the Pennsylvania Coal decision, Justice Holmes joined the Court's unanimous decision in Miller v. Schoene, 276 U. S. 272 (1928), holding that the Takings Clause did not require the State of Virginia to compensate the owners of cedar trees for the value of the trees that the State had ordered destroyed. The trees needed to be destroyed to prevent a disease from spreading to nearby apple orchards, which represented a far more valuable resource. In upholding the state action, the Court did not consider it necessary to "weigh with nicety the question whether the infected cedars constitute a nuisance according to common law; or whether they may be so declared by statute." Id., at 280. Rather, it was clear that the State's exercise of its police power to prevent the impending danger was justified, and did not require compensation. See also Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926); Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 502, 509 (1923). Other subsequent cases reaffirm the important role that the nature of the state action plays in our takings analysis. See Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U. S. 590 (1962); Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P. 2d 342, appeal dism'd, 371 U. S. 36 (1962). As the Court explained in Goldblatt: "Although a comparison of values before and after" a regulatory action "is relevant, it is by no means conclusive... " 369 U. S.,

at 594.19

"See also Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U. S. 255, 261 (1980) (the question whether a taking has occurred "necessarily requires a weighing of private and public interests"); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U. S. 155, 163 (1980) ("No police power justification is offered for the deprivation").

The Court's hesitance to find a taking when the State merely restrains uses of property that are tantamount to public nuisances is consistent with the notion of "reciprocity of advantage" that Justice Holmes referred to in Pennsylvania Coal.20 Under our system of government, one of the State's primary ways of preserving the public weal is restricting the uses individuals can make of their property. While each of us is burdened somewhat by such restrictions, we, in turn, benefit greatly from the restrictions that are placed on others." See Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S., at 144-150 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting); cf. California Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U. S. 306, 322 (1905). These restrictions are "properly treated as part of the burden of common citizenship." Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U. S. 1, 5 (1949). Long ago it was recognized that "all property in

20 The special status of this type of state action can also be understood on the simple theory that since no individual has a right to use his property so as to create a nuisance or otherwise harm others, the State has not "taken" anything when it asserts its power to enjoin the nuisance-like activity. Cf. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 Yale L. J. 149, 155-161 (1971); Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1235-1237 (1967).

However, as the current CHIEF JUSTICE has explained: "The nuisance exception to the taking guarantee is not coterminous with the police power itself." Penn Central Transportation Co., 438 U. S., at 145 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). This is certainly the case in light of our recent decisions holding that the "scope of the 'public use' requirement of the Takings Clause is 'coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police powers.' See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U. S. 986, 1014 (1984) (quoting Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U. S. 229, 240 (1984)). See generally R. Epstein, Takings 108-112 (1985).

"The Takings Clause has never been read to require the States or the courts to calculate whether a specific individual has suffered burdens under this generic rule in excess of the benefits received. Not every individual gets a full dollar return in benefits for the taxes he or she pays; yet, no one suggests that an individual has a right to compensation for the difference between taxes paid and the dollar value of benefits received.

this country is held under the implied obligation that the owner's use of it shall not be injurious to the community," Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S., at 665; see also Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25, 32 (1878), and the Takings Clause did not transform that principle to one that requires compensation whenever the State asserts its power to enforce it. See Mugler, 123 U. S., at 664.

22

In Agins v. Tiburon, we explained that the "determination that governmental action constitutes a taking, is, in essence, a determination that the public at large, rather than a single owner, must bear the burden of an exercise of state power in the public interest," and we recognized that this question "necessarily requires a weighing of private and public interests." 447 U. S., at 260-261. As the cases discussed above demonstrate, the public interest in preventing activities similar to public nuisances is a substantial one, which in many instances has not required compensation. The Subsidence Act, unlike the Kohler Act, plainly seeks to further such an interest. Nonetheless, we need not rest our decision on this factor alone, because petitioners have also failed to make a

"Courts have consistently held that a State need not provide compensation when it diminishes or destroys the value of property by stopping illegal activity or abating a public nuisance. See Nassr v. Commonwealth, 394 Mass. 767, 477 N. E. 2d 987 (1985) (hazardous waste operation); Kuban v. McGimsey, 96 Nev. 105, 605 P. 2d 623 (1980) (brothel); MacLeod v. Takoma Park, 257 Md. 477, 263 A. 2d 581 (1970) (unsafe building); Eno v. Burlington, 125 Vt. 8, 209 A. 2d 499 (1965) (fire and health hazard); Pompano Horse Club, Inc. v. State ex rel. Bryan, 93 Fla. 415, 111 So. 801 (1927) (gambling facility); People ex rel. Thrasher v. Smith, 275 Ill. 256, 114 N. E. 31 (1916) ("bawdyhouse"). It is hard to imagine a different rule that would be consistent with the maxim "sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas" (use your own property in such manner as not to injure that of another). See generally Empire State Insurance Co. v. Chafetz, 278 F. 2d 41 (CA5 1960). As Professor Epstein has recently commented: "The issue of compensation cannot arise until the question of justification has been disposed of. In the typical nuisance prevention case, this question is resolved against the claimant." Epstein, supra, at 199.