STEVENS, J., dissenting 480 U. S. placed a higher value on his client's interest in terminating the criminal proceeding promptly than on the uncertain benefits of pursuing a civil remedy against the town and its police department. After delaying a decision for three days, respondent reluctantly followed his lawyer's advice. 99 From respondent's point of view, it is unquestionably true that the decision to sign the release-dismissal agreement was, as the Court emphasizes, "voluntary, deliberate, and informed." Ante, at 391. It reflected "a highly rational judgment that the certain benefits of escaping criminal prosecution exceed the speculative benefits of prevailing in a civil action." Ante, at 394. As the plurality iterates and reiterates, respondent made a "considered decision that he would benefit personally from the agreement.' Ante, at 395. I submit, however, that the deliberate and rational character of respondent's decision is not a sufficient reason for concluding that the agreement is enforceable. Otherwise, a promise to pay a state trooper $20 for not issuing a ticket for a traffic violation, or a promise to contribute to the police department's retirement fund in exchange for the dismissal of a felony charge, would be enforceable. Indeed, I would suppose that virtually all contracts that courts refuse to enforce nevertheless reflect perfectly rational decisions by the parties who entered into them. There is nothing irrational about an agreement to bribe a police officer, to enter into a wagering arrangement, to pay usurious rates of interests, or to threaten to indict an innocent man in order to induce him to surrender something of value. is going to guarantee a result regardless of the guilt or innocence of their client. "And so I was less, perhaps personally less willing to subject, to want to subject Mr. Rumery to the full panoply of the trial aspects of the system than he was willing to subject himself." Tr. 56. 'Id., at 56-57. Although the witness Deary was a covenantee, she was not named as a defendant in the civil case. 386 STEVENS, J., dissenting The "voluntary, deliberate, and informed" character of a defendant's decision generally provides an acceptable basis for upholding the validity of a plea bargain. But it is inappropriate to assume that the same standard determines the validity of a quite different agreement to forgo a civil remedy for the violation of the defendant's constitutional rights in exchange for complete abandonment of a criminal charge. The net result of every plea bargain is an admission of wrongdoing by the defendant and the imposition of a criminal sanction with its attendant stigma. Although there may be some cases in which an innocent person pleads guilty to a minor offense to avoid the risk of conviction on a more serious charge, it is reasonable to presume that such cases are rare and represent the exception rather than the rule. See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11(f) (court may not enter judgment on a guilty plea unless it is satisfied the plea has a factual basis). Like a plea bargain, an agreement by the suspect to drop §1983 charges and to pay restitution to the victim in exchange for the prosecutor's termination of criminal proceedings involves an admission of wrongdoing by the defendant.10 The same cannot be said about an agreement that completely exonerates the defendant. Not only is such a person presumptively innocent as a matter of law; as a factual matter the prosecutor's interest in obtaining a covenant not to sue will be strongest in those cases in which he realizes that the defendant was innocent and was wrongfully accused. Moreover, the prosecutor will be most willing-indeed, he is ethically obligated-to drop charges when he believes that probable cause as established by the available, admissible evidence is lacking. The plea bargain represents a practical compromise between the prosecutor and the defendant that takes into ac "The enforceability of these kinds of agreements may well involve considerations different from the enforceability of agreements, such as the one at issue in this case, in which the defendant makes no admission of wrongdoing at all. STEVENS, J., dissenting 480 U. S. count the burdens of litigation and its probable outcome, as well as society's interest in imposing appropriate punishment upon an admitted wrongdoer. The defendant admits wrongdoing for conduct upon which the guilty plea is based and avoids further prosecution; the prosecutor need not go to trial; and an admitted wrongdoer is punished, all under close judicial supervision. See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11(e). By simultaneously establishing and limiting the defendant's criminal liability, plea bargains delicately balance individual and social advantage. This mutuality of advantage does not exist in release-dismissal agreements. A defendant entering a release-dismissal agreement is forced to waive claims based on official conduct under color of state law, in exchange merely for the assurance that the State will not prosecute him for conduct for which he has made no admission of wrongdoing. The State is spared the necessity of going to trial, but its willingness to drop