149 Opinion of BRENNAN, J. theless, the effects of these policies and practices remain The court then fashioned the relief at issue here. It held that "for a period of time," at least 50% of the promotions to corporal must be awarded to black troopers, if qualified black candidates were available. The court also held that "if there is to be within the near future an orderly path for black troopers to enter the upper ranks, any relief fashioned by the court must address the department's delay in developing acceptable promotion procedures for all ranks." Id., at 75. Thus, the court imposed a 50% promotional quota in the upper ranks, but only if there were qualified black candidates, if the rank were less than 25% black, and if the Department had not developed and implemented a promotion plan without adverse impact for the relevant rank. The court concluded that the effects of past discrimination in the Department "will not wither away of their own accord" and that "without promotional quotas the continuing effects of this discrimination cannot be eliminated." Id., at 75 and 76. The court highlighted the temporary nature and flexible Opinion of BRENNAN, J. 480 U. S. design of the relief ordered, stating that it was "specifically tailored" to eliminate the lingering effects of past discrimination, to remedy the delayed compliance with the consent decrees, and to ensure prompt implementation of lawful procedures. Ibid. Finally, the Department was ordered to submit within 30 days a schedule for the development of promotion procedures for all ranks above the entry level. The schedule was to be "based upon realistic expectations" as the court intended that "the use of the quotas... be a one-time occurrence." Ibid. The District Court reasoned that, under the order it had entered, the Department had "the prerogative to end the promotional quotas at any time, simply by developing acceptable promotion procedures." Id., at 76. Numerous motions for reconsideration of the court's order and for the alteration or amendment of the court's judgment were denied by the District Court. In its motion, the Department set forth the "new contention" that it was "without legal authority and sufficiently trained personnel to design any promotional procedures" because "this function is allocated by statute to the Department of Personnel." Paradise v. Prescott, Civ. Action No. 3561-N (MD Ala., Jan. 13, 1984). The District Court responded that the Department had signed consent decrees in 1979 and 1981 mandating development of an acceptable procedure and that Department counsel had represented at the January 5, 1984, hearing that "it was anticipated that the development of these procedures would take only a few months." Ibid. The judge concluded: "It is now years later and this court will not entertain the excuse that the department is now without legal authority to meet its obligations under the consent decrees. [T]he Department of Personnel, which is also a party to these proceedings, assured the court at the January 5, [1984] hearing that it would work closely with the Public Safety Department to develop acceptable promotion 149 Opinion of BRENNAN, J. procedures. The Public Safety Department's contention that it is without legal authority is not only meritless, it is frivolous. "Moreover, that the Department of Public Safety would even advance this argument dramatically demonstrates the need for the relief imposed by this court. Such frivolous arguments serve no purpose other than to prolong the discriminatory effects of the department's 37-year history of racial discrimination." Ibid. (emphasis added). In February 1984, the Department promoted eight blacks and eight whites to corporal pursuant to the District Court's order enforcing the consent decrees. Four months later, the Department submitted for the court's approval its proposed procedure for promotions to the rank of corporal. The District Court ruled that the Department could promote up to 13 troopers utilizing this procedure and suspended application of the one-for-one requirement for that purpose. App. 163-164. In October 1984, following approval of the Department's new selection procedure for promotion to sergeant, the court similarly suspended application of the quota at that rank. Id., at 176–177.1 On appeal the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District Court's order. The Court of Appeals concluded that the relief at issue was designed to remedy the present effects of past discrimination-"effects which, as the history of this case amply demonstrates, 'will not wither away of their own accord."" Paradise v. Prescott, 767 F. 2d 1514, 1533 (1985) (quoting 585 F. Supp., at 75). In addition, the relief awarded was deemed to "exten[d] no further than necessary to accomplish the objective of remedying the 'egre 15 In addition, the Department has been permitted to promote only white troopers to lieutenant and captain because no blacks have qualified, as of yet, for promotion to those ranks. Paradise v. Prescott, 767 F. 2d 1514, 1538, n. 19 (CA11 1985). Opinion of BRENNAN, J. 480 U. S. gious' and longstanding racial imbalances in the upper ranks of the Department." 767 F. 2d, at 1532-1533. We granted certiorari. 478 U. S. 1019 (1986). We affirm. II The United States maintains that the race-conscious relief ordered in this case violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.16 It is now well established that government bodies, including courts, may constitutionally employ racial classifications essential to remedy unlawful treatment of racial or ethnic groups subject to discrimination. See Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U. S. 421, 480 (1986), and cases cited therein. See also Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U. S. 267, 286 (1986) ("The Court is in agreement that . . . remedying past or present racial discrimination . . . is a sufficiently weighty state interest to warrant the remedial use of a carefully constructed affirmative action program") (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). But although this Court has consistently held that some elevated level of scrutiny is required when a racial or ethnic distinction is made for remedial purposes, it has yet to reach consensus on the appropriate constitutional analysis." We need not do 16 The Government framed the issue presented as “[w]hether the oneblack-for-one-white promotion quota adopted by the district court . . . is permissible under the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution." Brief for United States I. Because the reach of the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment is coextensive with that of the Fourteenth, we need not decide whether the race-conscious relief ordered in this case would violate the former as well as the latter constitutional provision. 17 See Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U. S. 267, 274 (1986) (opinion of POWELL, J.) (the means chosen must be "narrowly tailored" to achieve a "compelling government interest"); id., at 285 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring) (same); id., at 301-302 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting, joined by BRENNAN, J. and BLACKMUN, J.) (remedial use of race permissible if it 149 Opinion of BRENNAN, J. so in this case, however, because we conclude that the relief ordered survives even strict scrutiny analysis: it is "narrowly tailored" to serve a "compelling [governmental] purpose. Id., at 274 (opinion of POWELL, J.). 99 The Government unquestionably has a compelling interest in remedying past and present discrimination by a state actor. See ibid.; id., at 286 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring); Sheet Metal Workers, supra, at 480 (opinion of BRENNAN, J.). See also Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 763 (1976) (prevention and remedying of racial discrimination and its effects is a national policy of "highest priority"). In 1972 the District Court found, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, that for almost four decades the Department had excluded blacks from all positions, including jobs in the upper ranks. Such egregious discriminatory conduct was "unquestionably a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment." NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp., at 705. As the United States concedes, Brief for United States 21, the pervasive, systematic, and obstinate discriminatory conduct of the Department created a profound need and a firm justification for the race-conscious relief ordered by the District Court. 18 serves "important governmental objectives'" and is ""substantially related to achievement of those objectives'") (quoting University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 359 (1978)); 476 U. S., at 313 (STEVENS, J., dissenting) (both public interest served by racial classification and means employed must justify adverse effects on the disadvantaged group); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 507 (1980) (POWELL, J., concurring) (expressing concern first articulated in Bakke, supra, at 362, that review not be "strict' in theory and fatal in fact"). 18 Amici, the city of Birmingham, the city of Detroit, the city of Los Angeles, and the District of Columbia, state that the operations of police departments are crippled by the lingering effects of past discrimination. They believe that race-conscious relief in hiring and promotion restores community trust in the fairness of law enforcement and facilitates effective police service by encouraging citizen cooperation. See also Wygant, supra, at 314 (STEVENS, J., dissenting) (“[I]n a city with a recent history of racial unrest, the superintendent of police might reasonably conclude that |