tion between a commercial lessee and an interloper with a government license. We conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in applying the per se rule of Loretto to the Pole Attachments Act. III The remaining question, whether under traditional Fifth Amendment standards the challenged FCC order effected a taking of property, is readily answered. It is of course settled beyond dispute that regulation of rates chargeable from the employment of private property devoted to public uses is constitutionally permissible. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 133-134 (1877); Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U. S. 747, 768-769 (1968). Such regulation of maximum rates or prices "may, consistently with the Constitution, limit stringently the return recovered on investment, for investors' interests provide only one of the variables in the constitutional calculus of reasonableness." Id., at 769. So long as the rates set are not confiscatory, the Fifth Amendment does not bar their imposition. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, 53 (1936); see Permian Basin, supra, at 770. The Pole Attachments Act, as previously noted, provides a range of reasonableness within which the FCC may undertake ratesetting. The Act provides that the minimum reasonable rate is equal to "the additional costs of providing pole attachments," while the maximum reasonable rate is to be calculated "by multiplying the percentage of the total usable space, or the percentage of the total duct or conduit capacity, which is occupied by the pole attachment by the sum of the operating expenses and actual capital costs of the utility attributable to the entire pole, duct, conduit, or right-ofway." 47 U. S. C. §224(d)(1). The minimum measure is thus equivalent to the marginal cost of attachments, while the statutory maximum measure is determined by the fully allocated cost of the construction and operation of the pole to which cable is attached. POWELL, J., concurring 480 U. S. The FCC has evidently interpreted the statute to provide that when it reduces the contract rate for pole attachments, it may only reduce to the maximum rate allowed under the statute. Tr. of Oral Arg. 10. The rate imposed by the Commission in this case was calculated according to the statutory formula for the determination of fully allocated cost. App. to Juris. Statement of FCC 23a. Appellees have not contended, nor could it seriously be argued, that a rate providing for the recovery of fully allocated cost, including the actual cost of capital, is confiscatory. Accordingly, we hold that the the FCC regulatory order challenged below does not effect a taking of property under the Fifth Amendment. IV Because we hold that the Pole Attachments Act does not authorize a taking of property within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, the holding of the Court of Appeals, that the Act is void because it unconstitutionally constrains the judicial determination of just compensation for takings, necessarily falls. The decision of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE O'CONNOR joins, concurring. I join the Court's opinion, and write only to state generally my understanding as to the scope of judicial review of rates determined by an administrative agency. I agree that the FCC regulatory order challenged in these cases does not effect 'In view of the Commission's interpretation of the statute, and use of the fully allocated cost measure in this case, we have no occasion to consider the constitutionality of the minimum rate allowable under the statute. *Our disposition of the takings question makes it unnecessary to review on the merits the Court of Appeals' holding that Congress may not establish standards under which the initial determination of compensation will be made by an administrative authority subject to final judicial review. 245 POWELL, J., concurring an unconstitutional taking of property. In the Court's brief discussion of "traditional Fifth Amendment standards," it quotes a single sentence from the Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U. S. 747 (1968), to the effect that regulation of maximum rates "may, consistently with the Constitution, limit stringently the return recovered on investment, for investors' interests provide only one of the variables in the constitutional calculus of reasonableness," id., at 769. The inquiry mandated by the Constitution is considerably more complex than this simple statement reflects. Justice Harlan's opinion for the Court in that case is some 74 pages long. In addition, Justice Douglas wrote an interesting, and relevant, dissenting opinion. The one sentence included in today's opinion in no way accurately portrays the full rationale of judicial review of ratemaking by administrative tribunals. Other portions of the Permian opinion could be quoted to indicate that the standard gives governments far less leeway. Indeed, on the next page in Permian the Court identifies the relevant standard of review under the Natural Gas Act as "just and reasonable," id., at 770, and the opinion goes on to suggest that the Commission's rates must be selected "from the broad zone of reasonableness." Ibid. A second rate case in which several Justices carefully considered the role courts should play in reviewing administrative ratemaking orders is FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591 (1944). Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, stated that the "just and reasonable" standard required that "the return to the equity owner should be commensurate with returns on investments in other enterprises having corresponding risks." Id., at 603. I do not suggest that this isolated sentence from Hope Natural Gas is any more to be viewed as the appropriate standard than the sentence from Permian Basin the Court quotes today. My point is only that judicial review of rates challenged as taking property without just compensation involves careful consideration of the relevant statute, the action of the POWELL, J., concurring 480 U. S. regulatory commission, and a complex of other factors. The rates before us clearly comport with the Constitution. In my view no purpose is served by selecting for quotation a single sentence that, standing alone, is meaningless at best. Syllabus CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, MASSACHUSETTS v. KIBBE, ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF THURSTON CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT No. 85-1217. Argued November 4, 1986-Decided February 25, 1987 Certiorari was granted in this case to resolve the question whether consistently with the decision in Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658, a municipality can be held liable under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 for inadequate training of its employees. In addressing that issue, this Court anticipated that, under its Rule 21.1(a), it would be able to reach the "fairly included" related question whether more than negligence in training is required in order to establish such liability. However, in the District Court petitioner city did not object to the jury instruction stating that gross negligence would suffice, and in fact proposed its own instruction to the same effect. Nor did it argue for a higher standard than gross negligence in the Court of Appeals. Held: The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted. Although petitioner argues here that a heightened negligence standard does not suffice under Monell's requirement of a municipal policy, this Court ordinarily will not decide questions not raised or litigated in the lower courts, especially where the party seeking to argue the issue has failed to object to a jury instruction, as required by Rule 51 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This Court's inability to reach the negligence issue makes this case an inappropriate vehicle for resolving the inadequate-training question, because of the close interrelationship between the two matters, and the other questions presented are not of sufficient importance to warrant review independently. Although there is no jurisdictional bar to this Court's reaching the negligence issue, whether or not the Court of Appeals did so, there would be considerable prudential objection to reversing a judgment because of instructions that petitioner accepted, and indeed itself requested. Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U. S. 808, distinguished. Certiorari dismissed. Reported below: 777 F. 2d 801. Edward M. Pikula argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Richard T. Egan and Harry P. Carroll, |