the charge completely indicates that it might not have proceeded with the prosecution in any event.11 No social interest in the punishment of wrongdoers is satisfied; the only interest vindicated is that of resolving once and for all the question of § 1983 liability. Achieving this result has no connection with the give-andtake over the defendant's wrongdoing that is the essence of the plea-bargaining process, and thus cannot be justified by reference to the principles of mutual advantage that support plea bargaining. Although the outcome of a criminal proceeding may affect the value of the civil claim, as a matter of law the claims are quite distinct. Even a guilty defendant may be entitled to receive damages for physical abuse, and conversely, the fact that a defendant is ultimately acquitted is entirely consistent with the possibility that the police had "In this case the prosecutor had been advised that the witness Deary was unwilling to testify against respondent. He may also have known that she would not testify against Champy, her alleged assailant, on the sexual assault charge. 386 STEVENS, J., dissenting probable cause to arrest him and did not violate any of his constitutional rights. 12 The plurality assumes that many § 1983 suits "are marginal and some are frivolous," ante, at 395. Whether that assumption is correct or incorrect, the validity of each ought to be tested by the adversary process. 13 Experience teaches us that some § 1983 suits in which release-dismissal agreements are sought are meritorious." Whatever the true value of a § 1983 claim may be, a defendant who is required to give up such a claim in exchange for a dismissal of a criminal charge is being forced to pay a price that is unrelated to his possible wrongdoing as reflected in that charge. Indeed, if the defendant is forced to abandon a claim that has a value of $1,000, the price that he pays is the functional equivalent of a $1,000 payment to a police department's retirement benefit fund. Thus, even though respondent's decision in this case was deliberate, informed, and voluntary, this observation does not address two distinct objections to enforcement of the release-dismissal agreement. The prosecutor's offer to drop charges if the defendant accedes to the agreement is inherently coercive; moreover, the agreement exacts a price unrelated to the character of the defendant's own conduct. 12 See, e. g., Palhava de Varella-Cid v. Boston Five Cents Savings Bank, 787 F. 2d 676 (CA1 1986). 13 The plurality seems to overlook the fact that respondent has not yet had an opportunity to present evidence in support of his underlying claim which, incidentally, alleged police misconduct rather than prosecutorial misconduct. "See, e. g., Dixon v. District of Columbia, 129 U. S. App. D. C. 341, 394 F. 2d 966 (1968) (prosecutor may not file charges when defendant reneged on agreement not to sue); MacDonald v. Musick, 425 F. 2d 373 (CA9) (prosecutor may not condition dismissal of charges on defendant's admission of probable cause which would preclude enforcement of civil claim against arresting officers), cert. denied, 400 U. S. 852 (1970); Boyd v. Adams, 513 F. 2d 83 (CA7 1975) (postarrest release of § 1983 claim, executed while on conditional bail, is void as against public policy). 480 U. S. STEVENS, J., dissenting II When the prosecutor negotiated the agreement with respondent, he represented three potentially conflicting interests. His primary duty, of course, was to represent the sovereign's interest in the evenhanded and effective enforcement of its criminal laws. See Berger v. United States, 295 U. S. 78, 88 (1935). In addition, as the covenant demonstrates, he sought to represent the interests of the town of Newton and its Police Department in connection with their possible civil liability to respondent. Finally, as the inclusion of Mary Deary as a covenantee indicates, the prosecutor also represented the interest of a potential witness who allegedly accused both respondent and a mutual friend of separate instances of wrongdoing. If we view the problem from the standpoint of the prosecutor's principal client, the State of New Hampshire, it is perfectly clear that the release-dismissal agreement was both unnecessary and unjustified. For both the prosecutor and the State of New Hampshire enjoy absolute immunity from common-law and § 1983 liability arising out of a prosecutor's decision to initiate criminal proceedings. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 427 (1976). The agreement thus gave the State and the prosecutor no protection that the law did not already provide. The record in this case indicates that an important reason for obtaining the covenant was "[t]o protect the police department." 15 There is, however, an obvious potential conflict between the prosecutor's duty to enforce the law and his objective of protecting members of the Police Department who are accused of unlawful conduct. The public is entitled to have the prosecutor's decision to go forward with a criminal case, or to dismiss it, made independently of his concerns about the potential damages liability of the Police Department. It is equally clear that this separation of functions 15 See Tr. 48. |